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“Distant friends?” To what extent will a closer friendship make the difference in
Mexico-U.S. relations at the expense of a serious and respectful partnership? It
is commonplace to expect and desire that the bilateral relationship grow on the core
foundation of wholehearted friendship, even complicity. This approach to foreign
policy and handling proximity leads to a series of confusions and misinterpretations
of what Mexico’s national stance should be and the room for maneuver a country
has internationally in accordance with its interests and needs.
If anything is to be salvaged from the Bush administration, it is the lesson of what
went wrong back then and what could work better in the future. A bilateral relation-
ship based on the personal identification of the first executives certainly did not work
for repositioning Mexico —in a very particular moment of transition to democracy—
as the regional leader and bridge between the two Americas that it can potentially
become. On the other hand, keeping all our eggs in the immigration basket tiedMex-
ico’s hands and prevented us from advancing the rest of our interests of a bilateral
and urgent nature, especially in a context of crisis and shared economic and securi-
ty risks.
Parallel to the aforementioned lessons,Mexico has to deal with a personality prob-
lem. Historically, two attitudes have polluted the formulation and execution of its for-
eign policy. On the one hand, Mexico has struggled to create a relatively clear
distance from Washington in the eyes of the world. On the other hand, Tlatelolco
has worked persistently to guarantee the U.S. a convenient, peaceful, close relation-
ship, to the point that our northern partner has taken for granted the support and the
“alliance.” And Mexico on its own has underestimated both the need to improve
the quality of the agenda and to ensure the real character of the relationship that it
wants to establish with theU.S. Even though NAFTA, the SPP, and theMerida Initiative
are built on the understanding that there is a partnership with shared responsibilities
and duties, the three actors involved have remained far behind in the construction of
a solid, respectable partnership in all fields of the integration process.
No recipes for asymmetrical partnerships can be produced, and no model can be
replicated for a context such as that of the NorthAmerican region. The widespread
Mexican expectation is to have a partnership (especially with the U.S.) that could
lead to understanding and dealing with the natural obstacles that come with prox-
imity, embracing the opportunities to bridge the distance and take advantage of the
natural, institutional paths of communication that have emerged in the regional
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arena. Nevertheless, paths need to be blazoned that will become the channels of
communication and exchange that both sides of the road deserve and require. For
such a purpose, a prior understanding and internalization of the region as the starting
point for the U.S.-Mexico bilateral discussion is critical, however overlooked. Canada
may not have the most active frontier with the U.S., or be only peripheral for the
Mexican trade balance. Notwithstanding the lack of connectedness with its Canadian
fellows, Mexico needs to acknowledge —despite Canada’s relative reluctance to
accept it— the importance of strengthening the areas of opportunity it shares
with the more distant of its northern partners, in order to succeed regionally and
hemispherically.
The coming Obama administration poses interesting challenges for the bilateral
relationship since Mexico is not one of the top priorities on the president-elect’s for-
eign policy agenda. Nevertheless, George W. Bush’s departure unfolds the red carpet
to welcome a different attitude among the regional actors. Even though the economic
crisis, domestically and internationally, the Middle East chaos, and the repositioning
of the U.S. as the global leader top the forty-fourth president’s agenda, Obama came
to international politics with such a conciliatory, multilateral-led, and open perspec-
tive on international relations that almost every country —and particularly Mexico—
can be aware of an American turn in its foreign endeavors. This shift represents the
strongest foundation for a renewed bilateral relationship that can be boosted byMex-
ico and proposed on a less asymmetrical scheme for a partnership of the dimension
and importance of NAFTA. There is no guarantee of resonance —let alone success.
Nonetheless, the reconstruction and reinforcement of the bridges between the U.S.
and Mexico, sustained by a deep and comprehensive understanding of each other,
are the strongest step toward reducing the cultural and sensibility gap.
The stumbling blocks and constructive paths of U.S.-Mexico relations are not
exclusive to the intricate phenomenon of migration, and the present book highlights
the diversity of issues that bring both countries together in an apparently conflictive
relationship that is more cooperative than it seems. Migration is not the only clue to
solving the North American puzzle; it may be the most evident materialization of
undeniable integration, but it is certainly not the only field. The economy and secu-
rity are drawing attention away from immigration to other issues that have remained
silent or worse, underestimated. The need to disassociate foreign policy from the vic-
timized perspective recurrent in the Mexican government’s immigration discourse
may settle the path toward fully embracing the standing that the country has in the
region, as a partner, as an influence, and a middle power but from the very different
and perhaps unusual edges of the bilateral relation.
The contributions in this book share that holistic and multidimensional perspec-
tive of U.S.-Mexico linkages, in the sense that it embodies a unique composition
of dimensions ranging from the latent, never-ending discussion of migration, trade inte-
gration, and the security alliance to the emerging topics focusing on the regulation of sci-
entific developments, bilateral diplomacy, and the dynamics of rising transnational elites.
Compartmentalization of the U.S.-Mexico conundrum may be adequate for pro-
found learning and study of the multiple areas of unstoppable integration; however,
in the long run, there is a need not only to build connections among the states but also
among the issues in order to actually reduce the distance, uncertainty, and, most
importantly, the reluctance to rapprochement with our neighbors. The pieces in this
publication are a pristine example of that commitment.
José Luis Valdés-Ugalde, PhD.
Director of the CISAN
FOREWORD 9

This book came about after the presentation of a set of lectures entitled “Advanc-
ed Seminar Lecture Series on U.S.-Mexico Relations 2005,” where researchers
from the UNAM’s Center for Research on North America (CISAN) and from MSU’s
Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CLACS) had the opportunity to
present their findings to CLACS students and MSU faculty. Each of them dealt with
either a particular research topic or finding or a novel exploration of different
issues that we consider important to analyze in the current scenario of the U.S.-
Mexico relationship.
It is important to highlight that this book does not attempt to deal in a linear way
with the issues it contains, but rather to provide an open and a provocative forum for
exploring and discussing different ideas and perspectives. These essays truly reflect
the situation of the stumbling blocks of the U.S.-Mexico relations.
We purposely provided a forum to ensure that each researcher would offer a logic
and support for his or her points and then test their assumptions with participating
faculty and the audience. When we finished, we decided that the presentations were
not only rich in content but in dealing with non-traditional subjects in the relations
between the two neighbors. The experience was qualitatively stimulating to the point
that it was worth trying to present them in what today is this book.
This effort demonstrates that an increasing number of Mexican and U.S. scholars
are committed to building and advancing a constructive path for a better understand-
ing between our two countries. Therefore, the book explores a number of “selected”
issues on the U.S.-Mexican agenda. As explained later, priorities in the relationship
change because of variations in interests, unexpected events, and political environ-
ments. Some of them, like the scientific contribution, may not be on the priority list,
but nonetheless are critical topics because of the need to regulate the production of
genetically modified organisms. Another non-traditional topic included is the impor-
tance of working on each other’s public opinion. Public opinion in each country, what
each society thinks of the other, is its lowest point, and governments need to do a
better job in educating and informing citizens.
We faced a difficult task in determining what topics would be included both in the
lecture series and the book. As editors, we wanted to include every single topic affect-
ing the relationship between the two countries. But space, time, and scarce resources
forced us to limit the topics. The authors are well known scholars, media experts, and
many of them have participated as consultants or advisors for policy makers. Some of
INTRODUCTION
THE STUMBLING BLOCKS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
PATHS OF U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS
Manuel Chavez and Silvia Núñez-García
their contributions are cases placed in a complex interdependent analysis, and others
are thorough explanations where theories have not yet been developed.
Over time, the change in topics in the bi-national relationship is clear. The
issues in the U.S.-Mexican relationship have revolved around a variation of critical
themes derived from each country’s natural political economy and the forces of
domestic interests of their respective policy agendas. The issues that were a priority
in 1994 have a different importance today. For instance, in the mid-1990s, concerns
related to trade, environment and labor protection were both nations’ top priori-
ties. At the beginning of the 2000s, with the adjustment and dislocation of eco-
nomic sectors in each country due to the new free trade agreement, tariffs, quotas
and subsidies —this included Canada as well— became the top issues on the
agenda. And then came September 11, 2001, and the agenda once more chang-
ed to place security at the top, with important consequences for almost everything
else in bilateral relations. At the beginning of 2009, national security continues to
be the main concern, with two additional components: immigration control and
border security.
The book can be used in two formats: as a complementary source book for advan-
ced courses on international relations, U.S.-Mexico relations, and North American
studies; and as a scholarly resource on selected topics on U.S.-Mexico bilateral rela-
tions. A very important caveat to mention is that the authors write about questions
that have been significant over the last six years. So, there is no corresponding time-
line with a presidential administration in either country. Suffice it to say that in the
case of Mexico, it includes the administrations of Presidents Vicente Fox and Felipe
Calderón; and in the case of the United States, the first and second terms of President
George W. Bush.
The Framework of U.S.-Mexico Relations
The relationship of the United States and Mexico has been at the forefront of
both countries’ foreign relations agendas. At the beginning of the new millennium,
this vital, entwined relationship offers new challenges and opportunities. And as
neighbors, it encompasses new dynamics that challenge public policy formulation
in both nations.
However, any analysis of this relationship must start from the recognition of
each country’s specific history. The United States and Mexico not only have dif-
ferent origins but very distinct heritages. From colonial times to the process of eman-
cipation as independent nations until modern times, language, religion and cultural
differences have stressed misperceptions and reinforced negative attitudes about
one another.
Relations between these nations have never been easy, probably because Ameri-
cans and Mexicans both value national pride and patriotism. The former find their
identity in power and domination, while the latter reject foreign intervention and
discrimination. Their geographical location fits perfectly James N. Rosenau’s descrip-
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tion of a “distant proximity,” making them a social laboratory for today’s internation-
al relations.1
It is important to recognize that the origins of what makes the relationship between
the U.S. and Mexico difficult are still being debated. Whether everything started
by the mid-1800s or right after WWII is open for discussion and academic research.
What is clear is that in the early 1960s, the relationship began to increase in mag-
nitude and intensity. Flows of goods and people grew significantly during this period
making the geographical border area a critical point on the bilateral agenda.2 Likewise,
this relationship was at the forefront of the new forces of globalization and regio-
nalization.
Their traditional geographical relationship is currently embedded in numerous,
complex matrices that go beyond the border itself. These issues are economic, polit-
ical, social and cultural and offer no simple answers. Moreover, the forging of North
America as a regional economic bloc has imposed on both nations fluid and dynam-
ic interactions requiring attention not only from governments but also from their
respective societies. The strong, visible repercussions are points of contention
that offer opportunities to build on, as in the case of those who advocate eliminating
borders and those who support the construction of fences that divide.
The relationship is multifaceted and extensive, as it follows a complex model of
interdependence where decisions made on one side of the border have significant
and immediate repercussions on the other. From the “official” content of the bilater-
al agenda, which includes energy, trade and logistics, to the de facto agenda of unprece-
dented migratory flows, drug smuggling, increasing inequality, disputes over natural
resources and an expanding role of transnational NGOs and cultural interaction, the
list includes every topic imaginable.
For some time, especially at the beginning of the George W. Bush administration,
relations were cordial and promised a very constructive path. However, the 9/11 attacks
had an impact on that assumptionwhenmost of the attention of theU.S. administration
switched from regional issues to Afghanistan and Iraq, while placing national security
at the forefront of its foreign policy.
As interactions and day-to-day presence have increased, the psychological and
ideological forces of stereotyping regained ground and showed their impact by imped-
ing full mutual understanding.
Following Polish journalist Ryszard Kapu ci ski’s interpretation for understand-
ing such forces, there are three ways whereby one culture can approach “others”:
1) by declaring them enemies and thus promoting war; 2) by advocating isola-
n´s´
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1 Professor James N. Rosenau is renowned for his work on the dynamics of world politics and the overlap
of domestic and foreign affairs. He is the author of scores of articles and more than 35 books, including
Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change in Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1997).
2 Oscar Martinez writes about these benchmarks in the Introduction of the book he edited, The U.S.-
Mexican Borderlands. Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Wilmington, DE: Jaguar Books/ Schol-
arly Resources, 1996).
tionism and building fences, or 3) by building bridges to the other through com-
munication and dialogue.3
Mexico and the United States have already learned from war and conflict with
one another. At the same time, the stage of distrust between them has not been over-
come due to the reinforcement of stereotypes and myths. Arrays of ideas of cultural
superiority or imaginary threats still reproduce a perception of an ethnocentric reali-
ty, where there is no space for recognizing that we are all simultaneously diverse and
equally human.
Taking into account that the origins and current implications of free trade (the
North American Free Trade Agreement) in Mexico and the U.S. have been intensi-
vely explored from an economic, political and public policy perspective, we want to
highlight the need for reinforcing the study of the human factor. Deepening the
analysis of culture and society appears to be the next step forward for this rela-
tionship. Values and traditions are core elements for understanding the way nation-
al identities operate, and therefore essential issues for promoting alternative forms of
cooperation between U.S. and Mexican societies.
We argue that in order to overcome the stage of self-centered cultures, our coun-
tries need to recognize that interacting with one another surpasses the exchange not
only of goods and people, but of cultural values. Professor Raymond Rocco reinforces
this position by saying that “the levels of interdependence between Mexico and the
U.S. brought about by the related processes of globalization, transnationalization and
migration require the development of [new] forms of governance.”4
A clear example is the increasing number of Mexican immigrants to the United
States, as this is not only having a demographic impact on both sides of the border,
but has evolved into a model where diverse and contradictory traditions and values
result in a “cultural hybrid.”5 Through Kapu ci ski’s, it is possible to interpret that
the United States and Mexico have come to mirror each other, due to the undeni-
able interaction between them.
Likewise, today both countries converge as democratic societies where citizens
enjoy freedom of choice. Therefore, the starting point for promoting positive attitudes
toward one another is building a new political will that understands that cultural
change is unavoidable within globalization trends. Because the stage of caring for one
another —Kapu ci ski’s ultimate goal for different cultures— is not yet foreseeable
for the United States andMexico, our aim is to combat the remains of any frozen con-
flict by promoting mutual knowledge, respect and dialogue.
n´s´
n´s´
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3 See Ryszard Kapu ci ski’s detailed work about the construction of “otherness” in his Encuentro con
el otro (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2007).
4 Dr. Raymond Rocco is a professor at UCLA. His fields of expertise include political theory, race rela-
tions, ethnicity and politics.
5 Kapu ci ski’s, Encuentro, 24-25.
n´s´
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The Extent and Distinctiveness
Of U.S.-Mexican Relations
Our two countries have come to acknowledge the presence and importance of
these factors: the role and weight of their domestic agendas, the dynamics of local
needs and the relevance of working on international agreements. At any given time,
the three factors do not have the same influence on policy making. In fact, public
policies directed at one country may correspond to all three factors at a givenmoment,
while the other country may respond with a policy that corresponds to one or two
of the factors. The difficulty, now and in the future, is to ensure that those policies
are compatible with the neighbor’s remedies.
The issues that come to the top of U.S.-Mexico agenda continue to be a priority
for Mexico and of critical importance for the United States. The areas include three
levels of priority: 1) high priority, including border and logistical security, aviation and
maritime security, terrorism intelligence-sharing, migration, terrorist and drug financ-
ing and banking and military and law enforcement cooperation; 2) mid-level priority,
including energy, trade, environmental and natural resource management, health and
food safety, manufacturing, economic sector coordination and emergency manage-
ment; and 3) low priority, including education, scientific cooperation, family reunifi-
cation, child protection, labor and human rights, regional and social development and
cultural exchanges. This list is neither exhaustive nor complete, but illustrates the wide
and complex range of issues involved. Each one has a subset of areas and topics that
makes them virtually unattainable.
One area that represents a serious point of contention is migration. While immi-
gration policies and controls are polarizing in the United States, Mexicans living in
theU.S. resent the immigrant-bashing attitudes displayed inmost communities. Regard-
less of the two countries’ interactive labor market, immigration reform remains unre-
solved. Important sectors of the U.S. economy like agriculture, services, construction
and the hospitality industry, where the forces of supply and demand are at full strength,
continue to rely on immigrant labor. The situation attracted the full attention of the
United States with the recent, unprecedented rallies of thousands of migrants in Los
Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, Miami and New York. As immigrants took to
the streets, the news media provided prime-time coverage of the conditions, forces and
human side of immigration.6 Yet, the immigration reform bill, supported by the Bush
administration, was a casualty of the polarization and did not get enough support in
Congress to become law.
Border security has increased as result of a new domestic U.S. national security
policy. As never before, Washington has created new policies to increase Americans’
security and communities with extensive law enforcement, intelligence and anti-ter-
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rorism measures.7 These policies have an impact on the two countries bordering the
U.S. since they are the nations with the most active movement of people and goods
in the world. As reported by Manuel Chavez in his chapter, U.S. Homeland Security
officers on the border with Mexico perform almost one million inspections per day.
Measures that are part of the new national security policy seek primarily to deter
potential terrorism, but also to control illegal immigration and drug trafficking. The
new national security paradigm is non-negotiable; however, the programs and initia-
tives derived from it can be adjusted by open collaboration.
Likewise, trade and transportation are a combined priority item for both coun-
tries. The almost one billion dollars of trade per day is of critical importance for many
sectors of both economies, including agriculture, electronics, textiles, transportation,
auto-parts, home appliances and oil. The flow of goods and services is also part of the
economic interdependence experienced by both countries in the last 20 years. The
fully-integrated economic sectors in North America cannot be separated without
causing fatal damage to both economies.
Despite all the difficulties and arid areas of binational relations, the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), recently signed by the governments
of the U.S., Mexico and Canada (2005), is an instrument that recognizes the impor-
tance of collaboration. The federal governments developed a list of areas under secu-
rity and prosperity to coordinate bilateral and trinational efforts. The security goals
seek primarily to control border flows, air and maritime traffic and the overall secu-
rity of North America. As mentioned above, this area is not only based on the con-
trol of terrorism but on drug and illegal immigration targets. The prosperity goals are
oriented toward deepening regional economic integration and ensuring that threats
do not disrupt the flows of people and goods. Also, prosperity actions seek to better
coordinate sectors like energy, steel, transportation, agriculture, sanitation control
and the environment.
Examining Selected Issues in the Relationship
Given this complex scenario, this book offers an exploration of a selective set of
critical issues facing Mexico and the United States in the years to come. While
the issues presented here serve as a basis for understanding this difficult relation-
ship, they are neither complete nor exhaustive. They also provide some policy rec-
ommendations and ideas to be explored by policy makers.
Furthermore, as our countries grow closer, our understanding requires learning
and knowing more about each other, so this should be done not only in the classroom
or in this book, but at home and in our respective communities.
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7 The newspaper USA TODAY published a series of stories with an extensive review of the new U.S.
security anti-terror measures and their different implications for citizens’ rights. “Intelligence Bill also
an Anti-terror Catchall and Legislation Set Stage for Uniform Driver’s Licenses,” USA TODAY. Decem-
ber 16, 2004.
José Luis Valdés-Ugalde presents a comprehensive discussion of Mexico’s foreign
policy and its relationship to governance in his chapter, “Foreign Policy andGovernance
in Mexico: A Conceptual and Operational Dilemma.” He first examines the forces
behind foreign policy and the need to connect themwith the population’s general well-
being. He emphasizes the notion that political systems need tomake any policy, whether
domestic or international, jibe with the population’s well-being. All of this is present-
ed in the context of Mexico’s policy toward its powerful neighbor, the United States.
Valdés-Ugalde also examines the assumption that any foreign policy draws its main
tenets from domestic affairs, and that many countries exceed that relationship, while
others do not even include it in their calculations. He provides an example about how
former President Fox understood foreign policy as a tool for domestic development
and concluded that the plan failed because of misplaced calculations. Valdés also
provides a rich discussion of the theoretical framework for understanding global
forces and their assessment to formulate realistic foreign policy. He examines the for-
eign policy challenges Mexico currently faces and provides a fresh view of a positive,
realistic and comprehensive approach that can be taken to deal with the difficult rela-
tionship with the United States.
The chapter “Mexico-U.S. Security: A Priority for the Bilateral Agenda” by Leonar-
do Curzio recognizes the importance of national security in the relationship between
Mexico and the United States. Curzio examines the context of GeorgeW. Bush’s pre-
emptive doctrine that establishes the United States’ new military motivations derived
from the 9/11 attacks. He discussesMexico’s difficulty in acknowledging the unprece-
dented, watershed implications of the post-9/11 period in the U.S. security paradigm
that banished all previous arrangements.
Curzio elaborates on U.S. Homeland Security’s official discourse about the logic
of cooperation withMexico on security matters. He examines the public statements of
the highest U.S. federal security official, and then contrasts that with the reactions
byMexican federal officials.He further writes that the new security circumstancesmark
a turning point in the traditional interactions of Mexico with the U.S. on military and
law enforcement cooperation, leading to the creation of the 2005 Security and Pros-
perity Partnership of North America. He notes the inability of Mexican political
actors in dealing practically and objectively with these new realities.
Curzio also ponders the daily intersection of forces of integration and security bet-
ween the two countries. He cites the increasing volumes of trade, visitors, migrants and
also dependency on local resources. He concludes by outlining the paradoxical situation
that both countries face for coexisting under these new circumstances.
The broader implications of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North Ame-
rica (SPP) is examined byManuel Chavez in his chapter “Information, NewsMedia and
Diplomacy under the Security and Prosperity Partnership of NorthAmerica: Increasing
Cooperation in Turbulent Times.” He examines SPP contents, requirements and com-
mitments and states that the partnership is a new formal arrangement to enhance
structural conditions between the U.S., Mexico and Canada. He also shows how the
automotive sector, as an integrated manufacturing model in North America, is facing
multiple challenges that the SPP acknowledges and attempts to aid.
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Chavez argues that the SPP seeks to deepen and strengthen the already devel-
oped economic systems that make the countries regionally interdependent with
strong contents of 9/11 U.S. national security concerns. He also points out that
information given to the general public about the SPP has been confusing and con-
tradictory, creating a hostile public environment, especially in the United States.
And he states that the North American regional agenda depends on active engage-
ment by the three governments to provide and use information and institution
building particularly in areas that interact with each other on daily basis. He describes
the premises of the SPP, placing them in the context of how the media have present-
ed it to the general public, contrasting at the same time the coverage in each coun-
try. His results show that (dis)information has hindered its potentiality and makes
a strong case for the use of a sophisticated model of public diplomacy to actively
incorporate the news media.
The article by Silvia Núñez-García, “Emerging Influences in Contemporary U.S.-
Mexico Relations,” attempts to explore the feasibility of recognizing the formation of
new elites at the transnational level. Her starting point is the increasing interaction
between Mexican and U.S. societies, giving way to unprecedented activities affect-
ing individual and collective behavior.
The basic premise of her analysis is the recognition that the formation of their
traditional elites has been different, due to particular histories and cultural back-
grounds.
Nevertheless, Núñez seeks to stimulate a debate on the current potential of high-
ly visible transnational actors (Mexican-American social activists and Mexican-Ameri-
can entrepreneurs) who are key players in a new social fabric. In this context in which
the driving force behind power can be either politics or the economy, these transna-
tional elites could pave the way to its construction. Addressing the role of the U.S.
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, she illus-
trates the relevance of institutional arrangements for forging new influential actors
on the transnational level.
Elaine Levine’s article “MexicanMigration to the United States,” describes migra-
tion between Mexico and the U.S. as commonplace ever since the two countries
redefined their border in 1848. Her chapter discusses the characteristics and
most recent changes in this process and highlights the factors determining its
continued growth. In discussing these issues, she sheds light on how and why the
immigration debate has become so controversial in the U.S. today.
Levine explains that over the years economic conditions in both countries
greatly facilitated —and in fact propitiated— a large increase in undocumented
migration. The persistent wage differential between the two countries makes jobs
that are undesirable for many native-born U.S. workers attractive to Mexicans.
Migration provides not only an escape valve for workers the Mexican economy
cannot absorb, but also generates foreign exchange and income flows from the remit-
tances those workers send back home. Further, she mentions that nativist senti-
ments and xenophobic attitudes make immigration policy a highly sensitive issue
in the U.S. Moreover, recent immigration legislation and border controls designed
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to keep unauthorized migrants out have caused the opposite effect by prompting
those who manage to enter the U.S. to stay for longer periods of time, giving rise to
more permanent settlement.
Monica Gambrill’s chapter, “The ‘Maquiladorization’ of the Mexican Manufactu-
ring Industry under NAFTA,” analyses the process whereby manufacturing wages have
been reduced to the level paid in the maquiladora industry. Her objective is to deter-
mine the extent to which economic liberalization has operated to the detriment of
industrial workers and the development of manufacturing in Mexico. To do this, she
carefully separates the impact that the two major economic crises have had on wages
from that which can fairly be attributed to free trade, focusing on GATT and NAFTA.
This industry-wide comparison is then split into the different branches of industry
to increase the number of comparisons between general manufacturing andmaquilado-
ras. She detects three types of responses to free trade: branches of manufacturing that
cut their wages exactly to the maquiladora level; branches that fall even further below
this level; and branches that have been able to maintain their wages significantly
above this minimum. The author examines the structural and political reasons behind
these different wage policies and, based on that, makes policy recommendations.
In Edit Antal’s chapter, “The United States and Mexico in the Face of Scientific
Uncertainty: Regulating Genetically Modified Organisms,” the author takes a com-
prehensive look at the challenges for Mexico and the United States of the two coun-
tries’ discordant regulations. She includes an analysis based on the differences
between the decision-making process, regulations, institutions and actors in the two
countries.
By crossing elements from political economy, participatory democracy and com-
parative public policy studies, Antal differentiates U.S. deregulation strategy for genet-
ically modified organisms (GMOs) with that of Mexico, which seeks to protect its
unique, world-class biodiversity. Her article analyses the profit-oriented trend promot-
ed by the U.S. in accordance with policies favoring GMOs by means of advancing sci-
ence and technology. On the other hand, by focusing on the case of corn, Mexico’s
ancient cultural symbol, Antal develops her argument about NAFTA’s impact on Mex-
ican peasants, who are defending their right to oppose the unfair competition creat-
ed by GMOs and publicly denouncing the risks to their cultural traditions and the
environment, in the absence of scientifically proven security standards.
The Future of the Relationship
Signs of Optimism?
We believe that the future of the relationship rests on three possible scenarios: a
pessimistic one marked by the Bush administration’s abandonment of Latin Ame-
rica and, especially of Mexico. A second, frankly optimistic scenario, supported by
U.S. and Mexican economic sectors including chambers of commerce and industry.
And a third one, somewhere in between, where the parties realize that they share
too much in both their economies and their territorial space, to afford to lose it.
INTRODUCTION 19
The gloomy scenario is based on domestic ideological forces in either country
pushing for retrenchment and isolationism. If these forces continue expanding they
will make conditions more difficult to manage. Retraction and unilateral actions will
damage the relationship and the spirit of collaboration. The optimist scenario is the
one forged by the intensity of economic forces, continuing academic exchanges,
the persistent social and cultural exchange between the two countries and the large
number of U.S. citizens living in Mexico.8 The third alternative is a plain working
scenario that seeks to manage the substantial, profound content of the relationship.
This pragmatic scenario focuses on the existing realities that will continue to subsist
in the years to come.
Active stumbling blocks are nativism, ethnocentrism and the seemingly endless
plain discrimination evident all over the United States. Hate crimes against Lati-
nos in the U.S. FBI report. In fact, 819 people were victimized in anti-Latino hate
crimes in 2006.9 Samuel Huntington’s incendiary comments in his book Who Are
We? The Challenges of Americas’ National Identity are close to being doctrine and cat-
echism for demagogic TV and radio commentators like CNN’s Lou Dobbs, FOX’s Bill
O’Reilly and radio-talk-show host Rush Limbaugh. Unfortunately forMexico and the
United States, these destructive forces seem to be in the lead at this time.
Some binational efforts deserve a chance to succeed, like theAnnual U.S.-Mexico
Border Governors’ Conference, the efforts of the NorthAmerican Development Bank
and the Binational Environmental and Health Commission. The conference of gov-
ernors seems to attract enough media and political attention to impact regional and
national policies, but little progress is shown after the meetings. Likewise, both gov-
ernments need to embark more aggressively on public diplomacy. The role of public
diplomacy needs to be understood as an instrument to facilitate understanding, mu-
tual respect and cooperation. This type of diplomacy needs to be reconsidered and
implemented as a permanent feature of the binational relationship.
Citizens of both nations also play an important role in exercising public diploma-
cy. Examples of this are the many organized communities along the U.S.-Mexico bor-
ders that have proven successful in understanding one another. By identifying an
objective, such as the preservation of the environment, they have learned to focus on
common problems. Communication is therefore the core strategy in developing a new era
of bilateral collaboration.
Lastly, the use of the media by diplomats is necessary for forging and influencing
proper information about each country’s culture and decisions. Many top-level fed-
eral officials in Washington do not agree with this view, and they do little to reduce
misinformation and disinformation. This in turn can be interpreted as being neutral
about them. The same happens with Mexican diplomats in the U.S. capital who are
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popular because of their absence in the broadcast and print media. The new reality
requires each country’s officials to shift from neutrality to commitment. The succes-
sor to the Bush administration will need to be effective in creating policies toward
Mexico, without causing any major confrontations with the United States’ third lar-
gest trade partner. The intensity of interaction between the two countries is undeni-
able and requires the full attention of national, state and local governments.
In an era of declining trustworthiness, we hope this book will shed light and pro-
vide ideas about the two countries’ challenges and new ways for interacting. It is a
step toward continuing the dialogue, and ultimately, we would rather approach real-
ity as a promising adventure and not an insoluble dilemma. We invite our readers to
review and examine each chapter as a way to stimulate the bilateral debate, as well
as to build a constructive path for overcoming the current stumbling blocks.
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Introduction
Vicente Fox taking office as the first non-PRI president on December 1, 2000 was
a watershed in Mexican politics. On the one hand, it meant the beginning of a
transformation of the political regime, which had been dominated by a non-dem-
ocratic political tradition and a political class without a coherent long-term polit-
ical project. Mexico was a country with a closed political system, controlled by a
one-party regime, and with a relatively authoritarian order. Therefore, a compre-
hensive political transition was needed to make institutional change and the con-
solidation of new democratic rules possible. Hence, the new administration was the
crystallization of a long struggle to create the essential conditions for turning Mexico
into a modern democratic nation. The purpose of this was, in the first place, to secure
the values embraced by liberal democracy through modernization, and, secondly, to
guarantee that progress within the framework of this broad political development
would bring about the climate needed to create the basis for the economic opportu-
nities required to achieve the prosperity postponed for almost three decades.
Within this framework, in the past, bothMexico’s domestic political climate and its
interaction abroad had been quite rigid. Domestic change in Mexico occurred
alongside neo-globalization,2 particularly taking into account the international com-
munity’s widespread demand for radical democratic change in Mexican politics,
and the final outcome of moving toward the country’s democratic renovation. At
the same time, the challenge of both political and economic modernization requir-
ed that Mexico transform the polity and the economy to maintain the balance
* Director of the UNAM’s Center for Research on North America (CISAN).
1 I thank Bernadette Vega, my research assistant, for her valuable support in the final editing of this
text, originally presented at the Advanced Seminar Lecture Series on U.S.-Mexico Relations, spon-
sored by the UNAM’s Center for Research on North America (CISAN) and MSU’s Center for Latin
American and Caribbean Studies, held in July 2008.
2 This concept has recently been coined to replace the term “globalization” in order to explain today’s
economic process, in which the aim is to improve macroeconomic indicators regardless of growing
dependency and the widening gap between rich and poor. It is a neoliberal globalization emphasiz-
ing privatization, liberalization, free trade and widespread democratization, but using for these goals
existing widespread technological innovations and generally disregarding the population’s welfare.
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between the need for a historic domestic change and the prevailing international
reality. To a great extent, this expectation was fulfilled by deepening the domestic
political process, placing Mexico in a decisive stage on the path of economic mod-
ernization and political progress.
For better or for worse, globalization represented both an opportunity and a
challenge for Mexico, since ostensibly the opening and the strengthening of the
economy would simultaneously ensure an opening of the political system. Since
the end of the 1980s, important actors in the international community had begun
a full transformation of its socio-political and economic environment. On the one
hand, almost every single country underwent its own process of integration into
regional market blocs and the creation of a new normative framework, so much so
that almost none of the international actors remained unattached to some form of
geopolitical arrangement.3 On the other hand, international society reached a new
level of organization and an even more autonomous international civil society
emerged, its dynamism enhancing the political presence of a novel and belligerent
international citizenry. Mexico was no exception.
In the context of Mexico’s progress toward a new democratic order, a wide
spectrum of possibilities opened up for the country. One of the most representa-
tive fields where this happened was the international sphere, where old risks were
apparently in the process of being overcome. The new administration’s main
statements from December 1 onward —and even before that, when Fox was still
a presidential candidate— emphasized the need to equate the opening of the
economy and the democratic outcome of the July 2000 elections with citizens’
rights. Moreover, its foreign policy clearly stated that Mexico’s insertion into the
new international reality had to be produced by making respect for human rights
a central component of the democratic project.4 This was one of the avenues for
consolidating the democratic legitimacy obtained at the polls. Thus, the defense
of human rights was both a trigger and a launching pad for democracy. It was also
one of the main steps for enhancing the international legitimacy that the 2000
elections had produced. On the other hand, it embodied a component of an inter-
national trend, from which Mexico could not divorce itself.
Contrary to what had happened in the past when old-guard politicians conceived
of foreign relations from a conventional perspective, during the Fox administration,
foreign policy was intended to be a priority to ensureMexico’s entry into the new cen-
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tury’s globalized order as a dynamic actor capable of presenting itself as a paradigm
of modernity. The Mexican president was supposed to know that the current con-
text of both the continental and international order presented a broad spectrum of
possibilities for this country. Whereas Mexico’s standing within the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) placed it in an even more important position as a
potential Latin American litigant than its peers, the competing middle powers of the
region, Brazil —and to some extent Venezuela— were overtaking the regional stand-
ing that geo-strategically used to belong to the Mexican realm of potentialities.
In this regard, the foreign policy project was designed along two main axes.
Owing to strategic considerations, they deserve prior attention since they are indis-
pensable for Mexico to develop an efficient and relevant foreign policy to address
the country’s real needs. The first is the construction of a strategic relationship with the
United States, and the second, the active participation of Mexico in the configuration
of the new international system. Jorge G. Castañeda, Minister of ForeignAffairs from
2000 to 2003, once and for all unraveled the official vacillation between principles
and interests by stating that what the administration wanted was to ensure the ade-
quate protection and promotion of the country’s interests in the contemporary inter-
national scenario.Within themost rational and realistic paradigm, Jorge G. Castañeda
argued that the two axes were compatible, but above all inseparable because of the
extremely concentrated dependence of the asymmetrical bilateral relationship.5
And yet, the challenge was misunderstood and greatly confused with another
feature of bilateral relations with the United States: namely, the long-standing and
allegedly exceptional friendship-led relationship dominating several of the decisions
and reactions of the overestimated transitional government. All of this eliminated the
possibility of both embracing its domestic momentum of full democratic validation
and taking on the responsibility of reshaping the framework under which Mexican
foreign policy could have better performed its internationalization. Unfortunately
for Fox, this did not happen.
Likewise, Mexico was to be regarded by Canada and the U.S., among other
important actors of the industrialized world, as both an effective and a construc-
tive bridge for drawing the lines of the new regional arrangements. Among the
most relevant topics on the regional agenda were drug smuggling, migration flows,
trade, environmental issues and economic aid. At the same time, the new open-
ing of the international system allowed Mexico to start exploring the possibility of
finding other partnerships beyond the scope of its traditional relationships forged
throughout history with different actors in the hemisphere. It was about devel-
oping closer links with, among others, the countries of the European Union, Asia
and the Middle East, such as Japan and Israel. In this context, Mexico would
develop new trade relations by signing a number of agreements, all of which will
show their real potential for Mexico in the coming years.6
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For the aforementioned reasons, foreign policy became a powerful instrument
of domestic development. A new foreign relations agenda was designed so Mexico
could accomplish this international integration process. In this context, the coun-
try’s democratic legitimacy and, thus, broader room for maneuver posed a four-
fold structural challenge: 1) reinforcing the new domestic democratic reality by
ensuring that transparent local political processes slated for that year and during
the sexenio (Mexico’s six-year presidential term) strengthened the comprehensive
project for political and economic change that ushered Fox into office; 2) as a
result, Mexico was very probably going to play a prominent role in international
affairs, a vision that never materialized. The effects of this engagement in inter-
national politics were going to be at the regional level, the most important goal
being the democratic and economic transformation of the Latin American coun-
tries. By developing an independent and innovative international policy, Mexico
would have the opportunity to become both a bridge for reasonable cooperation
and a containing wall against those interests that threaten its own and the hemi-
spheric priorities; 3) consolidating the basis upon which Mexico had already
established its relative dominance within the regional sphere, such as its partner-
ship both in NAFTA and the potential new Latin American markets that President
Fox announced as priorities for Mexico’s new development goals, and, finally,
4) building a predictable foreign policy, whose strategy could primarily, efficient-
ly match objectives, priorities and outcomes that are both understandable and
easily identified with.
The election of President Vicente Fox usheredMexico into a new era. Democratic
legitimacy presented a wide range of opportunities and responsibilities. The advan-
tages of a democratic transition in a country as complex as Mexico also repre-
sented a myriad of challenges. As was already mentioned, guaranteeing Mexico’s
success in this process required that both the economic and the political variables
coincide —a need that remains to be met. However, the success of the new dem-
ocratic project depended on the following: a) the deepening of a broad democratic
transition; b) the participation of the majority of political actors in this transfor-
mation so that it produced conditions for the emergence of a stable democratic
regime; c) a strong economy; and d) Mexico’s active participation in the increas-
ingly challenging globalized arena vis-à-vis international economic conditions.
These are the challenges I will delve into more deeply theoretically and empiri-
cally in this chapter. Most importantly, I would argue that as much as foreign pol-
icy represents a window of opportunity within a very incomplete democratic
reform process, it has also been an obstacle for accomplishing the democratic gov-
ernment’s most cherished domestic goals,7 to the extent that the intimate link
between domestic and foreign policy created a great crisis of legitimacy in both
fields.
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The Foreign Policy Labyrinth
I should begin by stating —and not even Mexico’s principled foreign policy can
be exempt from this— that neither foreign policy nor the reality surrounding the
strategic decisions taken in defense of national interests is immutable. Foreign
policy must sometimes change its programmatic and basic priorities as changes
occur in history.
Any modern state must design a foreign policy. This stems from the circum-
stances. In the first place, as Lenin once observed, the state is not a cloistered
island, but a member of a society of states in which it inevitably participates. In
the second place, in this society of states, in theory, power should not be central-
ized but distributed among them, not in equal amounts but equitably. While for-
eign policy is similar to any other state activity, such as guaranteeing education
and health services or ensuring law and order, it differs from them to the extent
that the state exercises only imperfect control —if any at all— over the world in
which it lives.
According to Roscoe Pound, domestic policy exerts social control through the
law. Foreign policy, for its part, consists of the use of political influence to get
other states to exercise their executive and legislative power in a way that satisfies
the state in question. At the same time that this consideration is necessary in the
process of any foreign policy, we cannot underestimate the strength of the unpre-
dictable, of what Fisher once called “the play of the contingent and the unfore-
seen.”8 To this, we should add what can only be considered the perverse logic of
international events, the tendency for situations to arise that were not only unan-
ticipated but which the states made all their best efforts to avoid.9
Change or Continuity
What foreign policy is not subject to day-to-day pressures that question even its
historic alliances, the common interests it professes with friendly states and the
sacrifices it can make in the name of accommodating other powers and, in crisis
situations, hostile powers? What foreign policy is not subject to important modi-
fications when a place must be found in the world and the regional concert in the
context of changing its own local political conditions, and of a world transition of
still unsuspected dimensions? The price of foreign policy effectiveness is perma-
nent vigilance against the irremediable changes in world politics. In no other way
can a foreign policy be conceived that is at the same time strategic (visionary and
long-term), pragmatic and resolute (providing concrete solutions to the needs
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posed by world events). In that sense, the question of whether a policy must be
guided by principles —in my opinion, a relatively weak argument— transcends
even the legal and constitutional discussion.10
Nevertheless, it is true that foreign policy is an endless dialogue between the
powers of continuity and the powers of change.11 We have, first of all, the contin-
ued existence through the years of the general aspects of the international system
in which states live and which, sooner or later, their external behavior will help to
configure. Regardless of any Byzantine discussions that may arise, above all in
societies like Mexico’s that have not yet created solid institutional arrangements
to give strength to their economic and political modernization projects, the sur-
prising aspect of states’ encounters with the international system in situations of
low-level, medium-level or radical crisis, is that through time, we find ourselves
adjusting to states’ circumstantial requirements. This may be, for example, by
practicing a balance of power (when dealing with hegemonic or medium-sized
powers) that might counter their ideologies, or by refusing to continue a foreign
policy that ignores universal principles on which its own political genesis should
be based, not to mention the future of its march toward achieving those two elu-
sive spirits: progress and modernity.12
What is more, in this system, geographical space may remain immobile but the
geopolitical scenarios of the different states and their geographical relations have
enormous mobility; certainly technology, social movements, regime changes and
even crises can change the implications of the physical factors and make them
transcend the merely physical frontiers, imposing a transnational character on the
interaction not only among states but also among nations and societies.
This is the case of the relations that develop in the framework of NAFTA and
among European nations, for instance. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out
that it can be the case of societies and nation-states that have been affected by
changes in government and ideology —even revolutionary changes— in which there
are no necessarily substantial modifications in the way their foreign policy is con-
ducted. But here, particularly in this chapter, where we are discussing the basic
aspects of the not-always-felicitous relationship between domestic and foreign
policy, it seems imperative to bring up some of the differences in the functions of
ideology in foreign policy: 1) uniting a country psychologically; 2) offering a scale
of values so people know what to support and what to reject; 3) furnishing a frame
of reference that allows people to become aware of just how disconcerting inter-
national reality can become and to justify government efforts to deal with it, even
through basic changes in strategy; and 4) providing a prism through which states
perceive the international realities their foreign policy must be based on. Without
ideology, a country does not precisely die, but it would be relatively rudderless
when deciding what to approve or disapprove. Conversely, it can be said that in
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ordinary circumstances, we can expect that rational calculations about national
interests and ideological schema go hand in hand; most modern ideologies are
extremely malleable, and even more so when confined to “the international.”13
Changing Foreign Policy Realities and Options
Thus, how is it that, if everything is fixed and orderly in foreign policy, a govern-
ment or state of any size can be a free agent or actor in the execution of its inter-
national policy? In any case, we can say that, historically, policy makers have
found that their options are predetermined at the domestic policy level, yes, but
to a much greater extent in international matters, even more than they perceived
or rationally calculated before taking office. This does not mean that foreign pol-
icy makers do not make mistakes in the course of their rational deliberations, all
of which is implicit in the implementation of (foreign) policies and can hardly be
fully understood —and is sometimes even underestimated— by most of the pub-
lic. As a matter of fact, in a democracy, state policies are not exactly fashioned to
be understood by a broad public, although they do require a sphere of legitimacy
that rests on the institutional organization of an institutionalized government —
whether firmly institutionalized or not— that all modern states and societies
should have, to allow for subtle conditions for preservation and preventing risks.
However, the freedom that does matter in foreign policy questions —and weighs
critically in most cases— is the ability to decide among relatively few options. A
recurring image for illustrating this reasoning is a card game. Just like in cards,
the government’s hand is a result of the circumstances: there is no freedom to play
a card that you do not have in your hand; of the cards in your hand, there are
always one or perhaps two that are the “right” card to play at that stage of the game.
It is the “right” one in the sense that when the game is over and all the hands are
face up on the table (and part of the story reconstructed), that card was the right
one to play under the circumstances, with the understanding that the player was
ready to win the game. The reason the player makes a mistake by not playing the
decisive card at the decisive moment can be because of personality, political or
religious beliefs or his/her partisan loyalties, or because of a lack of ideally perfect
information. But in my opinion, there is no doubt that there is a decisive card,
whose identity is not governed by the player’s personal traits, but by the very way
the game is going, its rhythm. The game generates a “climate” or “climates” in which
concrete policies develop and force decisions that are not always subject to the
rigor of consensus: they are decisions that in a democratic environment stem from
a legitimate power whose responsibility is to act, first with a sense of commitment
to the obligations assumed in the international sphere and, second, that require,
of course, a statesman’s vision.
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Mexican Foreign Policy Objectives
And Times of Transition
What, then, is foreign policy? What do governments seek from it? In effect, it
must be assumed that foreign policy stems from the intimate interaction between
the internal and the external. It is a matter of defending interests more than of
national interests —interests that are served or interests that must wait to be sat-
isfied; not all interests are satisfied. It is a matter of the representation of inter-
ests emblematic of the national ethos. This is, I believe, the basis that motivates
the work of a leader in foreign policy: principles are insinuated through political
representation, and national interests are fulfilled in the light of a political reality.
In a liberal democracy such as the one Mexico is trying with great difficulties
to achieve and consolidate, the debate centers on what interests are defensible
and which, if necessary, can be sacrificed. All of this happens in the framework of
the implementation of foreign policy. The question is 1) whether some interests
are going to be damaged, and 2) which interests they should be. The hierarchy of
interests that a government tries to defend or refuses to decline is based on desires,
needs and a state’s demands in the international order, and on a national consensus
that is sufficiently firm so as to support and sustain leaders whose responsibility
is to represent the state in international policy.
In the framework of globalization, the state must reorganize itself and therefore
also the social relations that constitute it, so that these lost ties of the state com-
munity are reconstructed. External sovereignty cannot represent a state before the
rest of the states if the state does not recognize itself and define its personality and
sense of identity. It must be strong from within in order to be able to defend its
national interests in an interdependent world, and simultaneously, it must recog-
nize the rights of the rest of the states that make up international society. The cur-
rent challenge for each national state is to strengthen internal sovereignty.
Recent social phenomena, the transformation of national and international
relations and the reorganization of the economy and society undoubtedly show us
that in the last 20 years the world has become a different place. To paraphrase
Zaki Laïdi, globalization has turned into an important social representation of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.14 Globalization is a socio-political phenom-
enon related to the end of the Cold War: after the fall of the Soviet Union, it
emerged as the triumph of the democratic-liberal model. It has included the uni-
versalization of certain ideological, cultural and value models like those identified
with the principles of democracy and liberalism. In addition, it is commonly
understood as the transition between the reunification of the world and the dis-
appearance of national borders; it is related to processes of regionalization, cul-
tural harmonization and the transformation of the national state.
Globalization and recent political changes bring us face to face with a vast his-
torical and cultural diversity not explicable in the usual way. These changes have
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generated transformations in all spheres of human relations and in the dynamics
of international society, which in turn spur the creation of new theories to explain
and make reasonable order out of these new international social configurations.
The nature of the “new world order” is by no means obvious. With the end of
the Cold War, political expectations were dashed, as were models that explained
the bi-polar order and attempted to sketch its possible future (very often from uni-
formity, like “real socialism”). What is certain is that the transition from the old
bi-polar order to this new order caused disquiet and academic and political uncer-
tainty about whether theoretical elements are still valid or if others need to be incor-
porated.
After the end of the bi-polar order, all states have redefined their place in the
new international configuration. Basic concepts like sovereignty, independence,
national interest and national and international security have changed as the
objectives they pursue also changed. Formulation and execution of the national
foreign policies should therefore be designed accordingly.
The Mexican Paradox
For the first time in the history of Mexico since the Mexican Revolution, foreign
policy has acquired great importance and transcendence and has been more
closely linked to the success of domestic policy. For the last two presidential
terms, Mexico had sought to be present in and participate more in multilateral
discussions and negotiations for a simple reason, which, although not the only
one, was perhaps a kind of catalyst: the economy became the central focus of
Mexican international policy. As the country internationalized, the government
had to abandon its “anti-U.S.” stance, opt for cooperation instead of conflict and
forge a partnership mainly in economic but also in political terms with the United
States and Canada. The partnership-building process required a broader defini-
tion of the Mexican foreign policy paradigm and of the national perception of the
interests it wanted to pursue as an active international actor. The undeniable fact
is that the partnership was a demand that came from the de facto integration that
has always exceeded the institutional framework of the North American bloc. The
most representative —though not very successful— outcome of this new institu-
tionalized interconnectedness is the proposal for creating a sphere of cooperation
under the principle of policy unification and coordination to promote regional
security and prosperity (the SPP). This partnership can be praised as a successful
outcome for U.S. foreign policy that advanced—and up to a certain point imposed—
its national interest to protect U.S. citizens, notwithstanding the fact that Mexico
or Canada would need to include other elements to defend their security in the
region.
Despite the fact that foreign policy has changed in practice, its discussion has
been postponed. This is why the legal principles that frame the formulation and
execution of Mexico’s foreign policy are becoming more and more incongruous
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with time.15 The aforementioned principles are contained in Article 89 of the Mex-
ican Constitution since the reform of 1988, and refer to the guiding foreign poli-
cy principles that the chief executive should implement:16
1) Non-intervention;
2) The self-determination of nations;
3) A peaceful solution to controversy;
4) The elimination of threats or the use of force in international relations;
5) The legal equality of states;
6) International cooperation for development; and
7) The fight for peace and international security.17
Furthermore, the much sought-after reform should go beyond the debate on
principles and strategies and contemplate the broad, effective participation of all
actors involved in Mexico’s foreign policy-making process (i.e. the president, Con-
gress, political parties, civil society, the private and academic sectors, etc.). What ini-
tially was interpreted as a rather generalized consensus could have been more
accurately characterized as a lack of interest on the part of other actors and an
executive branch monopoly in the field.18 Only a small governmental elite partic-
ipated in this decision making, thus rendering the democratic foreign policy
process precarious. For example, traditionally, the executive has had greater power
over the formulation of foreign policy than the legislature, even though Congress
—and exclusively the Senate— is the body that constitutionally should sanction
the decisions previously made by the executive branch.19 This subordination was
a direct result of Congress’s lack of political independence and the over-concen-
tration of information in the executive branch. To a great extent, it evinced one of
the structural problems of the Mexican political regime: that is, the absence of a
coherent and consistent balance of power.
As the twentieth century advanced and the international context changed, the
incompatibility of those principles became increasingly evident. The Mexican gov-
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16 These principles are inserted in a multitude of international instruments that Mexico is a part of,
having subscribed, approved, ratified and adhered to them: the Charter of the Organization of Ame-
rican States (ratified November 23, 1948) reformed by the Buenos Aires Protocol of 1967, and by
the Cartagena of Indias Protocol of 1985; UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (October 24,
1975) containing the Declaration on Principles of International LawConcerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. See Edmundo
Hernández-Vela Salgado, Diccionario de política internacional, 5th ed. (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1999).
17 Alonso Gómez Robledo Verduzco, “Mexican Foreign Policy: its Fundamental Principles”,Mexican Law
Review no. 3 (January-June 2005) IIJ-UNAM, at http://info8.juridicas.unam.mx/cont/3/arc /arc5.htm.
18 See Rafael Velázquez Flores, Factores, bases y fundamentos de la política exterior de México (Mexico
City: Plaza y Valdés, 2007).
19 See Articles 73 and 76 of the Mexican Constitution in Secretaría de Gobernación, Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 8th edition (Mexico City: SG, 2001), 66-72 and 74-75.
ernment used foreign policy doctrine with increasing discretion to present itself
as a relatively weak country that had to resort to the law to defend itself from exter-
nal intervention. Nevertheless, for a long time, and despite being an anachronism,
the principle of non-intervention and the Estrada Doctrine20 basically made it
possible for the Mexican government, through a very intelligent maze of relation-
ships and complicities, to be authoritarian without any international ally being
able or wanting to intercede. In some cases, explicit accords were established, like
in the case of Cuba, not to intervene in each others’ internal affairs in exchange
for mutual support to further both countries’ authoritarian political models. Mex-
ico’s ambivalence, expressed through the so-called “agreement to disagree,”21 shap-
ed Mexico-U.S. relations for decades, in the sense that it was the only arrangement
that allowed a margin of relative independence for Mexico regarding the United
States in foreign policy implementation, without endangering Mexico’s most impor-
tant bilateral relationship, and without officially compromising with any of the
parties involved. Despite this, Mexico intervened actively in the Central American
process in the 1980s and before that, in the Chilean events of 1973. It was a rela-
tively comfortable foreign policy —although at the same time it had two faces— for
an authoritarian regime that cautiously used it as a smoke screen to hide the enor-
mous socio-political contradictions inside the country.
In that sense, Mexico’s foreign policy, like that of any other country, depends
on the international conditions of the state in question, but also on the interna-
tional historic environment and context. Domestic political conditions have chang-
ed gradually in recent years, and, as I already mentioned, the year of democratic
alternation in office, beginning in July 2000, was particularly important. Some
political actors’ attempts to defend a supposed tradition that they think is idealis-
tic, legal and principle-based are surprising, however, and they fight for its con-
tinued implementation arguing that continuity is a sign of effectiveness, owing to
the apparent status in the international arena thatMexico used to enjoy. Nevertheless,
if one of international society’s characteristics is dynamism, it is also reasonable
to say that foreign policy changes in accordance with international politics,
adjusting itself to historical circumstances to be effective.
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20 This doctrine, also known as “the Mexico Doctrine,” “the Mexican Doctrine” or even “the Ortiz
Rubio Doctrine,” basically makes reference to the recognition of states and the assumption of a right
to pass judgment critically on the legal capacity of foreign regimes, a right that is detrimental to the
sovereignty of other states. Consequently, the Mexican government thereafter confined itself to main-
taining or withdrawing its diplomatic representatives, as it deemed appropriate from time to time,
without any regard to accepting or not accepting any change of government. This doctrine gives wel-
come evidence to the important distinction between recognition of a new state and recognition of
a new government. See Philip C. Jessup, “The Estrada Doctrine,” The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, vol. 25, no. 4 (October 1931): 719-723.
21 Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, “La seguridad mexicana vista por Estados Unidos,” in Sergio Aguayo Queza-
da and Bruce Michael Bagley, comps., En busca de la seguridad: aproximaciones a la seguridad nacio-
nal (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1990), 306.
In a complex, conflictive, permanently changing world, a policy emphasizing tradition
and continuity (unchanging principles and objectives) as its most outstanding traits
could well be a policy that lags behind and is not very flexible. A policy that does not
change and better itself is a rigid, old-fashioned policy that will not march to the rhythm
of global change.22
Mexico’s traditional foreign policy model has changed in practice without this
being recognized in discourse or in theory. For that reason, I will mention some of
the most noteworthy components of today’s Mexican foreign policy:
1) Nationalism has been replaced by internationalism;
2) Independence has been replaced by interdependence;
3) Principles have been replaced by interests;
4) Legalism and symbolism have been replaced by pragmatism;
5) Idealism has been replaced by realism;
6) Being unrelated to domestic policy has been replaced by the effective linkage to
domestic policy; and
7) Passiveness has been replaced by activity.
The internationalism and activity that Mexico tried to exhibit during the first
democratic administration was clear in several efforts to exert international lead-
ership, the climax of which was its period as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council in 2002-2003. Other efforts that presented the new face of its
pro-active foreign policy were the launching of the Puebla Panama Plan; the can-
didacy of Ernesto Derbez, Minister of Foreign Relations, for general secretary of
the Organization of American States; the hosting of several international confer-
ences; and the campaign for United Nations reform. Regarding the latter, Mexico
pushed an agenda completely motivated by national interests when in April 2004,
the president launched the Group of Friends for the Reform of the United Nations,
aiming to reach “an integral understanding of the reform process that would allow
the United Nations to address the most delicate challenges and threats of each
historical cycle, not focusing exclusively on the composition of the Security Coun-
cil.”23 However, it was Mexico’s proposal to enlarge the Security Council that overt-
ly demonstrated its competition with Brazil for the prize of regional leadership.
Mexico tried to make its commitment to multilateralism as clear as possible, as
well as the effort to distance itself somewhat from the traditional associations the
international community used to take for granted, such as the unspoken agreement
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22 Humberto Garza Elizondo, “Desequilibrios y contradicciones en la política exterior de México,” Foro
Internacional, no. XXIV (April-June 1984): 538.
23 The counterparts invited were Germany, Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Spain, Japan,
Kenya, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Singapore and Sweden. See Misión Permanente
de México ante Naciones Unidas, Grupo de amigos de la reforma de las Naciones Unidas, at http://
www.un.int/mexico/index_reform.htm.
with Cuba during the annual human rights condemnation and the idea of being
subordinated to U.S. foreign policy interests —the greatest show of intended dis-
tancing was Mexico’s refusal to acquiesce to the Iraq invasion. At the same time,
Mexico was advancing its perceived national interests, frequently through very
thoughtless pragmatism that could have been mistaken for historic indifference,
diplomatic lack of concern and fragmented maneuvers. The pursuit of the “whole
enchilada” is the case that best portrays this new foreign policy framework in
which interests are prioritized, principles disregarded and policies are randomly
adjusted as a simple reaction to contingencies.24
The component highlighting the alleged effective linkage to domestic policy
must be nuanced: effectiveness depends on the sphere of action, self-evaluation,
the domestic and international impact of the recognition of areas of concern and, for
some specific cases, the degree of cooperation of the transnational partner. In the
fight against drug-trafficking, domestic policy went hand-in-hand with U.S. security
demands and the international condemnation of organized crime. In contrast, the
migratory issue involved several inconsistencies: first, since domestic policy is still
behind in recognizing Mexico’s responsibility for the push factors of migration, and,
secondly, there is no migration policy that would finally deal with the impressive
incoherence between the abandoned southern border and the overexposed northern
border realities. The national human rights deficit that the Mexican government
recently has openly condemned in multilateral forums also must not be forgotten.
It is not that Mexico’s foreign policy was not realistic, pragmatic and active or
that it did not take into account and act in accordance with specific interests.
What should be recognized is exactly the opposite: that is, that it did do all of this,
but covertly, always behind a “neutral” and—why not say it?— simulated discourse
and as the offspring of a frankly worn out —if not decomposed— post-revolution-
ary regime. It is time to make what is happening in practice unreservedly legiti-
mate and legal.
Historically, it has been said that there was a contradiction between the prin-
ciples and interests of Mexican foreign policy, despite this vision expressing a
false dichotomy that in turn stems from an erroneous idea of international socie-
ty (which, by the way, permeates the legislature today): it is believed to be static
and that, therefore, it acts in accordance with a pre-established order that has
predetermined the social and political roles of the states that make up interna-
tional society. While it is true that developing countries do not have the same
power of negotiation as developed countries, this idea should be rethought to assume
that principles and interests are compatible with each other if they are put for-
ward coherently in an interdependent and interconnected world. The use of the
law and of principles of doctrine in favor of internal development is not opposed
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to their defense in international forums through the promotion and proposal of
bilateral, trilateral and multilateral initiatives.
Principles of doctrine help as counterweights to the inequalities among states,
but are insufficient to fully exercise foreign policy for two reasons: 1) it would be
very hard to disagree with them since Mexican foreign policy principles are the
same as those of international law, and, therefore, they are general and inflexible;
and 2) they can be used to explain and argue a kind of behavior that they can,
however, only justify post-factum.25
It is a good idea to clearly and openly incorporate a dose of realism into the
exercise of foreign policy to avert the ambiguity in which Mexico has historically
been situated (being in everything and with everyone, but not in favor of or against
anything or anybody) and define national interests, and that policy’s priorities and
objectives. We should clarify that when we talk about realism, we are not refer-
ring to the type of policy conceived of as the exercise of power with no ideals or
values, using fraud and implemented mercilessly. As Giovanni Sartori says, this is
a mistaken conception:
Political realism is not what it is erroneously supposed to be. It is not a kind of self-
sufficient policy, something that can agree with or oppose the systems we call dem-
ocratic, socialist or others. In this continuum, there is no place for political realism
for the simple reason that it is only one element, one ingredient of each and every
one of the political positions. Every accurately descriptive explanation is a realistic
explanation, which is the same as saying that realism only leads us to the antecham-
ber of policy. Policy requires information; it needs to know reality and this is what
political realism brings to the mix, but it does so to the benefit of all and not of a
single side.26
The conviction that the application of international law is fundamental in the
development of international policy must be preserved and, what is more, vali-
dated in states’ domestic policies, and, more specifically in Mexico, imbuing inter-
national treaties (such as those referring to human rights) with the weight of the
law and enforcing them in society. However, the fact that there are no private polit-
ical interests often contrary to what is established in international law should not
be disregarded, and, precisely for that reason, active participation in multilateral
forums must be a constant. Although facts and values —understood as what they
are and what they should be— are reciprocally related, we should not forget that
they are two independent spheres that complement each other.
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26 Giovanni Sartori, Aspectos de la democracia, Rafael Castillo Dibildox, trans. (Mexico City: Limusa-
Wiley, 1965), 49-50.
We must not make the mistake of using a fact to refute a value or, vice-versa, using a
deontology to reject a manifestation of fact…. We must not fall into the mistake of
believing that the entire case can be presented in terms of a description of reality or, to
the contrary, in terms of value judgments. I mean that to encompass the entire field of
politics, we need both facts and ideals.27
Conclusion
Domestic political change cannot be divorced from the changing international
process. In the entire world, foreign policies have adapted themselves to the chang-
ing times of international reality and, to a great extent, NAFTA shows this. The pre-
eminence of the globalized era over these policies has given states no rest. The
states, for their part, have gone through an important process of transformation
to which they have convened, more or less rationally, their societies.
What is a historic fact is that in the last two decades, foreign policy issues have
had an increasing impact on domestic policy. Domestic policy, foreign policy and
international policy are three different moments of a single process. Thus, it is also
true that domestic policy generates a great number of the issues and problems that
are later transferred to the arena of foreign policy. This is why it is said that domes-
tic and foreign policies are increasingly interrelated, and, in addition to not being
really separable, are strategic components of a long-term state policy.
For analysts, but mainly for political actors directly involved in decision making,
it is of the utmost importance to understand this unity and its meaning in the defense
of national interests. What is more, it is of considerable significance that, regardless of
political or ideological differences, legislators and federal officials agree on state
strategies, forging a consensus about the steps for carrying out a foreign policy proj-
ect that was offered to society. All the actors involved are responsible for articulating
this project, sorting out their political differences —they are, after all, professional
politicians— and achieving a consensus as a point of departure. It is my impression
that nowadays, none of the political parties or political actors is sufficiently clear on
these ideas. Their legislators’ behavior vis-à-vis foreign policy issues gives the impres-
sion that they lack a clear vision: both of a national and a foreign policy project. It
would seem that they are still moving among the old models of international relations
—which up to a certain point is explicable— and the reality I have already described.
That is, politicians seem to lack strategic vision. This, on the other hand, stems from
the lack of professionalism that has dominated the legislature, partly because of the
absence of a professional civic class that can teach them about the country’s most
important issues, and partly because legislators themselves are novices in the mat-
ters they must deal with during their terms. In this sense, it would seem to be even
clearer that what is needed is to overcome the three major political parties’ conser-
vative resistance to constitutional reform and re-election.28 Here, and of course in the
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National Action Party (PAN).
consciousness and principles of party doctrine, is where the parties are most back-
ward in assuming responsibility for foreign policy in accordance with the new, already
stormy, times that our country has to face. Undoubtedly, this scenario has an impact
on the future of Mexico’s international relations, and it has also negatively impacted,
within the realm of NAFTA, our country’s complex bilateral and trilateral relations.
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Appendix 1
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY MEXICO
Agreement Country Date Published Entry into Force
NAFTA United States December 20, January 1, 1994
and Canada 1993
G3  FTA Colombia and January 9, 1995 January 1, 1995
Venezuela *
Mexico-Costa Rica FTA Costa Rica January 10, 1995 January 1, 1995
Mexico-Bolivia FTA Bolivia January 11, 1995 January 1, 1995
Mexico-Nicaragua FTA Nicaragua July 1, 1998 July 1, 1998
Mexico-Chile FTA Chile July 28, 1999 August 1, 1999
Mexico-EU FTA European Union June 26, 2000 July 1, 2000
Mexico-Israel FTA Israel June 28, 2000 July 1, 2000
Mexico-Northern El Salvador, March 14, 2001 March 15, 2001
Triangle FTA Guatemala and with El Salvador
Honduras and Guatemala, 
and June 1, 2001, 
with Honduras.
Mexico-European Free Iceland, Norway, June 29, 2001 July 1, 2001
Trade Association  FTA Liechtenstein and
Switzerland
Mexico-Uruguay  FTA Uruguay July 14, 2004 July 15, 2004
Mexico-Japan Agreement Japan March 31, 2005 April 1, 2005
of Economic Association 
* As of November 19, 2006, only Mexico and Colombia participate in the FTA with the G3.
Source: Free Trade Agreements signed by Mexico, Vice Ministry for International Commercial Negotiations,
Ministry of the Economy, http://www.economia.gob.mx/work/snci/negociaciones/ficha_ publica_ tlcs.
htm; accessed June 20, 2008.
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Appendix 2 
AGREEMENTS FOR MUTUAL PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
OF INVESTMENT SIGNED BY MEXICO
Country Date Signed Date Ratified Date Published Entry into Force
by the Senate
Argentina November 13, April 24, 1997 August 28, 1998 July 22, 1998
1996
Australia August 23, February 21, June 12, 2007 July 18, 2007
2005 2006
Austria June 29, December 14, March 23, 2001 March 26, 2001
1998 1998
Belgium-Lux August 27, December 14, March 19, 2003 March 20, 2003
Union 1998 1998
China July 11, 2008 Pending Pending Pending
Cuba May 30, 2001 December 11, May 3, 2002 March 29, 2002
2001
Czech April 4, 2002 October 29, 2002 March 25, 2004 March 14, 2004
Republic
Denmark April 13, 2000 April 28, 2000 November 30, September 23,
2000 2000
Finland February 22, April 17, November 30, August 21,
1999 2000 2000 2000
France November 12, April 17, November 30, October 11,
1998 2000 2000 2000
Germany August 25,1998 December 14, March 20, 2001 February 23, 
1998 2001
Greece November 30, April 26, October 11, September 17,
2000 2001 2002 2002
Iceland June 24, December 6, June 6, April 28,
2005 2005 2006 2006
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Appendix 2 
AGREEMENTS FOR MUTUAL PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
OF INVESTMENT SIGNED BY MEXICO (CONTINUE)
Country Date Signed Date Ratified Date Published Entry into Force
by the Senate
India May 21, December 11, March 5, February 23,
2007 2007 2008 2008
Italy November 24, April 17, January 17, December 4, 
1999 2000 2003 2002
Korea November 14, April 16, 2002 August 9, 2002 June 28, 2002
2000
Netherlands May 13, December 14, July 10, October 1,
1998 1998 2000 1999
Panama October 11, April 4, December 19, December 14, 
2005 2006 2006 2006
Portugal November 11, April 17, January 8, September 4, 
1999 2000 2001 2000
Spain June 22, 1995 November 16, March 19, 1997 December 18,
October 10, 1995 1996
2006* April 26, 2007* May 19, 2008* April 4, 2008*
Slovakia October 26, 2007 Pending Pending Pending
Sweden October 3, 2000 April 3, 2001 July 27, 2001 July 1, 2001
Switzerland July 10, 1995 November 16, 1995 August 20, 1998 March 11, 1996
Trinidad October 3, March 6, September 12, September 16,
and Tobago 2006 2007 2007 2007
United May 12, 2006 April 26, 2007 July 25, 2007 July 25, 2007
Kingdom 
Uruguay June 30, December 11, August 9, 2002 July 1, 2002
1999 1999
* Dates corresponding to the renegotiated agreement.
Source: Status of the Agreements for Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment signed by
Mexico, Office of Foreign Investment, Ministry of the Economy, http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=
1210, accessed June 25, 2008. Updated January 2009.
In recent years security has become a fundamental topic in relations between
Mexico and the United States. For both countries, it occupies a vital place on their
own domestic agendas, and on the bilateral agenda as well. Due to geographic
determinism and a circle of common economic interests —and despite political
variations in the state of affairs at any given moment and notwithstanding some
wounded sensibilities— they share a common problem unparalleled in history.
Beyond some confusion and what appeared in the media, Mexico’s position fol-
lowing the September 2001 terrorist attacks was one of full support. It is true that
there was some wavering on the part of some members of the cabinet in the days
after the attacks, and a certain mean-spiritedness on the part of some political par-
ties. Equally true is that these blunders have been well-documented in a kind of
combination “book-reproach” written by Jeffrey Davidow when he was U.S. ambas-
sador in Mexico. From the very first pages, his annoyance at Mexico’s lack of con-
sideration is evident:
The initial reaction by the Mexican people and government was, as expected, one of
horror.... However, the reaction rapidly became confused, and degenerated into an
unseemly political debate that revealed a great deal of imprudence and insensitivity.1
Beyond this clumsy reaction, Mexico carried out all the necessary changes in its
security strategy and risks agenda to cooperate in a resolute, visible way to impro-
ve security levels.
However, Washington’s reaction to Mexico and other countries has not contribut-
ed much to creating a better atmosphere. The premonitions expressed by many
observers after hearing President Bush’s initial speeches after the attacks were not
very encouraging and leaned toward the United States opting for a fundamentally uni-
lateral, self-absorbed policy, and adopting a paradigm that, as Luis Ernesto Derbez has
put it very well, consists of obtaining security “against everyone and despite everyone.”2
* Researcher at the UNAM’s Center for Research on North America (CISAN). E-mail: leonardocurzio
@nrm.com.mx
1 Jeffrey Davidow, El oso y el puercoespín (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2003), 23-24; translated from
Spanish by the author; available in English as The Bear and the Porcupine, published by Markus Wiener
Publishers. [Editor’s Note.]
2 Luis Ernesto Derbez Bautista, “Una frontera en franca evolución,” El Universal, August 9, 2004.
MEXICO-U.S. SECURITY: A PRIORITY
FOR THE BILATERAL AGENDA
Leonardo Curzio*
This has had tangible consequences. Influential political analyst Fareed Zakaria
attests to the increasing incomprehension in other countries of the way in which
Washington has handled its foreign policy since 2001. In countries as disparate as
France and Indonesia, anti-U.S. sentiment has increased to its highest levels in the
last 50 years.3 It is probably not that high in other countries, but there is growing mis-
trust, and this is not a spontaneous occurrence.
The initial security strategies designed by the Bush administration were developed
as if its surroundings were totally hostile, fraught with danger and threats. Inspections
and control of passengers and cargo containers were initiated without regard to the
fact that the United States is flanked by two friendly countries, allies and trade part-
ners, specifically Mexico and Canada.
It is important to emphasize here that there are two components in U.S. security
strategy: at the bilateral level, which is the most important for the two countries, the
issue is dominated by the guidelines of the National Strategy for Homeland Security,4
and on a broader level, the controversial doctrine of preemptive action has gained
ground.5 For most of the world’s countries, these two elements of U.S. strategy can
be conceived of as one and the same. However, for Mexico, it is vital to distinguish
between them, since the disagreements generated by U.S. international actions do
not necessarily affect the crucial agreements for defending the NorthAmerican secu-
rity perimeter.6
Mexico has cooperated without fail in maintaining the North American secu-
rity perimeter.7 Meetings between the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and
Mexico’s Interior Ministers have been frequent, and communication is guaran-
teed through special channels maintained between the two government officials.
In addition, Mexico reinforced its border controls, especially in relation to the
so-called restricted nationalities and has accepted and supported the concept of
intelligent borders. Mexico has implemented all the controls imposed by U.S.
authorities on its civil aviation, as if they were part of its own program. Operation
Centinela was implemented in response to the war in Iraq, mobilizing security
forces several thousand strong.8 Another facet of this cooperation is the partici-
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3 Fareed Zakaria, “The world’s most dangerous ideas,” Foreign Policy (September-October 2004).
4 Office of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Homeland Security,” July 2002, at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf.
5 See “The National Security Strategy of the USA,” September 2002, and especially Chapter V: “Prevent
our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with WMD,” at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc
/nssall.html.
6 A description and justification of Bush security strategy can be found in Philip Zelikow, “The
Transformation of National Security,” The National Interest, no. 79 (spring 2003). An interesting crit-
icism of aspects of Bush security doctrine can be found in Madeleine Albright, “La guerra equivo-
cada,” Foreign Affairs en español, vol. 3, no. 4 (2003).
7 See the critical perspective offered in regard to all these matters in Alejandro Dávila Flores, “Smart
borders y seguridad nacional después del 11 de septiembre ¿tomando decisiones inteligentes?” in
Cristina Rosas, comp., Terrorismo, democracia y seguridad (Mexico City: UNAM/Australian National
University, 2002).
8 Press conference, Ministers of the Interior and Defense, March 18, 2003, at www.gobernación.gob.mx.
pation in exercises simulating a terrorist attack, such as those conducted in
November 2003 along the Sonora-Arizona border. At the bilateral level, coopera-
tion is fluid, with no strings attached. Since the 2005 Waco summit, the Security
and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) has been the new trilateral framework for bol-
stering the security agenda and striking a balance with the prosperity agenda.
However, there have been important discrepancies in the multilateral context,
especially in how to deal with Iraq. During Mexico’s participation in the United
Nations Security Council (2001-2003), it took positions supporting the inspections
headed by Hans Blix,9 and this autonomy led to some friction with the hegemonic
power, without, however, placing bilateral cooperation in jeopardy—which is, in the
end, the most important for Washington and for Mexico.10 In addition to this, Mex-
ico is clearly off the map in terms of the fundamentalisms that encourage terrorism.
This comparative advantage has not, in our opinion, been adequately considered.
In short, the U.S. reaction —although initially understandable— offended a
good number of its allies in numerous ways, and this is especially true in the case
of a partner like Mexico, since it knocked Mexican affairs down to last place on
its list of priorities.11 Issues of great importance, such as the agenda for deepening
bilateral relations between the two countries, and consolidating North America as
a region, vanished from the scene in 2001. The so called “NAFTA Plus” has experi-
enced practically the same fate,12 although recently, more importance has been
placed on economic issues, and a more serious focus has been given to the com-
petitiveness of the North American region (United States, Canada and Mexico)
through the SSP with respect to other regions of the world.
The long-aspired-to migration agreement for regularizing the situation for thou-
sands of undocumented Mexicans working in the United States (proposed at the
beginning of the Fox administration) was brushed aside, relegated to the lowest of
U.S. priorities for nearly two years.
The issues that are fundamental for Mexico in a context dominated by the need
to redefine its relations with its neighbor to the north in a more constructive and
comprehensive way were literally placed on the back burner.
The Forgotten Agenda and Its Consequences
The progress made in Mexico since the year 2000 in terms of democratization,
respect for human rights, top-level cooperation in the fight against drug traffick-
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ing and the determination to deepen relations with the United States has not been
matched with concrete proposals. This lack of response from Washington has
implied political costs for Mexico’s first non-Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
administration.
What is true is that not all of the above can be attributed to U.S. disinterest inMex-
ican affairs. The misunderstandings and mistakes made by the Fox administration in
the way it handled the proposal for a migration agreement have damaged the Mex-
ican government’s credibility in the eyes of the public. Fox was mistaken in his initial
proposal, when he assumed that a splendid personal relationship between the two
presidents would be enough to provide the needed push for such an important instru-
ment. Reality has demonstrated the contrary.
The “old”Mexican nationalists regrouped into the PRI and Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD) attacked Fox for his “naïveté” in trusting the Bush administration,
reaffirming their long-held positions and prejudices with regard to the United States.
The notion of being considered the “back yard” of the world’s foremost power has
been reinforced in the perceptions of broad sectors of the population.
The consequences of this situation are clearly negative forMexico. The traditional
political class is reinforcing its anti-U.S. prejudices, which had gradually been disap-
pearing in the previous years with the advancement of trade integration.
The alleged initial spirit of the two administrations for seeking greater understand-
ing and cooperation remained nothing more than good intentions. A large number of
U.S. opinion-makers in the mass media and a considerable number of decision mak-
ers have not been able to understand that friendly cooperation was crucial for recog-
nizing Mexico as a real partner with whom it wishes to deepen relations. A gesture
of friendship and trust from its neighbor to the north would have been useful for the
Mexican government, with the aim of preventing cooperation from being interpret-
ed by revolutionary nationalists as a sign of surrender, and also, for expanding that
cooperation to other spheres. A fence along the common border as a way to deal with
security and migration issues is not precisely a constructive agenda.
Integration Comes to a Halt
By 2006, the development of North America as an economic region and trade
area marked by internal coherence had not advanced beyond the levels charac-
terizing the previous decade. The George W. Bush administration enjoyed boast-
ing of its privileged relationship with Mexico. At the closing ceremony of the
2002 Monterrey summit, Bush said that between Mexico and the United States,
there was “a historic partnership, one which will benefit both our peoples and
provide a good example for the rest of the world.”13 How can such a statement
be interpreted?
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While other regions of the world, like Europe, have developed an emerging supra-
national identity, while preserving their national particularities, North America has
not moved beyond the free trade level,14 and since 2001, the gap betweenMexico and
theUnited States has grown. Far fromdevelopingmore trust between the two countries,
our main successes can be described at two levels:
1) The first is that despite the obsession around security, we find that econom-
ic and human flows have been maintained, although hindered and marked
by more mistrust.
2) The second is that we have cooperated in a satisfactory way, not in building
bridges and liaisons for enhancing the prosperity of both countries, but in build-
ing borders, controls and even fences.
To the contrary, European countries have consistently worked together to deal with
security issues. The group of countries in what is known as the Schengen area has
suppressed internal border controls and created a European office for addressing ter-
rorism-related matters. They are working at a more comprehensive level to develop a
common security arrangement.15 But let us return to North America.
At a tactical-operational level, we should point out that despite the errors in the
way Mexico initially addressed the problem, and despite the nationalist reactions in
the United States, the two countries have adapted practically to security arrangements
for North America. Tom Ridge, the former Secretary of Homeland Security, put it
this way in 2004:
Each of us has a homeland to protect. An attack on one affects the security and
economy of the other… the mission of guaranteeing our liberties and protecting our
citizens against terrorists and other offenders who harm and take advantage of inno-
cent people. We share a clear vision of prosperity and security, of democracy and open
markets. We understand exactly what is at stake. Mexico is a strong partner in the war
against terrorism.16
We clearly share the same objectives. However, when it comes to the methods
used for dealing with problems, the two countries’ perceptions begin to diverge.
For the U.S. government, everything is potentially a risk and therefore must be given
priority attention. Once again, let us look at comments made by Tom Ridge:
Our historic confidence in the protection offered to us by two vast oceans and two
good neighbors will no longer be adequate against an enemy that turns airplanes into
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missiles and cargo containers into transportation for weapons. The same communi-
cation and transportation systems used to expand prosperity throughout the world
and lift people out of poverty are now used by terrorist networks to spread fear and
harvest destruction.17
Within this logic of universalizing risk, the everyday lives of the economic
actors who base their prosperity on free trade are directly affected. The long waits
for trucks at the borders and all the necessary certification processes for entering
the U.S. market constitute a type of neo-protectionist barrier. Agricultural exporters
and livestock producers have witnessed how regulations and controls have multi-
plied, in line with the bioterrorist legislation that came into effect at the end of
2003. The United States has not managed to —nor has it wanted to—propose its
security agenda as a matter of mutual interest, through which what Colin Powell
once called a “zone of confidence”18 could emerge. Rather, a lack of trust has been
the dominant tone.
The Mexican-U.S. border is a dynamic border with an intensity that cannot be
easily compared to any other in the world. Along its 3000 kilometers, there are
400 million border crossings each year, of which nearly 253 million are pedestri-
an crossings. It has been calculated that 98 percent of bilateral trade—which reached
a level of US$400 billion in 2006— takes place across that border. According to
reports from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte (the Northern Border College), Tom
Ridge’s aspiration of balancing security with free trade and agility in the transit of
individuals who legitimately enter the United States is merely a laudable inten-
tion since, in the words of the president of the Northern Border College, Jorge
Santibáñez, U.S. security policy “has put the management of international immigra-
tion in the same category as the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and weapons
trafficking.”19
Things could certainly be worse. It is true that efforts have been made to improve
and facilitate border crossings. Between the two countries, it has been possible to con-
jure up a scenario of the impregnable fortress, and despite restrictions and stepped-
up security measures, “a dynamic has been achieved that makes the U.S. obsession
with security now compatible with trade flows and the transit of citizens who have legit-
imate reasons for visiting the United States.”20
U.S. andMexican authorities concur on the need to invest considerable resources
to prevent the border from becoming an obstacle to legitimate activities. However,
little progress has been made to date toward this objective. Mexicans continue to be
eligible for a visa that may be granted only after extensive data has been collected.
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Mexico was one of the first countries to be included in the U.S. Visit program, but
entrance procedures into the United States can be long and annoying.
Beyond investment in technology to better control the entry of citizens and mer-
chandise, Mexico’s proposal for simultaneously moving forward with both the migra-
tion and security agendas was very logical and even provocative. The link between
the two agendas was put in this way:
U.S. national security strategy would be strengthened by identifying the population
currently living within its borders in legal limbo —meaning that this population is vul-
nerable to abuses and hindered from openly joining efforts by the responsible author-
ities to enforce the law. This is not simply a matter of recognizing their rights, but also
making them fully responsible for fulfilling their civic obligations.21
Mexico’s attempt to make the migration issue coincide with the increase in secu-
rity levels has not been successful, nor will it succeed in the immediate future. There
are a variety of reasons, but especially evident is the fact that despite all we share and
all that sets us apart, our region has not managed to clearly identify the circle of issues
within which cooperation would provide better results for implementing sovereign
policies. For Mexicans, illegal immigration opens up a situation marked by abuse,
and for the U.S., it demonstrates that its control over the population is highly vul-
nerable and probably susceptible to corruption, since it is impossible to explain how
more than 6 million individuals neither have legal immigration status nor are in the
process of acquiring it.
The United States finds itself facing an undeniable fact: its citizens coexist with
millions of individuals who have violated its immigration laws for purely economic
reasons. Ignoring the issue or attempting to address it unilaterally, without acknowl-
edging the economic component, only leads to a reduced perception of security, since
the world’s greatest power has been shown to be incapable of controlling the problem
through legal channels.
North America: A Tribute to Differences
The North American community should make efforts to acknowledge its circle of
common interests, which include many more than those on either side of the bor-
der initially want to recognize. The SPP is probably the first step in the right direc-
tion because it is a highly controversial attempt to reach a balance in the region’s
security concerns and prosperity priorities.
The objective of shared security is a magnificent opportunity for working togeth-
er, if we can surpass restrictive visions and complexes, since, as JorgeMontaño has said,
we can stop being anything but neighbors. Geographic determinism forces us to jointly
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address security matters.22 If terrorism is the main issue on the agenda, Mexico is an
invaluable ally and an ideal neighbor.
As already stated here, Mexico is not a country that encourages terrorism in any
way. We are a country that receives very few immigrants from the countries consid-
ered to be potentially dangerous. Furthermore, despite the fears of some nativists,
Mexico shares with its neighbor the values of individual freedom, the market econ-
omy and the entire symbolic model represented by the United States.
In 1993, Samuel Huntington published an essay that sparked an enormous contro-
versy regarding the ways in which conflicts will take shape on the international scene
after the decline of ideologies. He suggested that cultural factors will constitute the
main driving force of conflict. Even the title of his article was revealing: “The Clash of
Civilizations?”23 In his text, he defined a set of elements characterizing Western civ-
ilization, and in contrast to Naipaul, he established that the West was not the univer-
sal civilization, and that only a group of countries sharing certain characteristics fully
belonged to Western civilization. He stated that there is little resonance for ideas of
individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, the rule of law,
democracy, free markets and the separation of church and state in Islamic, Confucian,
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist and Orthodox civilizations.24
There is no doubt that Mexico shares the values mentioned here, in some cases
as something to aspire to, and in others, as a goal achieved after years of debate and
struggle. Mexico is a country that aspires to political modernity in accordance with
Western norms.
Definitively, the Mexican population cannot be considered —socially or cultural-
ly— a threat to U.S. security. On the contrary, the United States finds on its south-
ern border a country that, albeit with resentment and mistrust derived from a stormy
relationship, aspires to live in peace and to create greater prosperity for the region.
What perhaps have not been fully understood in some political, academic and
media circles are the transformations experienced by Mexico in economic, demo-
graphic and political spheres, which should be reflected in a new foreign policy and
crowned with a new relationship with the United States. If the United States con-
siders these changes with greater perspective, it should realize that Mexico cannot
continue to receive the same treatment it received 20 years ago.
Paradigms in Transformation
Mexico was “hooked” into economic globalization with the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, however other issues such as nation-
al security, foreign policy and Mexico’s role in the world remained largely anchored to
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doctrinaire matrices of the past.25 This is due in part to national inertia, and in part
because the door has not been opened in the United States to the possibility of think-
ing of a more generous integration scheme that is more politically attractive to
the majorities. The debate around the type of relations that should be developed
with the Unit ed States is evolving at coordinates very similar to those of the 1970s.
Strategic debate has been narrowing considerably since 2001. Any topics not
resolved at previous moments have been removed from the discussion. However, if
changes do not appear to be that significant in the area of international politics, the
process of Mexico’s integration into the U.S. economy is a seemingly irreversible
trend. The interdependence between the two economies is astound ing. Let us look
at some data. In the 1990s Mexico became consolidated as one of the world’s export
powers. Its total trade volume in the year 2000 was 2.3 times greater than that of
Russia. Or to compare it with another Latin American economy with a practically
identical gross domestic product (GDP), Mexico’s foreign trade volume is more than
five times greater than that of Brazil.26
In 1993, one year before NAFTA, Mexico’s total exports amounted to nearly US$52
billion. Three years later, the figure had reached nearly US$96 billion,27 and by 2006,
its total exports to the U.S. were just above US$212 billion. 
This process of becoming more connected internationally is accompanied by
increasing integration into the U.S. economy. In 1992, two years before the free trade
agreement with the United States and Canada went into effect, 81 percent of Mex -
ico’s exports were destined for the U.S. market; however by the end of that decade,
the figure had increased to levels slightly above 88 percent, which in practice, is
equivalent to almost complete dependence on the United States. In 2006, of Mex -
ico’s total exports of US$250 billion, approximately US$212 billion was concentrat-
ed in the United States.28
On the other side of the coin, imports are less concentrated. However, the figures
are high, with a tendency to rise. In 1992, 71.2 percent of Mexico’s imports came from
the United States, and in 1999, they increased to 74.2 percent. In 2006, Mex ico impor -
ted from the United States US$131 billion.29 In other words, what Mexico purchas-
es from the United States —which means competitiveness, jobs and well-being for
the U.S.— is greater than the total purchased from the United States by several European
countries, such as Italy, France, Spain and England. Thus, if we measure the relation-
ship of interdependence in terms of bilateral trade, Mexico should not be consider ed
a burden in the region. 
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However, the connection between the two countries can be perceived in other ways
beyond trade figures and consumer patterns. It is also important to consider demo-
graphic dynamics, since they offer clear elements for analysis. In a period of 30 years
(1970-2000), Mexico’s population doubled, and a significant portion migrated to large
cities in Mexico or to the United States. The number of Mexicans living in the Unit -
ed States has increased enormously in recent years.
Today, between 10 and 12 million Mexicans live in the United States, and between
40 and 50 percent of them are undocumented, according to estimates received by the
Pew Hispanic Center and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Migration and trade figures demonstrate that the current degree of integration of
the two countries is enormous, although many prefer to ignore this. “Strategic igno-
rance” is always an option for politicians but Mexico is clearly a country that has been
transnationalized in economic and demographic terms.
North America: A Pipe Dream?
Despite the convincing nature of trade and demographic statistics, as well as the
political will of the Vicente Fox administration to redefine bilateral relations around
new key points,30 the foundations for deepening bilateral relations have not been
established.
Because of this dilemma, many years have been lost to Mexico, which has been
unable to find a meeting point between, on the one hand, its economic and demograph-
ic reality with a focus on the North American region, and on the other, a traditional
foreign policy discourse that continues to be deeply entrenched in the nation’s polit-
ical class.31
It is true that Mexico is highly confused as to its place in the world. The revolu-
tionary nationalism that holds together the PRI and the PRD is anachronistic for one
of the world’s export powers. However, this continues to be the dominant focus of
these two political parties’ discourse, and the generalized opinion is that the United
States does not consider Mexico a real partner. This predominance of nationalism
has an important reactive component, and has methodologically hindered any progress
in reformulating national interests.
In this context, the region is experiencing a period of great ambiguity. Mexico
defines its trade and economic interests separate from and sometimes in opposition
to its foreign policy. And the United States defines it foreign and security policies as
if Mexico were a country with which it has only insignificant exchanges, and as if it
were potentially dangerous.
52 LEONARDO CURZIO
30 Monica Serrano, “Bordering on the Impossible: US-Mexico Relations after 9/11,” in Peter Andreas
and Thomas Biersteker, The Rebordering of North America (New York: Routlege, 2003). 
31 Interesting analyses of Fox’s foreign policy in the first years of his administration can be found, for
example, in Rafael Vázquez, comp., La política exterior de México bajo un régimen democrático (Mex -
ico City: Plaza y Valdés/UQR, 2002); and Rafael Fernández del Castro, comp., Cambio y continuidad
en la política exterior de México (Mexico City: Ariel, 2002).
Few dare to state clearly that a North American focus is —by geographic, eco-
nomic and demographic definition— of the highest priority for Mexico, and to a sig-
nificant degree, for the United States as well.
Thus, we have an ongoing problem that sparks heated patriotic discussions on both
sides of the border. The rhetoric does not exactly prevent moving forward in the inte-
gration of the North American region; but, it does create mistrust and reinforce prej-
udices. Nor does patriotic propaganda endanger bilateral relations, which are handled
with a great deal of pragmatism. However, what we have is far from an ideal situation.
It is worth asking ourselves seriously and directly whether the United States is
interested in developing a different relationship with Mexico. The very year that
NAFTA was approved, in his article on the clash of civilizations, Samuel Huntington
proposed the concept of “torn countries,” and referred to three cases: Turkey, Russia
and Mexico.
He stated that Mexico is the closest country to the United States, and one that
debates whether it will remain part of Latin America or become part of North
America. At the end of his article, he stated that in order to define to which civiliza-
tion a “torn country” belongs, it must satisfy three requirements. The first is that its
economic and political elites support the transformation. The second is that its peo-
ple are in agreement with the redefinition, and the third is that the dominant groups
in the civilization of destination are willing to receive the new convert. It is impor-
tant to point out that in the text cited here, Huntington indicated that “all three
requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico.”32
If this was true in 1993, and if structural data for 2007 points toward greater con-
vergence between Mexico and the United States, in the coming years, the two coun-
tries should find a place of collaboration and cooperation on security issues that, in
turn, should generate greater trust. Montaño phrased it well when he wrote, “There
is no way to ignore that we are neighbors, and thus we will never be able to disregard
the importance of our contribution to the security equation. This is our only real play-
ing card for achieving change, and we should use it legitimately and responsibly to
maintain dialogue that is indispensable for Mexico.”33
Being indispensable for the security equation is mutual. Mexico is indispensable
for guaranteeing U.S. security, and U.S. security is indispensable for Mexico. A ter-
rorist attack perpetrated from Mexican territory would be disastrous for bilateral rela-
tions and indeed for the country’s viability. Mexico is convinced —for practical and
ideological reasons— of the importance of cooperating, and consequently it does not
deserve to be treated as if it were a potentially hostile country.
Being indispensable for the security equation implies acknowledging that the secu-
rity of North America guarantees its future economic viability as well, in relation to
major competitors such as the European Union and China. In this respect, Mex ico
comprises a market of more than 105 million inhabitants and is a fundamental actor
in U.S. development, especially for some U.S. states in particular. A prosperous Mexico
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guarantees jobs and prosperity for North Americans, and conceiving of North America
as a coherent economic and trade area offers the United States greater vigor and
strength to compete with the economic and demographic giants in the East (China
and India) and the West (the European Union) throughout the twenty-first century.
Being indispensable for the security equation means acknowledging that Mexican
workers who migrate to the United States play a fundamental role in its competi-
tiveness and demographic revitalization. At the same time, these workers serve as an
oxygen tank for the Mexican economy, contributing nearly US$25 billion each year
with their remittances sent to families in Mexico. Migration should be understood as
a problem that presents challenges to U.S. immigration laws, but never to its nation-
al security. This is the great difference that is sometimes forgotten.
Finally, being indispensable for the security equation means that in addition to
geographic determinism, there is a new, inevitable circle of shared interests, as well
as a set of values that historically urge us toward convergence. Consequently, and as
the twenty-first century progresses and the major regional powers of Europe and
China are consolidated, the two countries will have to abandon sovereignty-oriented
logic and open up to a truly regional focus that includes Canada. In this focus, what
is beneficial for Mexico is also useful for the United States, and vice versa —with-
out, of course, losing sight of each country’s specificities.
The possibility of Mexico and the United States becoming further distanced from
each other in the coming years seems unthinkable, in the context of new threats and
the configuration of a new international order. On the contrary, and without lapsing
into voluntarism, we can assume that we are condemned in the long run to develop
a better understanding of each other, due to the converging interests we share.
If Mexico is politically stable, it can generate the conditions for sustainable devel-
opment, which not only offers prosperity, but also well paying jobs that do not force
people to migrate. If Mexico is demographically stable, as predicted by experts for
the coming decades, this will imply fewer tensions with its neighbor, and we will have
a safer border. If Mexico benefits from infrastructure and investment, it will enhance
the region’s global competitiveness, strengthening the relative power of the United
States in the world economic context.
In the current state of affairs, the issue of security represents an opportunity to
come together in tactical and operational terms. We should clear the air of past offenses
and tactless mistakes and focus squarely on the facts. The great challenge of the com-
ing years is to move beyond tactical and operational aspects to a strategic focus that
considers security in the long term. It seems evident to me that if we consider the
panorama over the next 50 years, and we use our political will to overcome the prej-
udices each side has toward the other, U.S. security will inevitably be formulated
from a perspective that unquestionably includes Mexico.
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The Creation of the Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America
The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), touted as an instru-
ment to increase the economic potential of the United States, Canada and Mexico
in a secure framework for people and communities, was signed in Waco, Texas,
March 23, 2005. Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, Mexican President Vicen-
te Fox, and U.S. President George W. Bush officially launched the agreement at
the signing ceremony.
The partnership includes two major policy components: an economic one call-
ed “prosperity” that proposes the deepening of trade and the economic interde-
pendence of the three countries. The other is called “security” and is based on
measures to improve U.S. safety and security concerns, especially as related to the
logistics of its daily interaction with Mexico and Canada. The latter is the result
of U.S. security concerns derived from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001;
the former is the result of open demands by corporations and transportation, in-
dustrial and commercial organizations.
In the report prepared for the three countries’ heads of state in June 2005, the
agencies responsible for writing the partnership’s rationale described the content
and scope of the SPP agenda as “improving the efficiency of the movement of peo-
ple, goods and services crossing borders while protecting our environment and
promoting health and safety for our people.”1 These impressive goals are supposed
to improve the overall well-being of the people of North America.
Public officials in each country have emphasized SPP content as an enhance-
ment of trade proposed by NAFTA and as an instrument to promote prosperity in
the three countries. But in examining the content and text of the partnership, the
clear rationale for the creation of the SPP is the U.S. security concerns related to
terrorism. The increased notion of national security is, clearly, a direct response
* Professor at Michigan State University’s School of Journalism and Center for Latin American and
Caribbean Studies.
1 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. Report to Leaders (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government/Government of Mexico/Government of Canada, June 27, 2005).
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to the potential of terrorism and indirectly to the violence generated by organized
crime smuggling drugs and immigrants.
The U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada and their security suddenly took on
a major role in the national political debate after September 11, 2001. Borders or
the concept of “defending borders” became a central theme for the U.S. govern-
ment, regardless of the fact that all the terrorists responsible for the attacks arrived
in the U.S. by air. Political conditions forced the U.S. government to create poli-
cies that would be diplomatically manageable with Mexico and Canada. There
was no similar precedent in which most of the border interaction became more
scrutinized, reexamined and re-regulated, despite the fact that both Canada and
Mexico are historically aware that their border with the U.S. is a potential source
for problems with their powerful neighbor. Some examples of the complexity
include: managing traffic and human flows, administering trade, conciliating envi-
ronmental regulations and aiding in the case of natural disasters.
In addition, the border with Mexico took another turn under the pressure of a
massive political movement to control illegal immigration. Since early 2003, most
of the southwestern states pushed for more border controls as this became a high-
ly political issue. During the 2004 presidential campaign President Bush responded
to those pressures and made the border a central issue with two major components:
terrorism and illegal immigration. In a way, that situated drug smuggling as second-
ary. The rhetoric increased as the election approached, and the border became
“the issue” that helped President Bush get reelected. The conservative support he
received accrued political capital with the administration that can create a real
problem for Washington, by demanding drastic measures on border control.
While the U.S. border with Mexico had attracted most of the attention, the
Canadian border also showed difficulties and future challenges. The new Home-
land Security document entry requirements for Canadian citizens crossing the
border caused major delays never seen before at inspection stations. Pre-9/11, at
the border crossings between Detroit and Windsor, the average weekday crossing
time was 10 minutes; by 2006, the time had quadrupled. Trucks that used to wait
for one to two hours to cross the border between Ontario and Michigan now spend
twice as much at the inspection stations. Interestingly, both issues were covered by the
Canadian media, which in turn pressured Ottawa to engage in diplomatic nego-
tiations with the U.S. government.2
The Contents of SPP by Focus
And Categories of Collaboration
While the SPP concentrates on security programs, not all measures focus on bor-
der areas. The SPP arrived as a policy mixing domestic issues with international
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agreements under a new security model led by the U.S. With two major aspects
concentrating on security and economic prosperity, the agenda items are ambi-
tious and challenging (see table 1). In the area of security, the agreement included
the creation of biometric standards, cooperation of law enforcement and emergency
agencies, sharing information and intelligence and the creation of regulations for
“trusted travelers and goods,” The trusted travelers concept includes coordination
through the NEXUS, FAST and SENTRI programs. Also, the partnership proposes a new
coordination model for the prevention of, protection from and response to cross-bor-
der terrorism, cross-border health threats (including epidemics and pandemics)
and cross-border natural disasters.
In the area of economic security, the SPP recommends the creation of trinational
alliances and close collaboration of corporations in the energy, auto, textile and agri-
cultural sectors. Collaboration includes formulas that include expanding current enter-
prises, the overall increase of productivity and efficiency and expanding sub-sectors
for companies based in one of the three countries. Yet, it also provides more demand-
ing policies such as further liberalization of the rules of origin and the harmonization
of air navigation systems. In addition, the prosperity section awkwardly recommends
policies to protect the environment, especially air and water resources.
TABLE 1
CATEGORIES AND FOCUS AREAS OF THE
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA
Security Prosperity
Major categories • Secure North America from • Improve productivity
external threats
• Prevent and respond to • Reduce the costs of trade
threats within North America
• Further streamline the secure • Enhance the quality of life
movement of low-risk traffic
across shared borders
Focus • Development of joint preventive, • Facilitate business operation
protective and response actions
• Intelligence sharing and • Collaboration for business
screening resources (movement
of G and P)
• Collaborative operations and • Safe food supply and joint
law enforcement controls for environment
and health
Source: Developed by the author based on the SSP Report to Leaders. U.S. Government-Government
of Mexico-Government of Canada. June 27, 2005.
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The SPP proposes a series of areas for programmatic development, and while
many measures target the border areas, others have national and regional content, as
seen above in table 2. The three countries agreed that to increase “border security,”
programs include biometric standards for North America requiring governments to
issue complying official documents by 2008.Also, under the security umbrella, there
is a concrete law enforcement program that includes information and intelligence
sharing and inter-agency cooperation.
A very critical area of cooperation includes the protection from, prevention of and
response to emergencies.After many years of marginal progress, the SPP proposes pro-
grams and the collaboration of the three governments to control the potentials for
cross-border terrorism, cross-border health threats and cross-border natural disasters.
This area proposes the open communication and collaboration of federal agencies to
respond not only to deliberate threats but to natural or health-related risks.
Sectors included in the SPP considered priorities for the North American region-
al economy include: food and agriculture, energy, manufacturing (steel and auto), the
environment, transportation and the financial sector. For the energy sector, the SPP
proposes expanding science and technology in NorthAmerica, cooperating on nuclear
facilities and materials and standardizing rules for regulatory cooperation. In addition,
it would also include cooperation to safely trade natural gas and oil and to increase
efficiency in the entire sector.
Clearly, this trinational partnership proposes to speed up the process of integra-
tion and the current modes of operation practiced by the three countries since NAFTA
came into effect in 1994. The novel component, though, is the new security policy
framework. In principle, the SPP offers a call for collective welfare and the improve-
ment of socio-economic conditions of the three societies; however, the content falls
short of offering practical alternatives. Given the early stages of the agreement and
60 MANUEL CHAVEZ
TABLE 2
SPECIFIC AREAS OF COLLABORATION UNDER THE SECURITY AND
PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA
Security Prosperity
• Traveler security • Manufactured goods, sectoral
and regional competitiveness
• Cargo security • Movement of goods
• Bio-protection • E-commerce and ICT
Content • Aviation security • Financial services
Areas • Maritime security • Transportation
• Law enforcement cooperation • Energy
• Intelligence cooperation • Environment
• Protection, prevention and response • Food and agriculture
• Border facilitation • Health
• Science and technology cooperation
Total Areas
Source: Developed by the author based on the SSP Report to Leaders. U.S. Government-
Government of Mexico-Government of Canada. June 27, 2005.
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its relatively slow advance and progress, it is important to analyze its content and con-
nections with communities and the general public.
North American Economic
And Security Interdependence
Economic interdependence in North America is the result of the continuing in-
tertwined forces and actions of the regional economy.As seen in table 3, trade is still
the main economic thrust in North America. Despite its inadequacies and missing
elements, trade has cemented an economic process that encompasses other social,
political, environmental and cultural content. Now, since 9/11, the emerging U.S.
Homeland Security policies require adjustments in U.S. interaction with Mexico
and Canada with minimal impacts on trade and economic interaction.
Trade between the United States and Mexico has increased significantly in the
last 10 years. As seen in table 3, in 1993, the year before the formalization of NAFTA,
total trade between the two countries came to US$88 billion. By 2000, trade had
increased almost three-fold. And while from 2000 to 2005 trade increased 15 per-
cent, during the decade from 1995 to 2005, it expanded the same three times. The
relatively slow growth of 25 percent is chalked up to two factors: the U.S. recession
from 2001 to 2003 and the logistical impacts derived from 9/11.
The U.S. Trade Administration reported in 2006 that the country’s two main
trade partners were Canada and Mexico, representing a total inter-trade volume
of US$866 billion in 2006, or roughly US$2.4 billion a day.3 Likewise, both for
Mexico and Canada, the U.S. is their main commercial partner.
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TABLE 3
U.S. AND MEXICO TRADE. SELECTED YEARS 1993-2005
(IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
1993 1995 1993- 2000 1995- 2005 2000-
1995 2000 2005
% change % change % change
Exports to Mexico 45 295 53 828 18.8 109 610 103.6 121 710 11.04
Imports from Mexico 42 850 66 273 54.7 145 640 119.8 171 125 17.50
Total Trade 88145 120101 36.3 255250 112.5 292835 514.72
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Trade Statistics, 2007.
Security interdependence is also evident in the volumes of trade, vehicle traffic
and people crossing the U.S. border. No other international border has the volume
of traffic that Canada and Mexico share with the United States, as seen in table 4.
The official U.S. Department of Transportation report shows the operational diffi-
culties caused by the number of incoming crossings, reported as inspections and ver-
ifications of individuals, cargo and vehicles. The total number of trucks that crossed
into the U.S. from Canada and Mexico in 2005 was 11.4 million, more than 30000
every day. The number of passenger vehicles totaled roughly 122 million, or more
than 335 000 a day. More than 295 million passengers and pedestrians crossed the
U.S. border in 2005, more than 800 thousand individuals a day, regardless of their
citizenship.4
The figures listed in the table reflect two things: first, Canada and Mexico’s large-
scale social and trade interdependence with the United States; and, second, the
logistical challenge this represents for the U.S. government to monitor these flows.
Both in crossings from Canada and Mexico, individual inspections (passengers or
pedestrians) accounted for almost two-thirds of all inspections in 2005. The second
logistical challenge is the number of vehicle crossings into the U.S. on either border
in a year, which represents roughly one-third of total inspections. Furthermore, three
times more vehicles come from Mexico than from Canada.
The relationship between the United States and its neighbors has deepened in
the last 20 years and broadened from simple economic and trade interdepend-
ence to other areas of strong, intertwined dynamics, such as: labor, environment,
energy, law enforcement, natural resource management, social issues and immi-
gration. And while economic forces need to be maintained and strengthened
because of their importance to the economies of each country, security needs are
becoming a new variable.5 The new security policies, derived from a redefinition
of national security in the U.S., pose a paradigm shift for the interaction among
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TABLE 4
NORTH AMERICAN BORDER CROSSINGS
TO THE U.S., 2005 (IN MILLIONS)
CAN-USA % of Total MEX-USA % of Total
Trucks 6.7 6.7 4.7 1.4
Vehicles 30.3 30.2 91.5 27.9
Pedestrians 0.7 0.7 45.8 14.0
Passengers 62.6 62.4 186.1 56.7
Total inspections 100.3 100.0 328.1 100.0
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation Reports, 2007.
4 U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation Reports (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 2007).
5 Raúl Benítez-Manaut, Mexico and the New Challenges of Hemispheric Security (Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004).
the three countries, including not only the traditional human and trade flows; but
also new items like biohazards, nuclear energy, health emergencies and the expe-
ditious crossing of “trusted” travelers.
A Regional Sector with Complex Interdependency
The North American automotive industry is the single largest manufacturing sec-
tor in the region. It illustrates the importance of sectoral integration, which, if well
managed, can be expanded to other regional sectors. Also, the North American
auto industry is the single largest sector of trade among the United States, Mexico
and Canada. In 2006, the U.S. automotive trade balance with Canada and Mex-
ico was almost US$153 billion, surpassed only by energy and oil trade.6
This sector has recently felt the impact of global competition, which has reper-
cussions in every country. The negative impacts affect employment and revenue and
ultimately the well-being of the communities where the industry is located. In
Michigan, for instance, in 2006 and 2007, the state had the country’s highest unem-
ployment rate, almost 2 percentage points above the national rate of about 5 percent.
According to a report published in 2006 by the Wayne State University Center for
Policy Studies, in the last three years Michigan has lost around 170 000 manufac-
turing jobs, with a drop of 19 percent of the jobs in that sector.
By the end of 2007 and the first part of 2008, the auto industry was in a downward
spiral of low sales and limited production. GM’s losses in 2007 were US$38 billion,
while Ford’s were close to US$3 billion.7 The number of jobs lost in 2007 is esti-
mated at 36000, and in 2008, that number is expected to increase significantly. In
response, GM announced early in 2008 that it would close some truck and sport util-
ity vehicle plants, including two in the U.S. (Janesville, Wisconsin, and Moraine, Ohio),
one in Canada (Oshawa, Ontario) and one in Mexico (Silao, Guanajuato).8
Since the regional auto industry depends to a large extent on the North American
market, it benefits from concerted trinational policies. Specifically, the SPP consid-
ered the North American automobile sector a priority with the creation of the
Automotive Partnership Council of North America (APCNA). The council is made up
of very representative industry organizations, specifically theAutomotive Trade Policy
Council, the Automotive Industry Action Group, the Alliance of Auto Manufactu-
rers, the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturing Association and the Mexican Automotive
Manufacturing Association.
The APCNA strategy focuses on facilitating integration, economic growth and ulti-
mately global competitiveness. APCNA is touted as an instrument of the three gov-
ernments seeking to be a real partnership of industry and government. While it is
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clear that there is a general agreement on the goals, the differences lie in the reme-
dies and the speed of implementation.
Yet, the design and formulation of common policies is a major challenge. Despite
the original target for the formalization of APCNA by September 2005, the announce-
ment of its creation came six months later, in March 2006. By the end of 2007, APCNA
was supposed to make public a list of short- and long-term actions to strengthen the
auto industry.9 The areas of cooperation will include country-specific as well as
regional actions.
Currently, some of the areas of cooperation and coordination actually constitute
facilitation of trade rather than industrial synchronization. Most measures are addi-
tional tariff reductions and some revisions and updates of previous agreements like
rules of origin and rules for standardization. The only measure with an industry-wide
impact seems to be defined as technological cooperation to re-concentrate research
and development in North America.
In the original SPP document, the creation of theAutomotive Partnership Council
of NorthAmerica describes narrow but ambitious goals. Four major categories of action
were mentioned: regulation, innovation, transportation infrastructure and border facil-
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TABLE 5
NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC SECTORS UNDER THE SPP (INTEGRATION BY AREA)
Security Prosperity
Major categories • Transportation infrastructure • Regulatory frameworks
(supply chain)
• Border facilitation
° ATM & ACE (Automated • Innovation and technology
Truck Manifest and cooperation
Automated Commercial
Environment)
° FAST & C-TPAT
Focus • System to oversee the • Facilitating business
packaging, sealing and operations
information about movement
in North America
• U.S. Customs and Border • Collaboration for business
Protection inspections resources (movement of
° moving the border personnel)
to the place of production
• Streamline the secure movement • Move to more synchronized
of manufactured goods across standards
shared borders
Source: Developed by the author based on the SSP Report to Leaders. U.S. Government-
Government of Mexico-Government of Canada. June 27, 2005.
9 Even by April 2008, the list was still unavailable and the APCNA representation in Washington, D.C.
was not firm in setting a possible date for its announcement.
itation. Two of the categories relate to the economic regulatory framework and two
relate to security. The proposal, again, was created under the assumption that these
categories will increase the automotive sector’s competitiveness.
APCNA’s three major objectives are complex and pose serious challenges for local
and state governments: 1) to facilitate integration of the North American auto indus-
try by looking at mechanisms to facilitate competitive advantage and location; 2) to
stimulate industry’s economic growth by looking at product and market diversifica-
tion and special attention to the North American consumer; and 3) to increase glob-
al competitiveness by looking at mechanisms mostly from federal, state and local
governments to provide incentives for the industry.
APCNA working groups are finalizing the council’s action lists. But it is still unclear
when the document will become public and no deadline has yet been set. Moreover,
not much has been public or covered by the media about this critical and strategic
initiative. This is a serious problem with the SPP: information about the council’s
actions has not been shared with the public, and the potential for creating positive
public opinion is slim. Public support may be limited if local governments, workers
and communities are kept out of the loop.
For this industry, the movement of products across borders is fundamental.
Auto makers and suppliers are embedded in the new security practices imposed
on logistics in North America. Measures being explored include monitoring pro-
duction sites within each country. As mentioned by the U.S. Chief Officer of the
Port of Detroit last year, these are “policies that move the border where the product
is packaged.”10 With that premise, new programs are emerging like the one creat-
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TABLE 6
MAJOR GOALS OF THE AUTOMOTIVE PARTNERSHIP
COUNCIL OF NORTH AMERICA (APCNA)
Integration of the Economic Growth Increase of Global
Auto Industry of the Industry Competitiveness
Themes on • Shared production • Research and • Incentives
the action list development
• Location • Market diversification • Removal or further
and differentiation reduction of tariffs
• Rules of origin • Training and skills • Logistics (fast and
building secure supply] chain)
• Logistics
• Harmonization of
standards
Source: Developed by the author based on the SSP Report to Leaders. U.S. Government-Government
of Mexico- Government of Canada. June 27, 2008.
ed by Canada and the U.S. to improve security, transportation time and clearance
in the supply chain. The program is called FAST (Free and Secure Trade) and includes
a registry called C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism). This pro-
gram is also being negotiated with the Mexican government to harmonize its sup-
ply chain system with those of both Canada and the United States.
As this example shows in the case of the automobile sector, industries fully inte-
grated in North America require significant operational changes not only on bor-
der areas but at their manufacturing, processing and shipping locations. The impacts
on states and provinces need to be carefully assessed to prepare adequate local respons-
es. In other words, state governments and legislatures need to be prepared for a major
policy reformulation.
The SPP, the News Media, Public Opinion and Diplomacy
Public support is a required component of the Security and Prosperity Partnership.
The careful cultivation of public opinion needs to be incorporated at two levels:
one, on the level of transparency and access to information required for any poli-
cy design and another regarding accountable proposals clear to all. If those more
likely to be affected, such as border communities and their respective local gov-
ernments, are not informed, the model is likely to fail. Moreover, the press and
news media need to receive timely briefings and to have access to information so
readers and viewers form a collective public sphere that understands the purpos-
es of the new policies.
The press, especially in the U.S., has published a limited number of stories about
areas of prosperity; and more about security because of the increasing waves of vio-
lence near the U.S.-Mexico border. This type of coverage has impacted negatively on
Mexico’s image in the U.S. and has influenced the formulation of severe, divisive
policies between the two countries. Information about the formalization of important
bi-national programs on energy, environment, transportation and manufacturing is
not placed in the context of cooperation, making the flow of information distorted
and incomplete. A similar but less damaging pattern exists in news coverage related
to Canada.
Of all the news published by Canadian, Mexican and U.S. newspapers from 2005
to 2007, Canada exhibits stronger coverage of the Security and Prosperity Partner-
ship of NorthAmerica. This affirmation comes after examining news stories and edi-
torials published by national elite newspapers in each country in February, March
and April of each year. The first year, a significant number of stories related to SPP
were printed in the three countries. But, since the SPP was signed in March 2005,
the number of articles dropped by more than 10 percent per year, representing a total
decline of almost 35 percent.
As table 7 shows, of all the news published about the SPP, almost half the articles
were printed in Canada, followed by Mexico with one-third. In the United States the
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coverage of SPP, its implications, contents and processes made up close to one-fifth
of the total stories published about NorthAmerica. In fact, in the U.S. after 2005, the
coverage declined by 30 percentage points each year.
The content of the coverage has some similarities. For the most part, Canadian
coverage reflects the new regulations and border controls that are more restrictive
and demanding of Canadians than in the past. Passport requirements for Canadians
entering the U.S., for instance, are a security regulation that affected many commuters
and business and regular travelers. Other news dealt with trade, energy and general
program cooperation with the U.S. and Mexico. U.S. news focused mostly (85 per-
cent) on security and border controls and only a few articles delved into energy and
manufacturing collaboration. Mexico’s content was similar to Canada’s: border con-
trols affecting local communities received more attention, followed by general trade
and transportation issues. Agriculture was the sector that received the most attention
from the Mexican press. Security and migration together were the main focus (80 per-
cent) of all stories published in the three countries. Only a small 20 percent looked at
areas of prosperity, as defined by the SPP.
Its programs, initiatives and overall coverage, however, receive minimal attention,
taking into consideration the importance of the partnership. The national newspa-
pers published news stemming from presidential activities. Two situations seem to
explain this: one is the increasing coverage of illegal migration to the U.S. and the
probable legal reforms to address the problems of almost 11 million illegal workers
and their families. And the other is related to the border policies themselves, partic-
ularly as related to the monumental increase of law enforcement to defend the border
and the building of the fence. The “border” as an issue is a response to the perceived
threat of terrorism and defending borders is an ideological statement. In fact, the bor-
der with Mexico —and to a certain degree with Canada— is touted as a back door to
terrorism and an open gate to illegal immigration and drugs.
Moreover, the media has contributed to the disinformation about the partnership
by ignoring topics that illustrate significant collaboration between the United States
and its neighbors. Some of the missing topics include the coverage and follow up of
the annual meeting of ten U.S.-Mexico-border governors, investments by the North
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TABLE 7
NEWS COVERAGE OF THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY
PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA
2005 % of Total 2006 % of Total 2007 % of Total
Canada 67 46 54 45 42 44
U.S. 32 22 23 19 18 19
Mexico 46 32 42 35 35 37
Total 145 119 95
News data bases consulted: FACTIVA, Lexis-Nexis, FIRSTSEARCH, plus the archives of the following news-
papers: Canada: Globe and Mail, Toronto Star and Ottawa Citizen; U.S.: The New York Times, Washington
Post and Wall Street Journal; and Mexico: El Universal, El Financiero and La Jornada.
American Development Bank in urban infrastructure, educational mobility pro-
grams and the good neighbor environmental board, as well as the collaboration of
the Great Lakes Commission. The press largely under-reports conferences, workshops
and official meetings sponsored by the Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. legislative bi-
national commissions, except in Canada and Mexico.
For instance, the Twenty-Fifth Border Governors Conference on September 27-28,
2007 in Puerto Peñasco, Sonora, where the governors announced emergency response
plans for the U.S.-Mexico border, got little media attention. Of the 22Associated Press
wire reports sent during the conference, only 3 made it to national papers and not nec-
essarily on the proposed prevention, preparation and response measures, but on the
governors’ agreement to join forces to reduce methanol trafficking.
In the analysis of news flows, it is clear that one topic is unifyingAmericans regard-
less of their origin, income, religion, education or party affiliation: undocumented
immigration. There is a consensus like never before about the need to deter and con-
trol immigration not only in the Southwest but in all areas of the country. Areas with
traditionally low influxes of migrants, like the Southeast and all the way to the Great
Lakes region, began to be polarized about the divergent policies to control migration.
The unintended consequences of this process have caused an openly negative atti-
tude toward migrants and Mexico. Very little is being said about migrants’ contributions
to the U.S. economy, the type of jobs they do and their interdependent relationship
with labor markets in the service, hospitality and agricultural sectors.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, information has increased, but so
has ideological disinformation. The distortion has eroded good will among the three
countries. Each country’s government needs to work on each other’s public opinion;
this is one of the goals of public diplomacy, and journalism and the news media are
the tools. By the end of 2007, given its deteriorating public image in the U.S., Mexico
clearly needs this the most. The generalized negative opinion of Mexico is eroding
the small but important support the current administration has for proposing signif-
icant changes in the relationship. While the public image of a vibrant and integrat-
ed North America is the responsibility of each country within its own borders, there
is little doubt that they all need to influence and persuade their neighbors.
Risks and Opportunities of the SPP
As mentioned in the previous section, one important actor for building public opin-
ion is the news media. As expected, the U.S. border press pays close attention to
transportation, border controls and security issues; but the influential national media
only minimally covers regional or tri-national issues unless they are conflict-based.
The media keeps influencing our notions of each other, while Mexican and Canadian
newspapers spend more time on U.S.-related news, which U.S. newspapers do not
do. Specifically, U.S. news coverage of Mexico comes in sensationalist waves rather
than informing the public to be able to understand interdependent issues that will
only be solved by the actions of the two neighbors.
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Under the heading of security, natural resources, transportation, migration,
trade, energy and, ultimately, development come topics the U.S. needs to address
as common problems with both its neighbors. Security is a matter of concern not
only for the United States; proximity makes it an issue for both its neighbors. To
deepen interaction within North America, economic interests are as important as
local political concerns. How each society and its culture will emerge from this
readjustment of interests remains to be seen. However, regardless of the format
adopted, a new regional form of integration is being forged.11
The evidence shows that as economic interdependence grows, concerns about
cooperation and sovereignty increase. Mexico participated in the NAFTA agreement
in asymmetric conditions that, together with a parochial ideological setting and
governmental incapacity, makes its role more complicated. The best example for
Mexico, though, is to examine the Canadian experience, rich in dealing and work-
ing with the U.S. and having a more pragmatic and realistic approach to their rela-
tionship. Mexico needs to learn from Canada’s institutional and lobbying actions to
influence the U.S., which provide practical approaches on how the two countries
solve common problems. This is particularly important in maintaining bi-national
organizations, fostering local agencies’ input to solve common problems, educating
populations on common issues and promoting accountability and access to infor-
mation.
Another important issue to demystify is the role of the U.S. administration in
many political decisions and policy issues. Most media in Mexico do a poor job of
differentiating the administration’s role (the executive branch) and Congress’s (the
legislative branch) in policy formulation. The tendency is to place most of the respon-
sibility on the president, rather than on congresspersons and senators with narrow
agendas.12 For instance, the recent decision to build a fence between the two coun-
tries can be traced more to the pressures of conservative constituencies on members
of Congress than on the administration’s internal policy decisions. New measures
to control illegal immigration also come from Congress rather than from the admin-
istration. In fact, the last comprehensive immigration bill that included temporary
worker provisions and the regularization of millions of undocumented immigrants
was strongly supported by the Bush administration but did not get enough support
in Congress to pass. To illustrate Congress’s power —and independence— many
Democrats and a vast majority of members of the president’s own political party
(the Republicans) did not support the measure and ultimately killed the bill.13
Despite its good intentions, the new North American agenda needs to add more
than just trade and economic collaboration. The new form requires a drastic help-
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12 Robert Pastor and Rafael Fernández de Castro, eds., The Controversial Pivot. The U.S. Congress and
North America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
13 Brian Naylor, “Senate Abandons Immigration Bill,” Morning Edition NPR, June 8, 2007.
ing hand to address the quality of life, including food safety, natural resources,
employment and health. As important as the content is, prompt information shar-
ing and dissemination will play an important role to inform the citizenry on the SPP’s
scope.14
Mexican, Canadian and U.S., citizens share not only a space but an economic
system, both of which frame their daily lives. This complex interactive system requires
constant fine-tuning to operate and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America offers a mechanism for doing that. The paradox is to maintain economic
vitality while ensuring that citizens of both countries live in a secure environment.
Under these conditions, the first challenge for the SPP is to increase the collec-
tive prosperity of the citizens of North America, as agreed by the three govern-
ments. Also, the U.S. needs to acknowledge that the trilateral relationship goes
beyond solely economic and trade purposes. The well-being and prosperity of cit-
izens in the three countries are essential.
The second challenge is to seek pragmatic formulas that give local needs a more
prominent role in the new regulations imposed by U.S. Homeland Security. The
North American governments need to recognize that local municipalities and bor-
der states are points of interaction every day and that these jurisdictions will con-
tinue to interact in the years to come. Also, local capacity to respond to logistical
and security demands will require investment and resources that need to be fund-
ed by the central governments.
A last challenge is to increase public understanding of trinational policies that
aim to improve general conditions in North America. The creation of security and
economic programs must be shared widely, including information about SPP goals
and programs. For the partnership to be successful, it needs to offer a clear view
of how prosperity is going to be achieved and how the benefits will be shared.
One of SPP’s direct beneficiaries is undoubtedly the North American regional
economy. The partnership needs to better coordinate economic sectors that are
already integrated or are in the process of regional consolidation. The SPP acknowl-
edges priority sectors like energy, steel, automotive, transportation, banking and
financial services and agriculture, but it needs to add other social sectors like edu-
cation, health and infrastructure. Whether each national economy is capable of
benefiting its citizens is one of the major questions the SPP needs to address to
fulfill the promise of prosperity “for all citizens living in North America” as stated
in the official document signed by the three heads of state.
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Given its indissoluble geographical link with the United States, the world’s fore-
most economic actor, Mexico’s insertion in the global order is a strategic laboratory
for Latin America in terms of analyzing the two nations’ growing interdependence.
Together with its dynamic trade with the U.S., Mexico’s structural adjustment pro-
gram, in place since the 1980s, has irrefutably had an impact on its society. This is
shown by the growing inequality and increasing number of Mexicans who emigrate
to the United States, an average of 450 to 500 thousand a year.1
In this context, the aim of this article is to contribute elements to allow us to explore
examples that not only illustrate the growing transnational activity between the two
countries, but also to study relations between transnational actors who may forge new
elites in social, economic, political or cultural structures. We will concentrate on the
characteristics of two organizations, the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC)
and the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, both recognized by the Mexican and U.S.
governments.
The Transnational Phenomenon
Specialist Rebeca Morales’s observations are an obligatory reference point for this
topic. She emphasizes that institutions, individuals, capital and all kinds of organ-
izations are transnationally mobile. This erodes traditional spheres of influence
and simultaneously generates new forms of behavior and fields of action.2 Her analy-
*Researcher and academic secretary at UNAM’s Center for Research on North America. The author
would like to thank Tonatiuh Velasco Frías for his collaboration in updating information and refer-
ences and developing Table 1.
1 Gerónimo Gutiérrez Fernández, “Migración, dimensión y factores de un fenómeno complejo”, in Cen-
tro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública (CESOP), La migración en México: ¿un problema sin solu-
ción? Legislando la Agenda Social Collection (Mexico City: Cámara de Diputados LIX Legislatura,
2006), http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/content/download/28773/126405/file/La%20migracion
%20en%20Mexico,%20un%20problema%20sin%20solucion.pdf, accessed March 26, 2007.
2 RebecaMorales, “Dependence or Interdependence: Issues and Policy Choices Facing LatinAmericans
and Latinas,” in Frank Bonilla, et al., eds., Borderless Borders. U.S. Latinos, LatinAmericans and the Para-
dox of Interdependence” (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 1-25.
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sis includes the concept of “interpenetration”, particularly important in the case
of Mexico-U.S. relations because of the growing impact on political, economic,
social and cultural structures.3
We base our analysis on the idea that transnationalist approaches have empha-
sized thinking about the interactions of immigrants with their countries of origin and
their adopted countries that led to processes linking up geographically separate insti-
tutions and communities.4 We are interested in stimulating the debate about current
shifts in the U.S. economic agenda and Mexico’s political agenda, in order to join
specific transnational communities to new organizational dynamics that would tend
to strengthen an eventual coalescence of traditional and emerging elites. This does
not keep us from recognizing that both the origins and the power of the elites in the
two countries are different since they have grown out of the specificities of each respec-
tive historical process.
According to the experts, the concept of “the transnational” must go beyond this,
analyzing the occupations and activities for which surpassing territorial boundaries is
absolutely necessary to get results.5 Thus, in this article, the aim is to inform the read-
er about the impact that the organization and cohesion of transnational groups have
on the agendas of the United States and Mexico.
According to Alejandro Canales and Christian Zlolniski, “It is enough to be part
of a community where transmigration… has allowed [the actors] to expand their ter-
ritorial spheres of social and economic reproduction” to constitute a transnational
community.6
The U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC)7
Though founded in 1979, in the last few years the USHCC has become more visi-
ble because it is one of the most important means for defending, representing and
promoting Latino businesspersons in the United States. Its current membership
comes to two million businesses, and 150 Local Hispanic Chambers.8
Its objectives include:
• Implementing and strengthening national programs that assist the economic
development of Hispanic firms;
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Rica, September 2000).
5 Alejandro Portes, Luis E. Guarnizo and Patricia Landolt, “The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and
Promise of an Emergent Research Field,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22 (2) (March 1999): 219.
6 Canales and Zlolniski, “Comunidades transnacionales y migración,” 6, 3 and 19.
7 U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, http://ww.ushcc.com/about.html, accessed March 3, 2008.
8 Ibid.
• Increasing business relationships and partnerships between the corporate sec-
tor and Hispanic-owned businesses;
• Promoting international trade between Hispanic businesses in the United States
and Latin America;
• Providing technical assistance to Hispanic business associations and entrepre-
neurs and monitoring legislation, policies and programs that affect the Hispanic
business community.
Considering that immigrants of Mexican origin make up most of the U.S. His-
panic population (64 percent in 2006),9 the following data outlines the context for
this chamber’s growing importance as a space for the transnational business sector’s
advocacy:
• The most recent U.S. Census Bureau figures, for 2006, show that the total Hispa-
nic population comes to 44.3 million people, of whom 28.3 million are of Mex-
ican origin. The demographic trend is for this figure to grow, so that by the year
2050, there will be more than 102 million Hispanics in the U.S., 25 percent of
the total population.10
• In the last decade, this community’s buying power has increased 56 percent,
reaching almost US$700 billion by May 2004.11
• The number of Hispanic firms is growing almost three times faster than the rest
of U.S. businesses. According to USHCC, while in 1992 there were fewer than
800,000, by 2002, there were an estimated 2million, and their total profits went
from US$35 billion to US$300 billion in that same period.
• Hispanic-owned companies’ commercial value totals over US$175 billion.
• The five states with the highest concentration of Hispanic firms are California
(427,805), Texas (319,460), Florida (266,828), New York and New Jersey. In
the first two there is a high concentration of Mexicans: 73 percent of Hispanic
businesses are owned by Mexicans, Mexican-Americans and/or Chicanos.12
• The U.S. Spanish-speaking community is considered the world’s fifth largest.
• The Latino market in the U.S. can be considered the world’s third most impor-
tant, after Brazil and Mexico.
On the other hand, Mexico was the main country of destination for Texas exports
in 2006, totaling US$54.877 billion.13
EMERGING INFLUENCES IN U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS 75
9 U.S. Census Bureau, “Hispanics in the U.S.,” 2006, http://www.census.gov/population/www /socde-
mo/hispanic/files/Internet_Hispanic_in_US_2006.pdf; accessed March 3, 2008.
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In that same year, Mexico was also the main destination for Californian exports,
coming to US$19.30 billion, or 15.4 percent of its foreign trade.14 And, it ranked first
among all the nations of Latin America for exports from the state of New York.
Experts estimate that by 2010, the United States will sell more products to Latin
America than to Europe and Japan combined.15
This is why the USHCC is betting that its linguistic and cultural links will strength-
en the projection of Hispanic business and professional elites inside and outside the
United States, which would provide, in our view, a window of opportunity for mak-
ing transnationalization even more dynamic.
Even though the number of small and large Mexican-origin entrepreneurs is low
in the United States, if we add the fact that only 25 percent of Hispanic businesses
manage to survive beyond the second generation, and 13 percent beyond the third
because of a dearth of professional advisory services,16 the U.S. Departments of State
and Commerce have committed to a crusade to consolidate this business sector. Using
mechanisms for technical and financial assistance and establishing commercial mis-
sions in Mexico and Latin America, they are seeking to facilitate bridge-building for
their expansion based on the natural links offered by cultural affinity.
We should underline the fact that the close economic relationship between Mex-
ico and the Mexican community in particular and the Hispanic community in gen-
eral in the United States goes far beyond the issue of remittances, which came to
US$13.605 billion in the first seven months of 2007.17
The Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME)18
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate and future President Vicente Fox
expressed concern about Mexican migrants getting attention and responses to their
many demands.
As part of a comprehensive strategy, theMinistry of Foreign Relations led the insti-
tutionalization of different mechanisms to create the Program forMexicanCommunities
Abroad. This program promoted links between those communities and their country
of origin and their development in the areas of health, education, sports, culture and
community organization.
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Based on this experience, the Mexican government’s commitment to Mexicans liv-
ing andworking abroad led in 2002 to the creation of the Institute forMexicansAbroad
(IME). Its mission is to promote strategies, develop programs and receive proposals and
recommendations from the communities, its members, organizations and consultative
bodies that tend to raise the living standards of Mexican communities abroad. The
IME’s objectives are to:
• Promote the rethinking of the phenomenon of migration and decent treatment
for Mexicans living abroad.
• Be a liaison with the Mexican communities living abroad, in coordination with
Mexico’s diplomatic missions.
• Establish appropriate coordination with governments, institutions and organizations
ofMexico’s states andmunicipalities with regard to prevention, attention and sup-
port to Mexican communities abroad and other related, complementary issues.
• Gather and systematize proposals and recommendations that tend to improve
the social development of Mexican communities abroad.
The institute carries out different activities to promote the study and analysis of
migration to develop new proposals for improving the well-being of Mexican com-
munities abroad.
The IME operates through a Consultative Board (CCIME), first created in 2006 with
126 full members. Most are from the Mexican and Mexican-American community in
the United States, although Mexican-Canadians (elected leaders living in the United
States and Canada) also sit on it.
The CCIME also includes 10 councilors from the United States’ most representa-
tive Latino organizations, like the Association of Farmworker Opportunity Programs,
the Hispanic National Bar Association, the Hispanic Scholarship Fund, the League
of United Latin American Citizens, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Edu-
cational Fund, the National Council of La Raza, the New American Alliance, U.S.
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and the National Association for Bilingual Educa-
tion, plus a representative from each of Mexico’s 32 state governments.
The IME has strengthened the CCIME ’s ability to fulfill its mission, which is to give
a voice to migrants and their descendents, by forming six working commissions.
These bodies concentrate efforts on issues of common interest and direct actions to
benefit Mexicans and persons of Mexican origin living in the United States. Cur-
rently its commissions are the following: Economic Affairs and Business; Educatio-
nal Affairs; Legal Affairs; Political Affairs; Health Affairs; Dissemination and Media;
and Border Issues.19 According to table 1, of all 126 CCIME full U.S. members:18
percent are business owners and/or executives; 21 percent earn their livings in the
professions (doctors, lawyers, educators, etc.); 4 percent are owners or editors of local
or national Hispanic newspapers; 9 percent are local or state officials; 2 percent are
mayors or members of Congress.
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When we analyze these percentages, we find that 54 percent of the 126 councilors
have sufficient economic means or influence to be considered an emerging transna-
tional elite.
Looking more deeply at this same hypothesis, we can say that the first and cur-
rent IME director, Cándido Morales, appointed in September 2002, sets a significant
precedent given his personal history.
Morales was picked from among a group of 320 candidates, all Mexican men and
women living abroad, mainly in the United States. Originally from the small town of
Miltepec, Oaxaca, he now holds dual nationality after emigrating at the age of eight
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TABLE 1
PROFILE OF THE 126 FULL MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE FOR MEXICANS
ABROAD CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL (CCIME) (2006-2008)
United States
Members of Hispanic organizations and/or organizations representing
the established Mexican community 73
Business owners and/or business executives 23
Political representatives of the Mexican and/or Hispanic community
(mayors and members of Congress) 3
Local county or state government officials 11
Active members of the broadcast media (radio or television) 7
Owners, directors of the print media specialized in the Mexican and/or
Hispanic community 5
Workers and/or activists exercising their professions (academics,
educators, doctors, interpreters, lawyers, etc.) 27
Members of bi-national Mexico-U.S. organizations, institutes and committees 10
Labor leaders 4
Members/leaders of Hispanic religious organizations 7
Promoters/disseminators of Mexican art and culture 9
Members of the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (MELDEF) 1
Members of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) 7
Members of the National Council of La Raza (CONCILIO) 3
Canada
Members of Hispanic organizations and/or organizations
representing the Mexican community 2
Members of bi-national Mexican-Canadian organizations/associations 1
Promoters/disseminators of Mexican art and culture 1
Active members of the broadcast media (radio or television) 1
NOTE: In most cases, the CCIME members participate in several activities at the same time and belong
to different organizations, which is why the numbers do not add up to 126.
Source: Table developed with information available at the IME official portal http://www.ime.gob.mx/
ccime/perfiles_ccime06.pdf, accessed May 20, 2008.
to California to join his father, a farm worker who entered the United States as an
undocumented migrant.
After getting his college degree at Sonoma State College, CándidoMorales began
a distinguished career as a social worker at theCaliforniaHumanDevelopment Corpo-
ration (CHDC), where he rose to the position of vice president and director of com-
munications.
This non-profit organization provides social services for people living in poverty in
18 rural Northern California counties. Presumably, a large number of its beneficiar-
ies are Mexican migrants. The CHDC’s work is carried out through contracts signed
with the federal, state and local governments.
The IME’s current president has distinguished himself as an able community leader,
vocational advisor, press director and head of several development programs target-
ing California’s Hispanic and Mexican communities.20
He has also been a member of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of Sonoma
County, where he demonstrated his ability to build bridges between social activism
and the transnational business milieu.
His appointment prompted strong reactions from conservative sectors in the United
States, who said,
[As] Vice President and Director of Communications at CHDC, Morales’s job was to
make sure illegal aliens received every federal and state handout available.... On and
on goes the Mexican propaganda machine. Whether the names are Salinas de Gortari,
Zedillo… orMorales, their mission is monotonously the same: gimme, gimme, gimme.21
Final Thoughts
The two examples described here show us that both institutions are based on
transnational networks, where businesspersons on the one hand and politicians or
social activists on the other link up with society in Mexico and the United States.
This allows them to gradually have an impact on their respective national govern-
ments and state and/or local institutions, broadening out the traditional spaces for
social, cultural, economic and even political reproduction. This way, both bodies
find the ideal spaces for optimizing their specific objectives, increasing their mem-
bers’ social capital.
Although with different focuses, both organizations confirm what Robert Smith
has pointed out about transnationalism being promoted by states once the govern-
ments realize the importance of their communities abroad, or the potential of those
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who have already emigrated, and for that reason they take on the role of facilitators of
new initiatives that can benefit them.22
In the case of the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, we can see what Portes
et al. point to when they argue that “the economic initiatives of [new] transnational
entrepreneurs who mobilize their contacts across borders in search of suppliers, cap-
ital and markets” situates this organization in the category of Transnationalism from
above.23 On the other hand, the IME could be identified with promoting Transnatio-
nalism from below, since its aims and actions include “the political activities of… gov-
ernment functionaries, or community leaders whose main goals are the achievement
of political power and influence in the sending or receiving countries.”24
We consider that a space for promoting emerging elites is being created in the
shadow of these two organizations, taking into account that the actors operating there
have to change their patterns of adaptation and integration into society in the United
States and Mexico. In other words, it is worth wondering whether the conditions
imposed by globalization favor the accumulation of social capital based on the mobi-
lization of economic, political and cultural resources around transnational actors, prior
to the displacement of those other actors who resist this process and who, by closing
themselves off from it, could see their capacity to influence erode even within the
context of national states.
In conclusion, we believe that these examples confirm that a sector of the national
political elites in both countries has decided to deepen the design and strengthening
of pro-active, institutional mechanisms to benefit from the emergence of increasingly
interdependent political and business-sector transnational actors.
The role of social networks today in determining new spheres of influence is unde-
niable. In turn, these networks are articulated beyond national borders, and their ca-
pacity for influence has transnational potential.
On the other hand, we base our ideas on the conviction that the development of
organizational skills is an imperative that must be fulfilled in constituting elites —in
accordance with the theses of Italian thinker Gaetano Mosca— and that this is hap-
pening in the cases we have presented here.
We find empirical research to deepen our analysis and comparison of Mexico-
U.S. transnational actors extremely important. It would incorporate into the study of
the elites concepts like heterogeneity, and thus make it possible to recognize new
interactions among economic, political, social and public administration leaders who
include negotiation, pacts, compromise and strategy development in their calcula-
tions for achieving power.
In the approach developed here, we think that the United States and Mexico are
already converging in a model of pluralist democracy in which societal power trans-
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24 Ibid.
cends the concept of closed elites. Thus, the USHCC and the IME-CCIME will have to
demonstrate their capacity to have an impact on society in both countries in order
to prove or refute their insertion as strategic elites,25 the result of the complexi-
ties of modern society, which has imposed a high degree of specialization in deci-
sion making.
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Migration from Mexico to the Unites States is one of the most formidable and com-
plex issues on the bilateral agenda today. Mexico now has more emigrants than any
other country in the world and over 95 percent of them have gone to the U.S. The
United States is the top immigrant-receiving country worldwide, and it hosts more
immigrants fromMexico (approximately 30 percent of the total of almost 40 million)
than from any other country. The U.S.-Mexican border is by far the world’s lead-
ing migration corridor. It has been estimated that from 1970 to 2006 the number
of persons born in Mexico who reside permanently in the U.S. rose 15-fold, to ap-
proximately 12 million. The average annual flow grew from about 220 000 per year
in the first half of 1980s to around 610 000 per year in this century.1 It should also
be pointed out that, in all likelihood, 85 percent or more of those who have enter-
ed the U.S. since 2000 are undocumented,2 which is now one of the main points
of controversy.
This migratory flow has been commonplace ever since Mexico was forced to cede
half its territory to the U.S. after losing the war in 1848. For many years thereafter,
movement between the two countries was entirely unregulated and was relatively
small-scale. In 1924, the United States began controlling and restricting entry for
the first time. During the 1930s, many Mexicans were deported from the U.S. —in-
cluding some persons who had been born there, of Mexican parents, and thus were,
in fact, U.S. citizens— as scapegoats for the massive unemployment and severe
economic hardships imposed by the “Great Depression.”
However World War II produced a shortage of male labor, and once again Mex-
ican workers were needed in the U.S. This renewed demand was filled through
what is commonly known as the bracero program, which lasted from 1942 to 1964.
Under this program, male workers were supplied mainly for agricultural employ-
ment and some railroad construction and maintenance on a temporary seasonal
basis. Many braceros established strong ties to their employers and some settled
permanently in the U.S., while others continued to go there to work on a season-
*Researcher at UNAM’s Center for Research on North America.
1 Jeffrey Passel, “How Many Mexicans Are Coming to the United States and How Are They Faring?”
(paper, seminar “U.S. Immigration Reform and Challenges for Mexican Policy,” Mexico City, June
20, 2007).
2 Jeffrey Passel, “UnauthorizedMigrants: Numbers and Characteristics,” Pew Hispanic Center, Washington
D.C., June 14, 2005.
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al basis long after the bracero program itself ceased to exist. From that time on,
unauthorized migration grew steadily so that it had reached significant propor-
tions by the mid-1980s.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in 1986 to regular-
ize undocumented workers who had been living and working in the U.S. for a consid-
erable period and supposedly stem future growth in unauthorized migration between
Mexico and the U.S. The end result, however, seems to have been just the opposite.
Large numbers of Mexicans (between 2 and 3 million) who achieved permanent res-
idency in the U.S. began requesting permission for their family members to join them.
Many whowere discouraged by the long waiting periods began to look for other means
to reunite their families north of the U.S.-Mexican border, thus providing a new impe-
tus for undocumented migration in the post-IRCA period.
At the same time economic conditions in both countries greatly facilitated —and in
fact propitiated— a significant increase in undocumented migration. While industrial
and economic restructuring in the U.S. eliminated many fairly well paying manufac-
turing jobs, employment opportunities for less skilled and lower paid service workers
began to rise, as the numbers of persons willing to accept these jobs declined. Further-
more, economic restructuring and modernization, as implemented in Mexico, creat-
ed a large supply of redundant labor. Many of Mexico’s unemployed, underemployed
or informally employed and underpaid workers sought to better their lot by migrat-
ing to the U.S. The significant wage differential makes jobs deemed undesirable by
many native born U.S. workers desirable enough to attract hundreds of thousands of
Mexicans who literally risk their lives to enter the U.S. to work each year.
Migration provides not only an escape valve for much of the labor that the Mexican
economy cannot absorb, but also generates foreign exchange and purchasing power
from the remittances these workers send back. The cheap, abundant supply of low-
skilled workers from Mexico keeps prices down for many domestically produced
goods and services in the U.S. and thus contributed significantly to economic growth
throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. However, nativist sentiments and xeno-
phobic attitudes have combined with fears of job loss and downward pressure on
wages to make immigration policy a highly controversial issue in the U.S. There seems
to be no easy way to resolve the contradiction of needingMexicanmigrants as a source
of cheap unskilled labor and yet not wanting them as residents.
Paradoxically, U.S. legislation and increased border surveillance, designed to keep
unauthorized immigrants out, have in effect worked toward an opposite end, keeping
those who do manage to enter the U.S. there for longer periods of time and increas-
ing their efforts to bring in family members as well. Thus, for many, the once circu-
latory patterns of going and coming betweenMexico and theU.S. on a regular basis have
given way to more permanent settlement. This has in turn exacerbated the xeno-
phobic and anti-immigrant sentiments prevalent among some segments of the U.S.
population. Since IRCA, the U.S. has consistently opposed any further facilitation of
freer transit and more permanence for workers from Mexico despite the evident de-
mand for such labor. Nevertheless Mexican immigration has continued to grow over
the past few decades contrary to the decline that was expected to result from the North
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and even though entering the U.S. has
become much more difficult since 9/11.
In this chapter we will discuss the characteristics of, andmost recent changes in, the
migratory process and highlight the factors determining its continued growth in recent
years. We will address the following issues: Why do so many Mexicans migrate to
the U.S.? How can the U.S. economy absorb so many migrants? What kinds of jobs
do they find and what are their earnings levels? What opportunities and obstacles do
the children of these migrants face in the U.S.? In discussing these issues, we will
also try to shed some light on how and why the immigration debate has become such
a controversial topic in the U.S. today and hence a conflictive item on the bilateral
agenda.
Why Do So Many Mexicans Migrate to the U.S.?
The flow of Mexicans entering the U.S. began to surpass European migration
during the 1980s. This sharp increase in Mexican migration was spurred by the
country’s profound economic crisis and the neoliberal economic policies imple-
mented at that time. Subsequently, in spite of the rhetoric and false hopes pinned
on NAFTA —both the Mexican and U.S. presidents maintained that the trade
agreement would significantly stem the growing migratory flow— migration from
Mexico grew even more during the 1990s. Increased border surveillance after 9/11
has not deterred migrants either; it has only prompted them to remain in the U.S.
for longer periods of time, often leading to more permanent settlement. Thus, in
recent years Mexico has been the main supplier of cheap unskilled labor for the
U.S. market. This is just the most recent twist in Mexico’s ongoing search for easy
solutions to the country’s unresolved economic problems. The Mexican economy
began facing difficulties in the 1970s, when the “stabilizing development model”
based on import substitution, credited with having produced 30 years of favorable
macroeconomic performance, became less and less effective in promoting eco-
nomic growth.
The oil boom in the late 1970s postponed the crisis for a while, but resulted in
over-indebtedness and instability. When international oil prices dropped back to their
more normal levels at the beginning of the 1980s, the flow of foreign exchange fell
and Mexico was about to default on its foreign debt payments. The payments were
finally renegotiated and an “adjustment program” was implemented, abruptly chang-
ing the course of economic policies.
ForMexico, as in the case of most of the other LatinAmerican countries, the 1980s
was considered a lost decade in terms of economic growth and well-being for the
majority of the population. Subsequent improvement during the Salinas administra-
tion (1989-1994) rested on very shaky foundations (volatile foreign capital flows,
attracted by high interest rates and manipulation of the exchange rate) as was evi-
denced by the peso crisis at the end of 1994. After a sharp drop (-6.2 percent) in GDP
in 1995, the economy grew at an average rate of just under 5.5 percent for the next
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five years. Real GDP did not grow at all in 2001 and remained stagnant until 2004.3
Growth rates from the mid-1990s on seem to indicate that macroeconomic behavior
in Mexico depends now, more than ever, on economic performance in the U.S.
Starting in 1999, employment growth in Mexico began to wane, and it was ne-
gative in 2004.4 Until the early 1960s, over half of the work force was still engaged
in agriculture, dominated by subsistence farming. However, agricultural employment
has declined significantly since then and currently stands at around 15 percent.
Between 1997 and 2006, almost three million workers were forced out of agricul-
tural employment.5 Some of these eventually found precarious low-paying jobs in
services or construction, while many others opted for migration to the U.S.
Employment growth in construction and services contrasts with the loss of
almost 700 000 manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2006. Moreover, less than
one-fifth (18 percent) of manufacturing workers are employed by the large firms
that produce 80 percent of the sector’s value added. A slightly smaller percentage
work in maquiladora plants, which still have not recovered the 2000 employment
levels of 1291000 jobs. Almost half of all jobs (48.4 percent in mid-2006) are pro-
vided by micro-businesses, with up to only 15 employees in manufacturing or five
or fewer in trade and services. Less than one-quarter of the economically active pop-
ulation (EAP) works in medium-sized or large firms.6 Almost half (approximately 48
percent) of all wage earners have no written contracts. While 20 percent of those
employed reported working fewer than 35 hours a week, 27 percent reported aver-
aging more than 48 hours. Around 40 percent of all workers have no benefits. Only
32 percent are registered in the national social security system (IMSS), with an addi-
tional 5.7 percent covered by social security for government employees (ISSSTE).7
The official “open unemployment” rate, which was 4.4 percent in mid-2006,
clearly underestimates the existing job deficit, and is also an attempt to hide the fact
that more than half of the persons counted as employed only work sporadically
and/or, in fact, work in the informal sector of the economy. According to Sandra
Polaski, informal employment grew during the first half of the 1990s, reaching ap-
proximately 50 percent, and although it has declined somewhat, it still stands at
around 46 percent.8 However an International Labor Organization (ILO) report re-
leased in 2004 maintained that over the past few years, informal employment in
Mexico had risen from 55 to 62 percent.9
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It is frequently said that Mexico needs to create one million new jobs per year
just to maintain current employment levels. This is slightly below the annual aver-
age of 1144 000 new jobs created between 1991 and 1999, according to official fi-
gures. Between 2000 and 2006 the average was only 406000 new jobs per year.10
The deficit of approximately 600000 a year coincides rather closely with Jeffrey Passel’s
estimate of about 610 000 Mexicans migrating to the U.S. every year since 2000.11
It is also frequently argued that it is not so much the outright lack of jobs that
is driving increased migration, but rather the lack of adequately paying jobs, or in
other words, the wage differential between Mexico and the U.S.12 In addition to
underemployment, disguised unemployment or informal employment, the Mexican
work force has also had to withstand steadily declining real wages, which have been
eroding individual and family incomes over the past 25 years. The main objective of
the price controls imposed after the 1982 crisis was to keep wages from rising.
Official data reveals that between 1982 and 2002 nominal wages increased by 150.5
percent, while prices rose 618 percent. The net effect was a 75 percent decline in
purchasing power.13 Until the end of May 2007, the federal minimum wage in the
U.S. was US$5.15 per hour, or approximately ten times more than the Mexican
minimum wage at that time, depending on the exchange rate. Twenty-two percent
of workers in Mexico earn the minimum wage or less; almost two-thirds earn up
to three times the minimum, and 83 percent earn up to five times the minimum,
which turns out to be less that half of the current U.S. minimum wage.14
The low wages and precarious working conditions so prevalent in Mexico often
make migration to the U.S. appear as the only viable alternative. Every state in the
country now has some level of international migration. Although most still come
from the traditional sending states in the western central region, states in Central,
Southern and Southeastern Mexico show high growth rates in the number of
recent migrants. Increased female migration is another new trend, along with the
extraordinary growth of remittances. The amount sent back to family members in
Mexico rose by more than 600 percent between 1995 and 2006. It is estimated
that approximately five percent of all Mexican households receive remittances,
which represent about 36 percent of their total income.15 The Mexican Central
Bank (Banco deMéxico) recognized that, as of 2003, remittances became the coun-
try’s second source of foreign exchange, after oil exports, and that they were vitally
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important in bolstering consumer spending during the economically stagnant years
from 2001 to 2003.16
Some years ago the Mexican government was accused of indifference toward
those who left the country to seek work in the U.S. Needless to say, the government
has no interest in preventing this north-bound flow. The main concern now seems
to be how to make sure that those who go continue to send money to their families
back home. Recently, in fact, there have been efforts to strengthen migrants’ ties to
their homeland. Dual nationality was approved, and hometown associations are
actively promoted and supported. Mexican consulates now provide a form of iden-
tification (the matricula consular, or consular registration) for all who request it. Those
living abroad now have the right to vote in Mexican presidential elections. All of
these measures help keep those who leave connected in some way to their places
of origin. However, in spite of all the adverse conditions in the Mexican labor market
and the fact that so many people have friends and relatives living in the U.S., there
would not be so many migrants today if there were no opportunities for employment
once they cross the border.
How Can the U.S. Economy Absorb So Many Migrants?
Just as remittances have become more and more important for the Mexican econ-
omy, immigrant labor has becomemore andmore important in the U.S.Andrew Sum
and his co-authors maintain that the record number of 14 million immigrants arriving
in the U.S. between 1990 and 2000 was decisive for filling old and new jobs dur-
ing the extraordinary period of uninterrupted economic growth from 1991 to 2001.17
Many people, including George W. Bush andAlan Greenspan, have recognized how
important immigrant labor is for the economy today, while others insist that it has
been negative for native-born workers.18 The foreign-born, almost a third of whom
are from Mexico, currently make up 15 percent of the work force. Undoubtedly their
presence has facilitated certain changes in the U.S. economy, in particular shifts in
the employment structure.
In absolute terms, the U.S. work force increased by 140 percent from 1950 to
2005, whereas, relatively, it only grew from 59.2 to 66 percent of the total working-
age population.19 However, important economic and social transformations (the
scientific and technological revolution, particularly the revolution in information
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technology; the growth of transnational corporations; the civil rights movement;
the feminist movement; globalization; increased access to higher education; eco-
nomic and industrial restructuring; and neoliberal economic policies, to mention
just a few) have significantly changed the characteristics and sectoral distribution
of the work force over time.
First of all, employment in agriculture dropped severely in both absolute and re-
lative terms. In 1940, 20 percent of the EAP, or 9.5 million persons, were employed
in agriculture compared to 2.2 million, barely 1.6 percent of the EAP, in 2005.
Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to be one of the world’s leading producers and
exporters of agricultural goods. Overall, the proportion of workers involved in pro-
ducing goods declined from 37.9 percent of the EAP in 1955 to 15.8 percent in
2005, in contrast to the rise of those producing or providing services, which grew
from 62.1 percent of the EAP to 83.4 percent.20 Furthermore, thanks in part to the
growing trade deficit, the range of goods and services available to U.S. consumers
is broader than ever.
In spite of the relative decline in manufacturing employment, the absolute num-
ber of jobs in this sector grew until 1979 when it reached 19.4 million. Since then,
over 5 million jobs have been lost in manufacturing, which went from employing 30.6
percent of the work force in 1955, to 21.6 percent in 1979 and just 10.7 percent
in 2005.21 The decline was particularly sharp from 2000 to 2005 when over 3 mil-
lion manufacturing jobs disappeared, over a third of them in the seven-state Great
Lakes region. Most of the workers laid off were men without college degrees who
will have a difficult time finding another position that offers similar income levels
and benefits. Therefore, many of them have simply dropped out of the work force.22
Male work force participation rate has declined slowly but surely since the mid-
dle of the twentieth century, from 86.4 percent in 1950 to 73.3 percent in 2005.23
Even the number of prime-working-age men (those between 30 and 55) who are
not in the work force has risen and now stands at around 13 percent.24 Female par-
ticipation, on the other hand, has increased steadily (from 33.9 percent in 1950 to
59.3 percent in 2005), to such an extent than women now constitute 46.4 percent
of the EAP. Female participation in the work force rose most heavily during the
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1970s and 1980s. Probably catalyzed first by the feminist movement, the later rise
came as a response to greater labor market insecurity and instability in family incomes
due to industrial restructuring and neoliberal economic policies. The increase in
service-sector jobs also facilitated greater female work force participation.
However, the U.S. work force grew by only 11.5 percent in the 1990s, and it
has been calculated that without newly arrived immigrants it would have increas-
ed by only 5 percent.25 There is general consensus that new immigrants were vital
for employment growth as well as economic growth in general.26 Unfortunately, both
women and lower skilled immigrants tend to be paid less than white non-Hispanic
males for similar work; hence, their increased labor force participation is also asso-
ciated with the decline in average wages observable since 1973. Growing polar-
ization, in terms of both types of jobs and earnings levels, has characterized the U.S.
labor market in recent decades. Job growth has been heaviest at both the high and
the low ends of the skills and earnings spectrum. Mexican migrants, most of whom
have low levels of educational attainment, are absorbed and concentrated in low-
skilled, low-paying jobs.
What Kinds of Jobs Do They Find and
What Are Their Earnings Levels?
For most Mexican migrants who come to the U.S., their primary motivation is to
work and earn dollars. It is not surprising, then, that the Mexican-origin popula-
tion27 has the highest work-force participation rate in the country: 68.4 percent in
2005.28 The male rate of 81.8 percent significantly exceeds that of any other
group. Although the female rate (53.6 percent) is slightly lower than for some other
population groups, it is much higher than women’s participation in the EAP in Mex-
ico, which is around 38 percent. Unemployment rates for those of Mexican origin
mirror the ups and downs of economic activity as do unemployment rates in general.
For the past three decades or more, unemployment rates for Mexicans and for
Latinos in general in the U.S. have consistently been lower than the rates for African
Americans but higher than those of the non-Hispanic white population.
It is not unusual for low-skilled recent immigrants to have the least desirable
and lowest-paying jobs, which nevertheless provide incomes much higher than
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they could earn in their countries of origin. Such has been the experience of the
vast majority of Mexican migrants to the U.S. since they have relatively few years
of schooling and little or no knowledge of English upon arrival. However, certain
disadvantages in terms of educational attainment persist even for the second and
third generations and affect labor market outcomes for many who were born in
the U.S.
Department of Labor statistics indicate that the Mexican-origin work force is
more or less evenly distributed among four of the five major occupational cate-
gories: 24.1 percent in services; 22 percent in natural resources, construction and
maintenance occupations; 19.7 percent in production, transportation and materi-
al moving; and 20 percent in sales and office occupations. Only 14.2 percent are
employed in the fifth major category of managerial or professional positions, which
is much lower than 34.7 percent for the entire work force and lower than any other
racial or ethnic group. Only 3.1 percent of all Mexican workers are employed in the
sub-category of farming, fishing or forestry; nonetheless, the percentage employed
in these activities, where wages tend to be extremely low, is much higher than that
of any other group.29
Significant numbers of Mexicans are employed in manufacturing and construc-
tion (11.2 percent and 15.9 percent, respectively), where there are some well-paying
positions for highly skilled, experienced workers. However, most hold low-paying,
low-skilled jobs. Just over 11 percent have office and administrative support posi-
tions, but many of these are female-dominated occupations where salaries tend
to be low. The same holds true for most of the sales jobs that provide employment
for 8.7 percent of Mexican workers. Another 9.1 and 8.8 percent, respectively, work
preparing and serving food and cleaning and maintaining buildings and grounds,
and their wages are very low. Within each of the general occupational categories or
sub-categories, Mexicans and other Latinos tend to be concentrated or constitute
a relatively high proportion of all workers in certain specific occupations: certain
branches of light rather than heavy manufacturing; cleaning and maintenance
services for buildings and grounds; food preparation and handling; cashiers in
self-service stores and retail sales; and certain types of construction work, to men-
tion a few.
Data for employment by industry reveals that some branches have come to
depend more and more on Latino workers, almost two-thirds of whom are Mexican
(see table 1).30 Between 1990 and 2005 the proportion of Latinos in the work force
grew from 7.5 to 13.1 percent. At the same time in the animal slaughtering and pro-
cessing industry it rose from 17 to 39.3 percent. In construction, it increased from
8.5 to 23 percent. In some branches (landscaping services, cutting and sewing ap-
parel, private household service) where Latino participation was already high, the
growth is less spectacular. Latino participation in food manufacturing grew from
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14.1 to 27.7 percent and was even more pronounced in certain sub-sectors. Carpet
and rug mills showed the sharpest rise: in just 15 years the percentage of Latino
workers grew from 10.1 to 31.6 percent. Dalton, Georgia is the carpet capital of the
United States, and Latinos are now around 40 percent of the town’s total population.
Occupational and industrial concentration among Latino workers is intertwined
with their geographical concentration. Approximately three-fourths of all Latinos
live in just seven states. However, in some states in the South, the Midwest and the
West, the Latino population —still quite small numerically— grew from more
than 200 to almost 400 percent between 1990 and 2000, because of employment
opportunities.31 Often Mexicans and others are actively recruited to fill jobs in
meat packing or poultry processing plants, or carpet and rug mills, that local work-
ers now disdain. The same holds true for agricultural work in many parts of the
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TABLE 1
INDUSTRIES WITH HIGH CONCENTRATION OF LATINO WORKERS (2005)
Industry % Latino % Latino Increase in
1990 2005 % Latinos
1990-2005
Total 7.5 13.1 74.7
Animal slaughtering and processing 17.0 39.3 131.2
Landscaping services* 25.2 37.5 48.8
Cut and sew apparel 22.6 35.8 58.4
Car washes* 22.5 35.4 57.3
Private households 17.6 33.9 92.6
Fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty foods 21.0 32.8 56.2
Services to buildings and dwellings 18.0 32.3 79.4
Carpet and rug mills 10.1 31.6 212.9
Crop production 19.5 29.1 49.2
Support activities for agriculture and forestry 15.4 27.9 81.2
Food manufacturing 14.1 27.7 96.5
Bakeries, except retail* 13.0 27.3 110.0
Warehousing and storage 13.8 24.7 79.0
Dry cleaning and laundry services 14.6 24.5 67.8
Retail bakeries 14.4 24.4 69.4
Textiles, apparel and leather 20.2 24.4 20.8
Specialty food stores* 13.1 24.4 86.3
Traveler accomodation 15.2 23.7 55.9
Soap, cleaning compounds and cosmetics 14.5 23.6 62.8
Construction 8.5 23.0 170.6
* There is no data for these industries in 1990; the figures shown in the first column are for 1994 and
the change is with repect to that year.
Source: Author's calculations with data from Employment and Earnings (January 2006), 234-238.
Southeast or states like California, Texas and Oregon. The demand for workers to
carry out undesirable low-paying jobs rose significantly at the end of the twentieth
century, and coincided with the arrival of new waves of immigrants from Mexico
and other Latin American countries, who were more than willing to take such jobs.
Most of the occupations with large numbers of Latinos are low-skilled, low-wage
jobs requiring no more than a high school education (see table 2). In occupations with
over a 100 000 Latino workers where median weekly earnings are above the overall
median, the percentage of Latinos, with respect to the total number employed, tends
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TABLE 2
OCCUPATIONS WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBERS OF LATINO WORKERS (2005)
Occupations # Latino % Latino Median
Weekly
Earnings
Total 16 Years and Over 18,566,630 13.1 $651
Construction laborers 608,328 40.8 $502
Janitors and building cleaners 566,202 27.3 $408
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 559,076 16.4 $624
Cooks 538,534 29.3 $336
Cashiers 498,150 16.2 $336
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 486,464 35.2 $335
Grounds maintenance workers 443,938 37.4 $389
Carpenters 438,468 24.4 $556
Farming, fishing and forestry occupations 393,328 40.3 $372
Retail salespersons 383,264 11.8 $494
Laborers and freight, stock, and
material movers, hand 353,976 19.6 $456
First-line supervisors/managers of retail
sales workers 317,070 9.0 $631
Secretaries and administrative assistants 300,914 8.6 $562
Waiters and waitresses 294,831 15.3 $352
Nursing, psychiatric and home health aides 285,000 15.0 $388
Stock clerks and order fillers 248,370 17.0 $427
Painters, construction and maintenance 241,150 35.0 $466
Child care workers 240,549 18.1 $332
Customer service representatives 240,123 13.1 $524
Packers and packagers, hand 188,032 41.6 $372
Automotive service technicians and mechanics 168,858 17.7 $629
Receptionists and information clerks 167,872 12.2 $466
Food preparation workers 162,016 24.4 $321
Elementary and middle school teachers 154,344 5.9 $826
First-line supervisors/managers of office and
administrative support 143,820 9.0 $686
First-line supervisors/managers of non-retail
sales workers 138,572 9.8 $881
Source: Author's calculations based on data in Employment and Earnings (January 2006).
to be low. For all occupations with high concentrations —or in other words the
highest percentages— of Latinos (see table 3), median weekly earnings were below
the overall median of US$651 in 2005.32 Latino workers are affected by the dis-
appearance of internal job ladders in many industries, on one hand, and, on the
other, by social networks for recruiting that channel them into certain types of jobs.33
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33 See Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: The New Press, 1998); and Roger
Waldinger and Michael I. Lichter, How the Other Half Works (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2003).
TABLE 3
OCCUPATIONS WITH THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGES OF LATINO WORKERS (2005)
Occupations # Latino Median % Latino
Weekly
Earnings
Total 16 Years and Over 13.1 $651 18,566,630
Cement masons, concrete finishers and terrazzo workers 54.4 $519 64,736
Drywall installers, ceiling tile installers and tapers 46.8 $511 117,936
Roofers 42.0 $500 115,080
Butchers and other meat, poultry and fish 
processing workers 42.0 $444 122,640
Packers and packagers, hand 41.6 $372 188,032
Construction laborers 40.8 $502 608,328
Graders and sorters, agricultural products 40.5 $402 27,945
Farming, fishing and forestry occupations 40.3 $372 393,328
Carpet, floor and tile installers and finishers 40.0 $482 118,800
Helpers, construction trades 38.6 $437 43,618
Helpers, production workers 37.8 n.d. 21,924
Packaging and filing machine operators and tenders 37.6 $410 113,928
Grounds maintenance workers 37.4 $389 443,938
Pressers, textile, garment and related materials 35.7 n.d. 24,990
Dishwashers 35.4 $296 93,456
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 35.2 $335 486,464
Painters, construction and maintenance 35.0 $466 241,150
Brickmasons, blockmasons and stonemasons 33.7 $598 82,565
Sewing machine operators 33.6 $360 90,384
Cleaners of vehicles and equipment 33.5 $385 116,245
Dining room and cafeteria attendants and 
bartender helpers 30.4 $347 113,392
Laundry and dry-cleaning workers 29.4 $372 52,332
Cooks 29.3 $336 538,534
Cutting workers 28.6 $496 28,600
Pest control workers 27.8 $508 19,182
Janitors and building cleaners 27.3 $408 566,202
Source: Author's calculations based on data in Employment and Earnings (January 2006).
Undocumented immigrants are all the more vulnerable because of their irregu-
lar status. Furthermore, their numbers have grown markedly over the past few years.
According to Jeffrey Passel’s estimations approximately half of all Mexicans living
in the United States today are undocumented, as are 85 percent of those who have
entered since 2000.34 In general, however, employment is precarious for the lowest-
skilled Latinos because of changes implemented in response to increased interna-
tional competition, which have made the labor market increasingly more segmented
and stratified.     
Many new “labor market niches for immigrants” have grown along with the seem -
ingly endless supply of newcomers. Most of them can earn up to 10 or even 15 times
more than in their countries of origin. Nevertheless they are relegated to the lowest
socioeconomic strata in the United States. Even though Latino workers make up
a growing proportion of the work force, they continue to experience high poverty
rates, high unemployment rates and low incomes.35 Relative wages have noticeably
declined in almost all the occupations that now have high concentrations of Latino
workers (see table 4). The drop is particularly noticeable in some of the specialized
construction trades, where median weekly earnings were higher than the general
median in 1990, and by 2005 they were considerably lower.36 Thus over the past
20 years, Latino workers have generally experienced wage decline with respect to
other population groups in the United States.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, in the case of women, and the early 1990s, for
men, Latinos have had lower median incomes than the rest of the population. La -
ti no men’s median income is slightly lower than Afro-Americans’, and there is a sub-
stantial gap between these two groups and non-Hispanic whites. For men who work
full time year round, Latinos’ median income has been lower than Afro-Americans’
since the mid-1980s, and the gap is growing, as is the much larger gap between La -
tinos and non-Hispanic whites (see graph 1). 
Latina women’s median income is considerably lower than that of AfricanAmerican
women, who actually have incomes somewhat closer to non-Hispanic white women’s.
In the case of women who work year-round full time (see graph 2), Latina’s median
income has consistently been the lowest of all, since it began being registered, and
the difference is growing.37 Among all Latino workers, Mexican males and females
have the lowest median incomes.38
Even though Latino families and households’ median incomes are slightly high-
er than AfricanAmericans’, the gap between both of these groups and non-Hispanic
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34 Passel, “How many Mexicans?”
35 Thomas-Breitfeld, “The Latino Workforce,” Statistical Brief no. 3. Washington, D.C.: National Council
of La Raza, 2003.
36 U.S. Department of Labor, January 1991, 196-199, 223-227; and January, 2006, 218-223, 258-262.
37 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2004,
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38 For a more detailed analysis of Latinos’ occupations and earnings in the United States, see Elaine
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white families and households tends to grow. Furthermore, Latino families and
households appear to do better than African American ones not because of indi-
vidual earnings —which as we have just seen tend to be lower than those of African
American men and women, respectively— but because there are more persons
employed per family or household. At the same time, however, there are usually
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also more dependents. Latino households often include members of the extend-
ed family (uncles, aunts, cousins, etc.), and even individuals who are not family mem-
bers but perhaps come from the same hometown. The net effect is that the higher
incomes have to meet the needs of a larger number of persons; thus, from 1985 on,
Latinos’ per capita income has been lower than African Americans’. In 2003, the dif-
ference was just over US$2,000 per year (US$13,492 and US$15,583, respec tively),
and non-Hispanic whites’ per capita income was almost double (US$26,774).39
While the poverty rate for African Americans has been cut in half since 1959,
the rate for Latinos has not improved overall, beyond that observed in the early
1970s, when such data was first registered. In general, Latino poverty rose between
1972 and 1994 (from 22.8 percent in 1972 to 30.7 percent in 1994), and then return -
ed to prior levels as a result of the economic expansion thereafter (see graph 3).
African Americans, who comprised 31.1 percent of those living below the poverty
threshold in 1966, were only 25.4 percent in 2004, whereas Latinos, who were 10.3
percent of those living in poverty in 1972, comprised 24.7 percent by 2004 (see
graph 4).40 In other words, a little more that one-eighth of the total population is
Latino but Latinos now constitute almost one fourth of all those with incomes
below the poverty line. If these tendencies continue, Latinos will not only be the largest
ethnic or racial minority —as the 2000 census classifies them— they may also soon
become the most impoverished. Moreover, the proportion of recently arrived Mex -
icans and Latinos living in poverty definitely exceeds the overall rates. 
Source: Constructed by the author with data from the Current Population Survey, Historical
Poverty Tables.
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What Opportunities and Obstacles 
Do the Children of Mexican Immigrants Face?
The differences observed in incomes and socioeconomic status can be partially
explained by differences in years of schooling, particularly in recent decades, given
the high correlation between earnings and educational attainment observable in the
United States. Despite this connection, however, dropping out of high school is still
fairly prevalent among Latinos. Access to higher education is still quite limited for
most Latino youth, consequently limiting their employment options and also the
perspectives for intergenerational socioeconomic mobility. As shown is graphs 5 and
6, Mexicans lag furthest behind in terms of educational attainment in the United
States.
The high percentage of Mexicans who have not finished high school, or its equiv-
alent in Mexico, is largely due to the fact that compulsory education there only
includes nine years of schooling. In fact, many small villages only have elementary
schools. Upon finishing the ninth grade, or secundaria in Mexico, many families
consider that their children’s formal education has concluded, and they are ready to
go to work. At that time, young people from regions with high migratory rates may
choose to set out on their first journey north. This helps explain, to some extent,
why educational attainment for Mexicans in the U.S. is so low. 
Something not so easily explainable, however, is the great disparity in income
levels for persons with similar levels of educational attainment. At all levels, the aver-
age incomes of white males are considerably higher that those of African American
males or females, Latino males or females and white females. The differences grow
as educational attainment rises, and can only be attributed to persistent, racial,
ethnic and gender discrimination in the U.S. labor market (see graph 7).
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Despite these clear income differentials, Roberto Suro maintains that “In the
United States today the most impenetrable barriers to economic mobility are not
to be found in the labor markets, but in the nation’s public school systems.”41 A
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Source: Constructed by the author with data from the Statistical Abstract of the
U.S. 2004-2005.
Source: Constructed by the author with data from the Statistical Abstract of the
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41 Roberto Suro, Strangers Among Us, Latino Lives in a Changing America (New York: Vintage Books,
1999), 314.
little further on, he adds, “The segregation of winners and losers in American soci-
ety still bears a high correlation to race and ethnicity but most of the segregating
takes place before people look for their first job,”42 in other words, while they are
still in school, or when they drop out of school. As we have already mentioned,
educational attainment is one of the most important determinants of income. A
large portion of the Mexican population in the U.S. has not completed high school
(or its equivalent in Mexico). Referring to the vicious circle metaphor seems unavoid -
able. Low family incomes and parents with little schooling are among the factors
most often associated with poor performance in school and high probabilities of
dropping out. 
In general, in the United States today, rich children and poor children do not
usually attend the same schools. Most AfricanAmerican and Latino children attend
schools where racial and ethnic minorities predominate and the preparation they
receive may be quite different from that offered to their non-Hispanic white and
Asian peers, who attend other schools in other neighborhoods. Commemoration
(in 2004) of the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court decision banning racial
segregation in public schools was dampened by persistent de facto segregation.
Since school assignment is determined by place of residence, schools in many
cities throughout the country are, in fact, even more segregated than they were
50 years ago. Furthermore, the inequality in funding between rich school districts
and poor ones is growing. “By relying on local property taxes as a crucial source of
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42 Ibid.
funds, the U.S. has created a caste system of public education that is increasing-
ly separate and unequal.”43
Moreover, segregation occurs not only between schools but also within schools.
In any given school students may be grouped in ways that in effect result in sep-
arating Afro-Americans and Latinos from non-Hispanic whites and others. New
means are constantly being devised that differentiate the educational experiences
and outcomes for poor minority children from those of their middle- and upper-class
counterparts.44 Funding, infrastructure, and even teaching practices, goals and content
differ to such an extent that the aims and objectives of the teaching-learning process
end up being not at all similar. Thus, the dreams and aspirations, the opportunities
and options for poor Latino immigrant children are limited almost as soon as they
enter school in the United Status. The public school system is, by and large, prepar-
ing them for the same kinds of low-skilled, low-paying jobs their parents have.
Final Considerations
Latino participation in the U.S. work force is expected to grow significantly over
the next few years and reach 17 percent by 2014.45 Labor Department projections
indicate that the number of low-skilled, low-wage, service sector jobs will also rise
considerably. Given the country’s changing demographic profile —an aging popu-
lation with low birth rates— and the low cost of unskilled Mexican labor, new
immigrants will still be finding employment opportunities in the U.S. for years to
come. Even though birth rates have recently declined somewhat in Mexico, pre-
vailing economic policies will probably assure a ready supply of emigrants for some
time yet. Thus, the demand for, and supply of, Mexican immigrant labor in the U.S.
will surely continue well into the next decade.
For more than 10 years now the U.S. has been unsuccessfully grappling with the
need for immigration reform. Nevertheless, and in spite of Mexican former President
(2000-2006) Vicente Fox’s repeated references to the possibilities for an “immigra-
tion agreement” between the two countries, there is no indication that the U.S. is
willing to consider anything other than unilateral action on this issue. However,
thus far, any action whatsoever has been elusive. Many proposals for immigra-
tion reform have been introduced into Congress over the past several years, but
few of them have gotten as far as to have actually been voted on. Senators Edward
Kennedy (Democrat) and John McCain (Republican) have been the most persist-
ent proponents of such legislation, but even these bipartisan attempts, of which there
have been several successive versions, have all failed. 
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In January 2004, President Bush launched his own proposal for a new and enhanc -
 ed Temporary Worker Program. In December 2005, the House of Represen tatives
passed the highly controversial and highly punitive proposal sponsored by Repre -
sen tative James Sensenbrenner, which after 239 votes for and only 182 against, became
known as H.R. 4437. This sparked massive protests by Latinos and many others through-
out the country in the spring of 2006. Different and considerably more flexible leg-
islation was subsequently approved by the Senate at the end of May, but it was
obviously not possible to reconcile the sharp differences between the two. Toward
the end of 2007, it became clear that any action on immigration reform will have
to wait until after the 2008 presidential elections.  
Since there has been no federal action in this area, many states have passed
their own laws, most of which are restrictive measures with an anti-immigrant bias.
Fe de ral officials have staged selective raids at some worksites, and many undocu-
mented workers have been deported. The climate of fear that prevails in many
localities nationwide now contrasts sharply with the exuberance of the 2006
marches and demonstrations.
Oddly enough, the Republican front runner at this time, and presidential candi-
date, John McCain, and the two Democratic contenders, Barack Obama and Hillary
Clinton, have voiced similar views on the need to regularize the status of the approx -
imately 12 million currently undocumented immigrants in the U.S., over half of whom
are presumably Mexican. All three voted “yes” on the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act approved by the Senate in 2006, but also voted “yes” to the Secure
Fence Act creating 700 miles of new fence along the U.S.-Mexico border. They all
favor granting in-state college tuition and even some sort of path to residency or
citizenship, for undocumented youth brought into the country by their parents when
they were younger. Obama and Clinton voted “no” on explicitly declaring English as
the national language, whereas McCain voted “yes.”
However, their apparent agreement on wanting to provide undocumented work-
ers with an opportunity to earn legal status is by no means a guarantee that legisla-
tion to that effect will be approved by the new Congress after the elections. Many
legislators are virulently opposed to granting what they consider to be “amnesty” to
those who, they argue, “have not played by the rules.” Most of these same law-mak-
ers —and many people in general— are not nearly as interested in punishing and
sanctioning employers who hire undocumented workers as they are in taking action
against the workers themselves. 
The entire question of immigration reform with all of its ramifications and relat -
ed issues is a highly controversial subject throughout the U.S. Despite the fact that
almost everyone agrees that the existing system has broken down and needs to be
fixed, it is not at all clear that there will be enough consensus on any of the ques-
tions involved to be able to pass new laws in the near future. What is clear is that,
in the minds of most, immigration is now strongly linked to national security and
hence not an issue open to bilateral discussion. In fact, immigration has always
been dealt with in the U.S. as a unilateral rather than a bilateral or multilateral
issue.  
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Introduction1
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was expected to raise industrial
wages in Mexico, perhaps not to the U.S. level but at least higher than before; and the
Mexican maquiladora industry was the prime candidate for this type of improvement
because it is the most closely integrated with the United States and because its
wages used to be just half of those paid in the manufacturing sector. The objective
of this chapter is to test this hypothesis of an upwards convergence between maquila-
dora and manufacturing wages, which, together, comprise all of Mexico’s industry.
The principal finding is that convergence has been downwards instead of
upwards; that is, with manufacturing wages coming down toward the maquiladora
level and with maquiladora wages remaining constant. This is what is meant by
the term “maquiladorization” of the manufacturing industry: a historical shift in the
level of industrial wages in which the lower-paying industry has become the stan-
dard for what had traditionally been the higher-paying one. The downward turn
in the structure of industrial remunerations is explained in this chapter within the
context of NAFTA and free trade in general.
To put this change into perspective and demonstrate the degree to which it is
related to free trade, data series spanning several decades are used, making it possi-
ble to draw links between the most dramatic movements in wage levels and significant
changes in trade liberalization (the different measures taken to open Mexico’s mar-
ket to international commerce). These data series start back in the mid-1970s, when
commercial policy was still protectionist, and move through the liberalization process
that began in the mid-1980s, culminating in the NAFTA agreement in 1994, which,
by 2008, had completed the process of tariff elimination in North America.
Data on average industrial wages are used to make nationwide generalizations
about how well workers of the maquiladora and manufacturing industries have
fared under this liberalization process.2 This aggregate data is then disaggregated
into different branches of industry, matching those of the maquiladora with corre-
sponding sectors of manufacturing to provide a more detailed analysis that reveals
*Researcher at UNAM’s Center for Research on North America.
1 The author thanks Marcela Osnaya Ortega for her help with the graphs and tables in this article.
2 Wages include fringe benefits and are measured for all direct workers, that is, production workers,
supervisors and technicians, but not clerical employees or management.
THE “MAQUILADORIZATION” OF THE MEXICAN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY UNDER NAFTA
Monica Gambrill*
important differences hidden within the average industrial data. A few branches of
manufacturing were able to avoid sacrificing their wage levels when faced with the
international competition brought by liberalization; but others responded by lower-
ing their wages to the same level as those paid in the maquiladoras; and a third group
of manufacturing branches fell still further below this mark.
The correlation between the relative wage levels of these three types of man-
ufacturing branches and their structural characteristics, along with the specific
liberalization schedules to which they were subjected and the steps they took to
make their production competitive, are all factors that will help understand the
relationship between wages and free trade. The structural characteristics of the dif-
ferent manufacturing branches include variables such as whether the establishments
are large or small, capital- or labor-intensive, have received foreign investment or not,
as well as whether their production is internationalized or concentrated in the
country of origin. Also of importance are the differences in the way liberalization
measures were applied to specific manufacturing branches and the way the latter
responded, ranging from those that had already modernized their productive meth-
ods to those that converted to maquiladora-style production, to those that did noth-
ing to prevent the impending onslaught except reduce wages.
It would be too detailed to analyze each branch of manufacturing since the
objective of this chapter is to give a general overview of the different types of strate-
gies used for managing the liberalization process and their impact on wage levels.
Therefore, just one example of each of the three different types of manufacturing
strategies will be analyzed in detail here, making only summary references to the
rest. The full study, including all branches of industry, is available for consultation.3
The comparison with the maquiladora industry is used as a control, since there was
no reason to expect them to be negatively affected by free trade, having always oper-
ated in a competitive international environment; on the contrary, they were expect-
ed to raise their wages.
The first section of the chapter analyzes average wages in both industries and
nationwide liberalization measures; the second section does the same but on the
branch level, with the three different examples of manufacturing strategies deal-
ing with liberalization; and the conclusions discuss some of the larger issues relat-
ed to free trade and its impact on wages.
Average Manufacturing versus Maquiladora
Wages and General Liberalization Measures
In graph 1: “Wages in the Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries (1975-2006)”
we see changes in real wages in both industries over the course of three deca-
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3 Monica Gambrill, “El impacto del TLCAN en las remuneraciones de la industria de la transformación
en México”, in Monica Gambrill, ed., Diez años del TLCAN en México (Mexico City: Universidad Na-
cional Autónoma de México-CISAN/IIE/FE), 57-100.
des.4 It is clear at first glance that the most pronounced drops in the wages of
both industries occurred in 1983 and 1995, corresponding, on the one hand, to the
debt crisis that began at the end of 1982 and, on the other, to the financial crisis
that began in late 1994. What is not clear is how to distinguish the effect of these
two crises from that of the liberalization measures that also began in the mid-
1980s and then culminated in January 1994 with NAFTA. This is the crux of most
disputes about the relationship between free trade and wages in Mexico, and it is
necessary to take a position on it from the beginning.
If all drops in manufacturing wages, from their high point in 1982 onward, were
attributed to free trade, then it would be a closed case: free trade would have to
be considered extremely harmful to Mexican workers. However, if the 1993 crisis is
attributed to debt accumulated during the previous protectionist period —incurred
to cover the deficit in the balance of payments but leading to catastrophic inflation,
devaluation and national insolvency— then the question is how much of the sub-
sequent decline in real wages should be attributed to the failure of protectionism
instead of blaming it on free trade? The stance taken here is that the 1993 crisis was
the product of the old system, not the new. This is not to say that free trade is bene-
volent for industries and workers; rather that, in order to measure it correctly,
those junctures in which liberalization accelerated have to be focused on, separat-
ing them carefully from the effects of the debt crisis.
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GRAPH 1
WAGES IN THE MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES (1975-2006)
Maquiladora Manufacturing
Source: Table 1, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries,
1975-2006” (see the Statistical Appendix of this chapter).
The cumulative loss in manufacturing wages during the crises of 1983 and
1984 was 28.2 percent, but by 1985 this tendency had ended.5 This drop in wages
cannot be attributed to trade liberalization because it was not until 1985 that
quantitative restrictions on imports (quotas) began to be eliminated. However, the
second sharp reduction in wages does seem to be related to trade, since it coin-
cided with Mexico’s entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
in 1986, causing a cumulative loss of 19.5 percent during the ensuing three-year
period, from 1986 to 1988. During the following six years, from 1989 through 1994,
the downward trend came to an end and wages recovered 28.3 percent, ending even
higher than they had been before the beginning of the GATT sub-period. So, this pos-
itive reaction could be interpreted as the result of the industrial restructuring that
was put into effect to counter the impact of GATT liberalization, as well as an ini-
tial positive response to NAFTA during its first year in force, 1994.
With respect to the 1995 financial crisis, the greatest impact on wage levels,
which brought them down 30.5 percent, was concentrated in the first two years
of the crisis. Even though this period overlapped with NAFTA, during its second and
third years in effect, the case for attributing the financial crisis to free trade is cir-
cumstantial: same time, same place, same leaders, but not directly related to the free
trade agreement itself. Therefore, the extent to which losses in real wages incurred
during this crisis should be attributed to free trade is, at best, questionable. That said,
what can clearly be demonstrated is the unsatisfactory growth rate after the finan-
cial crisis, from 1997 to 2006, which is the best measure of NAFTA’s performance.
From 1997 through 2006, growth in wages has been very slow, albeit constant,
yielding a cumulative increase of 22.7 percent in 10 years. This might seem like
a good record but manufacturing wages did not recoup nearly as rapidly in this
period as they did in the previous six-year GATT sub-period. The end result was
that in 2006, real wages were still 15 percent below their 1994 level when NAFTA
came into effect and 37 percent below their starting point in 1977. This is far
from what was expected to result from the NAFTA agreement, and, therefore, it
cannot be considered to have been successful in raising manufacturing wages.
Maquiladora wages serve as a point of comparison for measuring what has hap-
pened in the manufacturing industry because they are not negatively impacted by
free trade. Having always had to adjust their costs to world market prices, their
labor policy was designed to be extremely competitive, which is why they were
able to pay only a bit more than half the manufacturing wage. This can be seen
in graph 1: they were 42 percent lower in 1977 and still 43 percent below in 1985.
From 1985 on, the gap between the two industries lessened, not because maquiladora
wages went up but rather because manufacturing wages went down. Twenty-one years
later, in 2006, real maquiladora wages were only 8.5 percent higher than in 1985.
This is not to say that maquiladora wages did not react to the crisis in Mexico.
On the contrary, they had negative growth rates of -22.8 percent in 1983-1984
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and of -12.6 in 1995-1996. They also responded to free trade in the same direc-
tion as manufacturing but on a very different scale. In the GATT sub-period, they
lost 6.4 percent of their buying power during the first three years (1986-1988),
but then regained 11.5 percent of it (1989-1994). In the NAFTA sub-period, their
buying power increased 18.6 percent overall (1997-2006), however with two dis-
tinct trends, having gone up through 2002 but consistently down thereafter. This
change from 2003 onward is related to the transfer of assembly production to
China, sending maquiladora wages on a slightly different path from manufactur-
ing, where wages were slowly but continually rising.
As we have seen, the overall trend from 1974 through 2006 has been for man-
ufacturing wages to fall closer and closer to the maquiladora level, which is what
is meant by the term “maquiladorization”. More specifically, in the NAFTA sub-
period, wage levels in these two industries began to move in perfect synchrony
with each other. From 1996 to 2002, manufacturing wages had completed their
downward adjustment to the competitive level paid in the maquiladora industry.
However, after China came on board in 2003, this synchronization ended and,
although the wage levels of the two industries have remained much closer togeth-
er than in any previous sub-period, they did begin to separate slightly.
Where this competition with China will lead industrial wages after 2006 is, of
course, unknown; but hints of what is to come after the NAFTA sub-period will
become clearer after disaggregating the industrial data onto the branch level to
see which specific manufacturing branches synchronized their wages with the
maquiladoras, which remained above this level and which fell below. This is what
will be done in the following section.
Manufacturing and Maquiladora Wages in Select Industrial Branches
And Branch-specific Liberalization Measures
To examine more closely the double impact liberalization and restructuring have
had on wages, data from both the manufacturing and the maquiladora industries
will be disaggregated into industrial branches. Of the nine branches that comprise the
maquiladora industry, only three will be compared to their equivalents in the man-
ufacturing industry, due to space limitations in this chapter. However, these three
are representative of the rest in that they are examples of the three different pat-
terns of interaction that have been detected between maquiladoras and manufac-
turing in a larger study. Similarities and differences are based on the degree to
which specific manufacturing branches have converted to the fragmented pro-
ductive process used in the maquiladoras, as well as on the degree to which they
have reduced their wages to the maquiladora level.
The first comparison is between the “electric and electronic” branches of the
two industries studied. Liberalization was embraced early in this branch of man-
ufacturing and was reinforced by sector-wide agreements that further speeded its
commercial opening. Above and beyond the nationwide elimination of import per-
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mits in 1985 and Mexico’s entry into the GATT in 1986, the rest of the sectoral
protectionist policy that had previously prevailed in this industrial branch was also
dismantled. In 1987, two Trade Ministry (SECOFI) decrees changed this sector’s
specific protectionist program; and a 1990 presidential decree eliminated practi-
cally all tariff and non-tariff barriers in the area of computers.6 This radical liber-
alization continued deepening not only under NAFTA but also later, in 1998, under
the first Sectoral Program (Prosec),7 with any country at all, even those without a
reciprocal trade agreement with Mexico. Hence, commercial policies applicable
to this manufacturing branch were harmonized with those that used to be restrict-
ed to the maquiladoras and other export industries.
Liberalization in this manufacturing branch led to the adoption of the same pro-
duction style used in the maquiladoras: i.e. fragmentation of production chains and
outsourcing of foreign intermediary goods. As a result, industrial activity in the man-
ufacturing branch has centered on the assembly of these imported parts and pieces.8
Up until the 1990s, both the manufacturing and maquiladora branches were still far
removed from the production of competitive intermediary goods and challenged to
deepen their productive processes. However, in the 1990s, a new image of the “elec-
tric-electronic” branches began to emerge. They were adding more national content
to their products by incorporating complex manufacturing and design operations into
their operations.9 All of these commercial and structural adjustments impacted the
industrial branches’ remunerations in one way or the other.
As can be seen in graph 2: “Wages in the Electric and Electronics Assembly
Branches: Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries (1980-2006),” manufactur-
ing wages fell not only in the 1983-1984 crisis but also continually through 1988,
almost to the point of convergence with maquiladoras. This happened from as far
back as the GATT sub-period and is due not only to the nationwide liberalization
that this multilateral trade agreement implied but also to the sector-specific meas-
ures described above. Even though manufacturing wages improved a bit between
1991 and 1995, resisting the financial crisis of that year with no significant impact,
from 1996 on they converged with the maquiladoras. This is not to deny that there
was an improvement in maquiladora wages in the NAFTA sub-period and that man-
ufacturing kept up with them, probably due to the upgrading of production that
took place in this branch in the 1990s; however, this trend reversed in maquilado-
ras starting in 2003 due to competition with China, and it is yet to be seen whether
manufacturing will follow or not.
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6 Arturo Borja, El Estado y el desarrollo industrial. La política mexicana de cómputo en una perspectiva
comparada (Mexico City: CIDE/Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 1995), 175-177.
7 These programs eliminated tariffs on imported parts, machinery and equipment from any country for
use in the electric and electronics industry.
8 As can be seen in the statistical index for graph 2, the industrial classes that comprise the “electric
and electronic” manufacturing branch all refer to their “assembly” function in the production of dif-
ferent products.
9 Sergio Ordóñez, “La nueva industria electrónica en México en el contexto del Tratado de Libre Co-
mercio de Norteamérica” (paper, International Colloquium on “El Impacto del TLCAN en México a
los 10 Años,” National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, June 29-30, 2004).
On the basis of this branch-specific information, it can be concluded that its
wages behaved in a very different way from the national average seen in the first
graph. This manufacturing branch is characterized by its early and deep liberaliza-
tion, especially in the area of electronics, which determined not only its conversion
to fragmented production but also its early convergence with wage levels in the
corresponding maquiladora branch. This example of convergence is not restricted
to the “electric-electronic” branch; it happened in other branches as well, such as
“tools” and “clothing”. Hence, “convergence” with maquiladora wages characterizes a
specific type of manufacturing branches, as they restructure in order to deal with
liberalization. It is not, however, the only typology hidden within the national aver-
age; two more are yet to be seen.
The second comparison can be seen in graph 3: “Wages in the Furniture Branch:
Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries (1980-2006).” The manufacturing branch
reduced its wages from quite a high level before the 1983 debt crisis to below the
level of the maquiladora branch, as far back as 1987 in the middle of the GATT sub-
period. Even though it rallied a bit before NAFTA went into effect, it fell again with
the 1995 financial crisis. Although it contained its fall in 1998 and then began to
rise again afterwards, it has never caught up with maquiladora wages. This is because
maquiladora wages have been growing steadily from 1996 on, despite competition
with China, due in part to Mexico’s proximity to the United States which gives heavy,
bulky products like furniture a competitive advantage. However this advantage would
work in favor of the manufacturing branch as well; so, the decisive variables have
more to do with the efficiency of their production: the economies of scale that their
larger size affords, as well as the efficiency that their peculiar style of fragmented
production brings to their ability to compete in the world market.
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GRAPH 2
WAGES IN THE ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY BRANCHES:
MAQUILADORAS AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Maquiladora Manufacturing
Source: Table 2, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Machinery, Equipment and Electronics
Apparatuses and Articles Assembly Branch, and in the Electric and Electronic Accesories
Branch:Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries, 1980-2006” (see the StatisticalAppendix
of this chapter).
Manufacturing’s inability to pay wages comparable to the maquiladora’s has to
do both with its structural characteristics and the way liberalization was carried
out in this branch. It was not until late 1986 that government permits to import
wooden products and metallic furniture were no longer required; even afterwards,
average tariffs fell slowly, and were still 18 percent to 19 percent in 1988.10 Despite
having resisted the trade opening, this manufacturing branch still had to face
competition later with imported final goods, more in the NAFTA than in the GATT sub-
period. What is more, no sector-specific agreements were adopted allowing free
access to imported intermediate goods required to modernize production until a
very recent Prosec. Neither private enterprise nor government led a concerted effort
to prepare this manufacturing branch for the trade opening by implementing a
restructuring plan. This is due to the fact that it is composed predominantly of small
businesses, working with traditional designs and low productivity levels.
“Furniture” is representative of other branches such as “shoes,” “toys and sport-
ing goods,” where the traditional relationship between manufacturing and maqui-
ladora wages is also inverted. The fact that some manufacturing branches fall
below the maquiladora parameter represents a historical change in Mexico, demon-
strating just how grave the situation of these traditional manufacturing branches
is. The only strategy they had was delaying liberalization as long as possible, open-
ing up to international commerce late and half-way, without discriminating clearly
between the benefits of protection for final goods and the disadvantages of pro-
tecting the intermediate goods they use. By charging the same tariffs on both kinds
116 MONICA GAMBRILL
10 Adrian Ten Kate and Fernando de Mateo Venturini, “Apertura comercial y estructura de la protec-
ción en México. Estimaciones cuantitativas de los ochenta,” Comercio Exterior, vol. 39, no. 4 (April
1989): 323, 326.
1.000
0.900
0.800
0.700
0.600
0.500
0.400
0.300
0.200
0.100
0.000
B
uy
in
g
Po
w
er
In
de
x
D
ec
.1
98
2=
1.
00
0
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
GRAPH 3
WAGES IN THE FURNITURE BRANCH: MAQUILADORAS
AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Maquiladora Manufacturing
Source: Table 3, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Construction, Reconstruction andAssembly
of Transport Equipment andAccesories Branch: Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries,
1980-2006)” (see the Statistical Appendix of this chapter).
of goods, the companies deprived themselves of free access to intermediate goods
that would have been indispensable for industrial restructuring and successful
competition with imported final goods later on. It is important to recognize that
this alternative is worse than “maquiladorization.”
The third comparison can be seen in graph 4: “Wages in the Transport Equip-
ment and Accessories Branch: Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries (1980-
2006).” The wage curve for manufacturing is higher than the national average and
very different from the other two cases above that either converged with the maqui-
ladoras or fell significantly below them. In “transport,” manufacturing wages started
off more than double maquiladora wages and ended up about a third above it, far
from recovering their initial level but also with a significant distance from conver-
gence with maquiladoras. They also suffered during the periods of liberalization: in
the GATT sub-period, from 1986 to 1988 when import permits protecting the auto-
mobile industry were done away with and tariffs were reduced to 17 percent;11
and again at the beginning of the NAFTA sub-period, from 1997 to 1999, when they
remained flat. However, after each of these downturns, the wage level went back
up again to the same purchasing capacity as before the corresponding period of
commercial opening. Thus, this branch of manufacturing avoided the permanent
traumas that the other two branches experienced during the course of their liber-
alization, outperforming the national average. The question is, why was it relative-
ly sheltered from the onslaught of foreign competition?
This independence from the maquiladora norm is due to a unique combination
of two factors: the initial protection that the sector-specific auto agreement pro-
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GRAPH 4
WAGES IN THE TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT AND ACCESORIES BRANCH:
MAQUILADORAS AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Source: Table 4, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Construction, Reconstruction andAssembly
of Transport Equipment andAccesories Branch: Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries,
1980-2006)” (see the Statistical Appendix of this chapter).
vided it from imports of assembled vehicles for 22 years, encouraging them to man-
ufacture auto parts that the government obliged foreign companies to incorporate
into their final products; and, simultaneously, the fact that this same agreement
began opening this manufacturing branch up to the importation of auto parts from
1982 onward. Another decree in the GATT sub-period, in 1989, completely freed up
importation of intermediary goods, at the same time as maintaining tariff and non-
tariff barriers on the importation of finished vehicles, thus reinforcing this early
strategic decision to specialize in intermediary goods. And with NAFTA, motor vehicles
were one of the last sectors to open to foreign competition.12 Despite this protection,
it had to conform to international standards because it sold its parts to maquilado-
ras and other foreign assembly plants.13 However, at the same time, this influence
was attenuated by the greater profit margin that protection from imports of final
goods afforded the assembly companies, all of which helped keep wages higher.
Thus, this manufacturing branch was shaped by a virtuous combination of pro-
tection and liberalization. It is an example of what can be accomplished within the
logic of fragmented production, having enjoyed a longstanding, consistent indus-
trial policy that encouraged local production of intermediate goods. To a large extent,
this is due to the fact that the companies in this branch are large enough to influence
the government in designing an industrial policy appropriate to them. “Transport”
forms part of a third category of industrial branches that consistently maintained
their wages higher than those of the maquiladoras, primarily oriented toward assem-
bly. Other examples of manufacturing branches with wage levels significantly above
maquiladoras are “food” and “chemicals,” where the gap between the two industries
has even increased over time. This is due to the fact that they use production tech-
nology that is completely different from the fragmented maquiladora model, employ-
ing highly specialized labor with wages that compare very favorably with those of less
skilled assembly workers. Even though they were not sheltered from foreign com-
petition, they are competitive enough to hold their own.
Conclusions
The general conclusion is that free trade eliminates the differences between the man-
ufacturing and maquiladora industries, not only by bringing the former’s wages
down to the latter’s but also by creating conditions that make it advantageous to
adopt the fragmented production style that characterizes globalization. This is
perceived in Mexico as a historic loss, both for the workers of the manufacturing
industry who see the possibility of earning a decent living slip away from them
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12 Humberto Juárez Núñez, “La industria automotriz en México. Diagnóstico y desarrollo en una polí-
tica económica alternativa,” in José Luis Calva, Mario Capdevielle Allevato and Cuauhtémoc Pérez
Llanas, comps., Industria manufacturera: Situación actual y desarrollo bajo un modelo alternativo (Mexico
City: UAM-Xochimilco, 1996), 392-393.
13 Jordy Micheli, “Industria, calidad y poder (A propósito de la industria de autopartes en México)” in Cal-
va, Allevato and Pérez, Industria Manufacturera, 407.
and for the owners of these industries who often end up in bankruptcy or having
to sell their businesses. An overly simplified response to this is the desire to return to
old-style protectionism, as it existed before the 1982 crisis, without recognizing that
that system’s inefficiencies were what caused the debt crisis to begin with. A more
realistic response is attempted here, identifying those elements within the new sys-
tem of fragmented production that allow the standard of living to improve.
Fragmented production is not limited to assembly operations only; it also requires
the production of intermediate goods, not to mention the participation of the mul-
tinational corporations that subcontract these different processes and commer-
cialize the final products worldwide. What we have seen in this chapter, once the
national average of manufacturing wages was broken down into a variety of indus-
trial branches, is that these branches have reacted in three different ways to lib-
eralization, only one of which can be considered successful. The formula for this
successful adaptation seems to have been getting the right combination of early
protection from imported intermediate goods, at the same time as gradually open-
ing to imported final goods, before the liberalization process came into full swing.
This was achieved with the help of government intervention that fine-tuned the
trade opening to protect high-value local manufacturing while at the same time
allowing sufficient foreign competition to force conversion to international best-
practice standards. In lieu of an industrial policy of this type, what the interna-
tional market propitiates is specialization in the assembly of imported intermediate
goods.
Branches like transport are the basis for this formula because they incorporate
both the manufacture and the final assembly of intermediate parts, with the end
result of keeping wage levels significantly higher than those in the other two cate-
gories of industrial branches. It seems that the most important variable for branches
like transport is having had the proper combination of early exposure to interna-
tional competition, plus elements of prolonged protection from imported goods,
determined by their branch-specific industrial policy. Despite suffering temporar-
ily from the negative impact of liberalization, both in the GATT and in the NAFTA
sub-periods, they were able on each occasion to return to the same wage level
they had had before. This indicates successful restructuring in tune with the new
conditions of the globalized economy, adapting successfully to competition from
abroad, even though wages in these branches were never able to return to their
1980 highs.
Manufacturing branches like electric-electronics have been shaped more by
international market forces than by national industrial policy; hence, their orienta-
tion has been toward adopting the assembly model, although recently they began
to manufacture some of their own intermediate goods in Mexico. It is important to
recognize this possibility for the production of intermediate goods to evolve out of
assembly operations, even though it had not existed previously to liberalization, as
well as the possibility of reinforcing this evolution through industrial policy. Remunera-
tions in these manufacturing branches were negatively impacted at first when
obliged to adopt the assembly model, with downward convergence to the level of
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the maquiladoras; but, with the beginning of production of intermediate goods, both
maquiladora and manufacturing wages began to increase. However, the multina-
tional corporations that subcontract both assembly and production of intermediate
goods in the maquiladoras put a cap on these wage increases by sending some of
their operations to China. Whether manufacturing will follow maquiladoras down-
ward or not might depend on whether an industrial policy is put in place to raise
productivity in Mexico.
Manufacturing branches like furniture, in the absence of an industrial policy
to prod them toward a restructuring plan, have resisted liberalization through
political pressure for continued protection. However, this does not constitute an
acceptable alternative for the small and medium-sized producers of traditional
goods in these manufacturing branches; rather, it drags their agony out until they
finally close down or sell out to larger ones able to convert to the assembly model
and keeps their wages stagnating below the maquiladora level. Protectionism in
an open market is unlike protectionism decades ago, when it allowed excess prof-
its to be accumulated at the expense of the consumer. Now, its consequences are
worse than those of the assembly model because it has no possibility of compet-
ing with imports and, hence, cannot guarantee a decent living wage to workers.
There should have been a plan to help these industries restructure their produc-
tion before the liberalization process began but it is still possible for them to find
a place in the new system of fragmented production, either as assemblers or as pro-
ducers of intermediate goods.
Despite the rigors of fragmented production, it is possible to work within its
logic to find ways to upgrade production from assembly to manufacture of inter-
mediate goods, and then possibly to brand-name products whose production is
scattered among different subcontracting companies around the world. Moving
up this ladder requires support from the state in the form of a congruent indus-
trial policy, which would benefit not only the companies involved but also their
workers and the population in general since more sophisticated manufacturing
affords higher wages and adds more value locally, thus expanding the tax base and
allowing the government to provide better services. Creating a virtuous circle of
this kind is one way to move forward toward industrial development, although it is
not the only one because, as we have seen, there are other manufacturing branch-
es with different production models, capable of adding more value and paying higher
wages than in the branches characterized by fragmented production. Therefore, we
recognize that there are limits to what industrial policy can or should do to promote
upgrading in fragmented production —since it has to take into account the needs
of other manufacturing branches, as well as other sectors, such as agriculture and
services— but in it lies the key to avoiding the “maquiladorization” that an unabridged
free market economy tends to extend throughout manufacturing branches.
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Statistical Appendix
TABLE 1. WAGE OF DIRECT WORKERS IN THE MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1975-2006)
Average Inflation Real Growth Average Real Growth
Daily Wage Index Wage Rate Daily Wage Wage Rate
Workers and Maquiladora Manu-
Technicians December Industry Workers facturing
Maquiladora 1982=100 (Dec. MAQUI- MANUFAC- (Dec. MANUFAC-
Year Industry1 1982 pesos) LADORA TURING 1982 pesos) TURING
1975 0.094 13.4 0.697
19761 0.117 15.6 0.754 8.2
1977 0.151 20.1 0.753 -0.1 0.261 1.298
1978 0.173 23.6 0.732 -2.9 0.302 1.278 -1.5
1979 0.197 27.9 0.705 -3.7 0.353 1.264 -1.1
1980 0.227 35.2 0.645 -8.5 0.439 1.245 -1.5
1981 0.290 45.1 0.643 -0.3 0.584 1.296 4.0
1982 0.495 71.6 0.691 7.5 0.926 1.293 -0.2
1983 0.794 144.6 0.549 -20.6 1.435 0.992 -23.3
1984 1.285 239.3 0.537 -2.2 2.219 0.927 -6.5
1985 1.998 377.5 0.529 -1.5 3.497 0.927 -0.1
1986 3.603 703.0 0.513 -3.2 5.989 0.852 -8.1
19872 8.459 1,629.6 0.519 1.3 12.746 0.782 -8.2
1988 17.262 3,490.1 0.495 -4.7 26.041 0.746 -4.6
1989 22.104 4,188.4 0.528 6.7 33.365 0.797 6.8
1990 28.024 5,304.7 0.528 0.1 42.965 0.810 1.7
1991 33.677 6,506.8 0.518 -2.0 55.122 0.847 4.6
1992 39.627 7,515.9 0.527 1.9 67.712 0.901 6.3
1993 43.211 8,248.8 0.524 -0.6 76.260 0.924 2.6
19943 48.692 8,823.4 0.552 5.3 84.416 0.957 3.5
1995 60.844 11,911.5 0.511 -7.4 88.051 0.739 -22.7
1996 77.482 16,006.5 0.484 -5.2 106.500 0.665 -10.0
1997 95.407 19,308.0 0.494 2.1 128.585 0.666 0.1
1998 113.925 22,383.4 0.509 3.0 152.888 0.683 2.6
1999 135.586 26,095.8 0.520 2.1 180.885 0.693 1.5
2000 156.772 28,572.7 0.549 5.6 210.566 0.737 6.3
2001 177.172 30,392.2 0.583 6.2 238.822 0.786 6.6
2002 198.340 31,921.1 0.621 6.6 254.406 0.797 1.4
2003 204.721 33,372.5 0.613 -1.3 268.985 0.806 1.1
2004 209.471 34,937.2 0.600 -2.3 283.324 0.811 0.6
2005 211.169 36,330.5 0.581 -3.1 295.136 0.812 0.2
2006 216.034 37,649.1 0.574 -1.3 307.226 0.816 0.5
1 57 categories of activity, 1,157 establishments. 2 129 categories of activity, 3,172 establishments.
3 205 categories of activity, 6,726 establishments.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-1993,
1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 at
http://www.inegi.gob.mx; ibid., Estadística industrial anual 1975-1982; ibid., Encuesta industrial anual
1983-1986; ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994,1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002; índice de precios de la Comisión Nacional de Salarios Mí-
nimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by the Banco de México from 1983 on.
Av
er
ag
e
D
ai
ly
W
ag
e
W
or
ke
rs
an
d
Te
ch
ni
ci
an
s
M
aq
ui
la
do
ra
In
du
st
ry
1
Av
er
ag
e
D
ai
ly
W
ag
e
W
or
ke
rs
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
R
ea
lW
ag
e
M
aq
ui
la
do
ra
In
du
st
ry
(D
ec
.1
98
2
pe
so
s)
R
ea
lW
ag
e
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
(D
ec
.1
98
2
pe
so
s)
In
fla
tio
n
In
de
x
D
ec
em
be
r
19
82
=
10
0
G
ro
w
th
R
at
e
M
aq
ui
la
do
ra
G
ro
w
th
R
at
e
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
THE “MAQUILADORIZATION” OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 123
Statistical Appendix
TABLE 2. WAGE OF DIRECT WORKERS IN THE MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT, ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC
APPARATUSES AND ARTICLES ASSEMBLY BRANCH, AND IN THE ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC ACCES-
SORIES BRANCH: MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Wages Wages Inflation Real Real Real
Index Wages Wages Maquiladora
Wages
Real
MAQUI- Manufac-
MAQUI- MANUFAC- Dec. LADORA MANUFAC- turing
Year LADORAS TURING1 1982=100 INDUSTRY TURING1 Wages
1980 0.231 0.384 35.2 0.654 1.089 0.60
1981 0.292 0.480 45.1 0.649 1.064 0.61
1982 0.504 0.777 71.6 0.704 1.084 0.65
1983 0.811 1.149 144.6 0.561 0.795 0.71
1984 1.319 1.854 239.3 0.551 0.775 0.71
1985 2.107 2.717 377.5 0.558 0.720 0.78
1986 3.898 4.716 703.0 0.555 0.671 0.83
1987 9.216 10.271 1,629.6 0.566 0.630 0.90
1988 19.005 20.929 3,490.1 0.545 0.600 0.91
1989 24.868 26.988 4,188.4 0.594 0.644 0.92
1990 30.576 33.956 5,304.7 0.576 0.640 0.90
1991 37.236 43.417 6,506.8 0.572 0.667 0.86
1992 43.509 51.892 7,515.9 0.579 0.690 0.84
1993 46.434 57.678 8,248.8 0.563 0.699 0.81
1994 51.077 59.495 8,823.4 0.579 0.674 0.86
1995 65.023 79.004 11,911.5 0.546 0.663 0.82
1996 84.226 93.956 16,006.5 0.526 0.587 0.90
1997 105.594 113.413 19,308.0 0.547 0.587 0.93
1998 127.152 131.640 22,383.4 0.568 0.588 0.97
1999 151.200 153.275 26,095.8 0.579 0.587 0.99
2000 176.458 175.036 28,572.7 0.618 0.613 1.01
2001 203.105 202.481 30,392.2 0.668 0.666 1.00
2002 228.717 217.535 31,921.1 0.717 0.681 1.05
2003 235.805 221.510 33,372.5 0.707 0.664 1.06
2004 236.608 234.613 34,937.2 0.677 0.672 1.01
2005 235.835 247.176 36,330.5 0.649 0.680 0.95
2006 237.979 257.162 37,649.1 0.632 0.683 0.93
1 From 1995 to 2006, classes 3831, manufacture and/or assembly of machinery, equipment and electrical
accessories (including the generation of electricity); 3832, manufacture and/or assembly of electronic
equipment for radio, television, communications and medical use; and 3833, manufacture and/or assem-
bly of apparatuses and accessories for domestic use, excluding electronics. From 1987-1994, class 3700
manufacture and assembly of machinery, equipment, apparatuses, accessories, electrical and electronic
articles and their parts. From 1980-1986, classes 3721, 3723, 3731 and 3741.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-1993,
1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 at http://www.
inegi.gob.mx; ibid., Estadística industrial anual 1975-1982; ibid., Encuesta industrial anual 1983-1986;
ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006; Índice de precios de la Comisión Nacional de Sala-
rios Mínimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by the Banco de México from 1983 on.
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Statistical Appendix
TABLE3.WAGE OFDIRECTWORKERS IN THEFURNITURE, FURNITUREACCESORIESAND OTHERWOOD
AND METAL PRODUCTS BRANCH: MAQUILADORAS AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Wages Wages Inflation Real Real Real
Index Wages Wages Maquiladora
Wages
Real
Manufac-
Year
1980 0.250 0.330 35.2 0.708 0.938 0.755
1981 0.309 0.425 45.1 0.686 0.942 0.728
1982 0.471 0.674 71.6 0.658 0.941 0.699
1983 0.754 1.070 144.6 0.521 0.740 0.705
1984 1.249 1.714 239.3 0.522 0.716 0.728
1985 2.032 2.440 377.5 0.538 0.646 0.832
1986 3.626 3.764 703.0 0.516 0.535 0.963
1987 8.654 8.026 1,629.6 0.531 0.493 1.078
1988 17.334 15.829 3,490.1 0.497 0.454 1.095
1989 22.433 20.173 4,188.4 0.536 0.482 1.112
1990 27.884 25.767 5,304.7 0.526 0.486 1.082
1991 33.135 32.612 6,506.8 0.509 0.501 1.016
1992 38.293 40.465 7,515.9 0.509 0.538 0.946
1993 41.085 47.312 8,248.8 0.498 0.574 0.868
1994 48.935 50.306 8,823.4 0.555 0.570 0.973
1995 60.159 51.615 11,911.5 0.505 0.433 1.166
1996 76.254 60.392 16,006.5 0.476 0.377 1.263
1997 99.499 70.624 19,308.0 0.515 0.366 1.409
1998 121.308 85.749 22,383.4 0.542 0.383 1.415
1999 150.407 105.741 26,095.8 0.576 0.405 1.422
2000 171.688 125.819 28,572.7 0.601 0.440 1.365
2001 193.541 144.988 30,392.2 0.637 0.477 1.335
2002 210.896 154.944 31,921.1 0.661 0.485 1.361
2003 221.410 169.378 33,372.5 0.663 0.508 1.307
2004 237.742 180.655 34,937.2 0.680 0.517 1.316
2005 247.019 190.318 36,330.5 0.680 0.524 1.298
2006 260.480 197.725 37,649.1 0.692 0.525 1.317
1 From 1995 to 2006, branches 332001, manufacture and repair of furniture, principally wooden, and
branch 381300, manufacture and repair of metallic furniture and furniture accessories. From 1987
to 1994, class 2711, manufacture of wooden furniture, and class 3520, manufacture of principally
metallic furniture and furniture and furniture accessories. From 1987 to 1994, class 2711, manufac-
ture of wooden furniture, and class 3520, manufacture of principally metallic furniture and furniture
accessories. From 1980-1986, class 3521, manufacture of furniture and furniture accessories, princi-
pally metallic.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-
1993, 1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988,
1989, 1990, 1991,1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002; Índice de
precios de la Comisión Nacional de Salarios Mínimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by
the Banco de México from 1983 on.
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Statistical Appendix
TABLE 4. WAGES OF DIRECT WORKERS IN THE CONSTRUCTION, RECONSTRUCTION AND ASSEM-
BLY OF TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT AND ACCESORIES BRANCH: MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTUR-
ING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Wages Wages Inflation Real Real Real
Index Wages Wages Maquiladora
Wages
Real
Manufac-
MAQUI- MANUFAC- Dec. MAQUI- MANUFAC- turing
Year LADORAS TURING1 1982=100 LADORAS TURING1 Wages
1980 0.237 0.600 35.2 0.673 1.702 0.396
1981 0.308 0.829 45.1 0.684 1.839 0.372
1982 0.551 1.260 71.6 0.769 1.759 0.437
1983 0.870 1.989 144.6 0.602 1.375 0.438
1984 1.358 2.964 239.3 0.568 1.239 0.458
1985 2.024 4.645 377.5 0.536 1.231 0.436
1986 3.631 8.359 703.0 0.517 1.189 0.434
1987 8.696 15.720 1,629.6 0.534 0.965 0.553
1988 18.259 30.513 3,490.1 0.523 0.874 0.598
1989 22.857 37.524 4,188.4 0.546 0.896 0.609
1990 29.483 51.692 5,304.7 0.556 0.974 0.570
1991 35.628 67.253 6,506.8 0.548 1.034 0.530
1992 42.944 86.214 7,515.9 0.571 1.147 0.498
1993 49.227 94.915 8,248.8 0.597 1.151 0.519
1994 56.425 104.373 8,823.4 0.639 1.183 0.541
1995 72.154 111.962 11,911.5 0.606 0.940 0.644
1996 94.866 129.992 16,006.5 0.593 0.812 0.730
1997 115.666 161.502 19,308.0 0.599 0.836 0.716
1998 138.228 189.310 22,383.4 0.618 0.846 0.730
1999 164.066 227.387 26,095.8 0.629 0.871 0.722
2000 184.855 275.608 28,572.7 0.647 0.965 0.671
2001 205.312 327.711 30,392.2 0.676 1.078 0.627
2002 227.779 343.050 31,921.1 0.714 1.075 0.664
2003 225.195 356.418 33,372.5 0.675 1.068 0.632
2004 231.811 372.763 34,937.2 0.664 1.067 0.622
2005 240.589 382.870 36,330.5 0.662 1.054 0.628
2006 247.199 389.225 37,649.1 0.657 1.034 0.635
1 From 1995 to 2006, branches 3841, automobile industry, and 3842, manufacture, repair and/or
assembly of transport equipment (excluding automobiles and trucks). From 1987 to 1994, class 3800,
construction, reconstruction and assembly of transport equipment and its parts. From 1980 to 1987,
classes 3821, 3831 and 3832.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-
1993, 1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 at
http://www.inegi.gob.mx; ibid., Estadística industrial anual 1975-1982; ibid., Encuesta industrial anual
1983-1986; ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006; Índice de precios de la Comisión
Nacional de Salarios Mínimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by the Banco de México
from 1983 on.
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This chapter addresses the topic of biosecurity and the regulation of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) in the United States and Mexico. What we find are
two different conceptions, basically involving each society’s degree of access to
new technologies. In the United States the conditions needed for this access
clearly exist, while in Mexico experience has been mixed and, thus, there is a ten-
dency toward the defensive. This article analyzes the two different conceptions
of risk assessment in the specific case of the use of transgenic seeds, focusing
particularly on the case of corn. We can suppose that the deeper the roots of the
differences between the two countries —absolute, unconditional acceptance in
the United States, and selective, conditional acceptance in Mexico— the more
likelihood that conflicts will arise in the future. In theory, the possibility also exists
that the two positions are complementary, and therefore the conclusions of this
analysis propose potential mechanisms, channels and concrete areas for cooperation
between the two countries.
The differences in the conception of risk assessment between the United States
and Mexico occur in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which, while it does not directly regulate GMOs, does promote the harmo-
nization of regulatory policies in many ways. Furthermore, and ultimately, national
regulations exist in a globalized world in which the primary tendencies are defined
by forces like the powerful influence of biotechnology companies and international
institutions, for example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD).
To establish the origins of the two positions, we will closely examine the compre-
hensive decision-making process, the regulatory system and the institutions and
actors involved in the process in both countries. The primary aim is to establish how
independent these processes are in terms of corresponding to each country’s partic-
ular social interests. A basic premise is that regulations express the interests of organ-
ized social groups and clearly reflect the prevailing dominant discourses in each
society, not only with regard to science and technology, but also to the issues that have
been linked to the topic of GMOs. In the United States these issues are primarily eco-
* Researcher at UNAM’s Center for Research on North America.
1 The research on which this article is based was carried out with the support of a grant from the
UNAM’s DGAPA between July 2005 and July 2006.
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nomic growth, international competitiveness and the right to be informed, while in
Mexico, the issues are the defense of biological diversity and of economic and food
security.
From a global perspective, the acceptance of transgenic foods is a highly complex
matter throughout the world. The main trade controversy is a formal U.S. complaint
to the WTO made in May 2003 against the European Union for its foot dragging in
authorizing commerce of genetically modified products. This trade controversy was
finally resolved in favor of the United States in 2006. The U.S. viewpoint is that the
rejection of transgenic food is a simple protectionist trade barrier, while Europe main-
tains it is freely exercising its right to choose, in this case expressing mistrust for sci-
ence and using precaution as its primary guide for action.
The GMO issue is also multi-dimensional, as it involves the dynamics of scien-
tific and industrial development, the structure of agriculture, protection of the
environment and the nature of the predominant political system, culture and val-
ues in each country. Comparative studies on GMO regulations abound in the spe-
cialized literature in this area; however, most of these studies are comparisons of
industrialized nations like the United States and European countries, or of vari-
ous European countries.2 Studies comparing the United States with Mexico are
practically non-existent, possibly because comparing entities that are too signifi-
cantly different is not viewed as methodologically useful or correct, since the rea-
sons explaining the differences in positions and the potential variables would be
so numerous that it would be impossible to indicate the ones directly responsible
for the differences. Consequently, this article does not intend to be a comparative
study, but rather proposes to simply present both cases, analyze and explain the
origins of the positions and attempt to establish possible areas for cooperation, or
as the case may be, detect the especially vulnerable points for conflict.
Theoretical Framework
Several theories and methodological resources are used in this article, in particu-
lar for explaining the differences in the two countries’ positions, some combined
with others. Some analytical elements from international political economy are
nearly always present and are combined with comparative public policy and a
new analytical tendency in this type of study: discourse analysis.
A political economics perspective poses the question of who benefits from the
new technology, and points to a detailed study of the changing relationships between
market actors, biotechnology companies (usually multinationals), government reg-
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2 To mention only some of the most recent comparative studies: Aseem Prakash, “Biopolitics in the
EU and the U.S.: A Race to the Bottom or Convergence to the Top?” International Studies Quarterly,
no. 47: 617-641; Dave Toke, The Politics of GM Food. A Comparative Study of the UK, USA and EU.
(London: Routledge, 2004); Thomas Bernauer and Erika Meins, “Technological Revolution Meets
Policy and theMarket: Explaining Cross-national Differences inAgricultural Biotechnology Regulation,”
European Journal of Political Research, no. 42 (2003).
ulators and in some cases, international bodies.3 This view considers biotechnol-
ogy an industrial sector that has radically modified the conventional regulatory
relationship between the state and private enterprise, specifically increasing the
influence of private over public. A political economics approach also helps identify
and discuss the roles played by producers and consumers in agricultural biotech-
nology based on the principle that the interests of producers, not consumers, take
the lead in establishing the rules of the game.
Comparative public policy studies include varying explanatory factors such as:
environmental groups’ capability for collective action, for example; the character-
istics of the regulatory institutions involved in public policies; and productive sec-
tors’ organizational form.4 In this context, reference is made to a greater capacity
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the decentralization of institutions
in Europe as opposed to those in the United States, and in contrast, greater inte-
gration and cohesion in the organizing of and lobbying by productive sectors in
the United States, in comparison to their European counterparts.
Supporters of deliberative democracy frequently use resources from discourse
analysis, understood in terms of Foucault’s dominant discourse or Kuhn’s para-
digm.5 The basic assumption in this case is that none of the parties in conflict
have an automatic right to know and possess the truth. It is maintained that in
the presence of genuine uncertainty —as is the case in the debate on transgenics—
a discourse analysis is the appropriate choice for discussing issues characterized by
major polarization and radical opposition. This approach is based on a critique of
the positivist conception of interaction between science and politics, which assu-
mes that the truth can only be established in relation to a particular set of values.
The incorporation of categories such as values, confidence and the interpretation
of information tends to transform the analysis into a socially constructivist analy-
sis, since it is taken for granted that the interests of the actors involved are not
given but, rather, constructed. The primary proposals from this approach are col-
lective reflection on preferences and the public presentation of views involved in
the conflict as tools to manage it better.
The Case of the United States
The U.S. positive vision and stance—generally considered to be positivist— regard-
ing the use of biotechnology in agriculture has been a determining factor in inter-
national forums related to the topic of biotechnology in the WTO and Organization for
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3 See Peter Newell and Dominic Glover, “Business and Biotechnology: Regulation and the Politics of
Influence,” IDS Working Paper 192 (2003), published by the Institute of Development Studies, England;
and Peter Newell, “Globalization and the Governance of Biotechnology,” Global Environmental Politics,
3, 2 (May 2003), published by MIT.
4 See Bernauer and Meins, “Technological Revolution”: 642-683.
5 See Dave Toke, The Politics of GM Food. A Comparative Study of the UK, USA and EU (London: Rout-
ledge, 2004).
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and in the various UN forums,
and it has been a pattern reproduced in other countries of the world. Other coun-
tries’ decision to adopt the U.S. position on GMOs without reflecting on their own
local conditions has been highly criticized, with the argument that the U.S. stance
is very specific to the particular conditions in that country. Despite this sharp crit-
icism, the immense influence exerted by biotechnology companies in the inter-
national market is undeniably an obligatory point of reference in the study of the
regulation of biotechnology.
In order to establish the importance of agricultural biotechnology in the Unit-
ed States, it is important to clarify the dimension represented by the agricultural
sector overall, which corresponds to only 2 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) and 2.4 percent of the work force. This reduced importance of agriculture
in relation to the rest of the economy contrasts with the great political influence
exerted by the U.S. agricultural sector, considered to be over-represented in rela-
tion to its actual weight. The area in which biotechnological seeds are planted in
the United States is 42.8 million hectares, 63 percent of the world’s total. Four
crops are planted: corn, cotton, soybeans and canola. These crops have an esti-
mated market value of US$27.5 billion, compared to the world total of US$44 bil-
lion in 2003-2004.6
Regarding agricultural biotechnology results, it is important to make a distinc-
tion between facts and intentions, the latter expressed in the commercial propa-
ganda of the biotechnology industry. The production of biotechnological varieties
in the world is very highly concentrated geographically. The United States,
Argentina and Canada produce 90 percent of the total, and together with three
other countries (Brazil, China and South Africa), they produce 99 percent of all
the world’s GMOs.7 Despite the long list of countries mentioned in promotional
documents as those using this technology, the reality is that the current agricul-
tural biotechnology industry is concentrated in only six countries, and there are
only four major products involved.8 Despite the industry’s big promises to create
more nutritious products that are more resistant to various soil conditions and
extreme climates, to date, only two traits have been commercialized on a large
scale around the world: tolerance to herbicides and resistance to insects, which
turns the plant into an insecticide (the two traits are used individually or in com-
bination).9
In the United States, the product we are the most interested in here, corn, is
grown on 28.8 million hectares, with a production of 256.9 million tons, 40 per-
6 C. Ford Runge and Barry Ryan, The Global Diffusion of Plant Biotechnology. International Adoption
and Research in 2004, University of Minnesota, 6, at http://www.apec.umn.edu/faculty/frunge /glob-
albiotech04.pdf, accessed June 28, 2007.
7 Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, “Genetically Modified Crops in the United States” (2004),
at http://pewagbiotech.org.
8 Soybeans, corn, canola and cotton.
9 Ann Clark, “Has Ag Biotech Lived Up to Its Promise?” (2004), at http://www.plant.uoguelph.ca/
research/homepages/eclark.
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cent of which corresponds to biotechnological varieties with a total estimated
market value of US$10.3 billion.10
Regulation
Initially, in the 1980s, there was disagreement in both the United States and Europe
as to whether the use of GMOs should be regulated on the basis of the product or
the process through which the product is obtained. The U.S. quickly opted for
product-oriented regulation, while Europe chose to use the process as the basis
for assessment. These decisions had profound implications, since they established
the foundations for two completely opposing philosophies for risk assessment that
are currently dividing the world.
The option of product-based risk assessment meant nothing less than assuming
that in the use of techniques for genetic modification, there is nothing new to regu-
late since the resulting agricultural product is essentially the same as that obtained
through the traditional method. The alternative, chosen by Europe, with regulation
based on the process whereby the product is obtained, implies the acknowledge-
ment of a new type of risk potential generated precisely by the use of a new tech-
nology, and consequently, the establishment of a single, specific procedure for
regulating GMOs, involving its own legislation in the area of biosecurity.
In the United States, government agencies involved in making the decision were
initially divided: on the one hand, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
in favor of the process-based method, while the Department of Agriculture (USDA),
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the White House Office on Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) were in favor of the product-based method.11 The
division between government agencies was due to the fact that the process-based
orientation, defended by the EPA, involved a commitment to greater environmen-
tal sensitivity in evaluating the risks of GMOs, in addition to health-related risks.
It is important to note that in 1986, when the decision was made by the Reagan
administration—which incidentally was in favor of deregulation— the EPA was vir-
tually deprived of its authority, basically due to its being unanimously, insistently
rejected by the biotechnology industry. Finally, a working group created by the
president’s office, including participation by 15 agencies, plus active intervention
by Congress and public scrutiny, issued a document called the “Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,” which clearly established the option
in favor of the product-based method. From that time on, it was clear that accord-
ing to the United States, GMOs should not be viewed as something that in and of
themselves could represent a risk for health and the environment. Responsibility
for GMOs, consequently, rested with the same agencies that had performed the
10 Ibid.
11 S. Jasanoff, “Product, Process or Programme: Three Cultures of Regulation of Biotechnology,” in M.
Bauer, ed., Resistance to New Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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function of inspecting products in the past, specifically the EPA, USDA and FDA,
originally created for conventional agriculture.
Throughout the 1990s, this procedure was simplified even more, to the extent
that the FDA principle known as GRAS or “generally recognized as safe” has been
assumed and institutionalized. This principle opened the way for biotechnology
companies to self-regulate their own products, since the approval, or rather, the
acknowledgement of the FDA, was based on consultations with the manufacturers,
which provided a summary of tests carried out with the product.12 The objective of
the regulation was to diminish and simplify any potential burden and avoid anything
that could complicate the process and impede progress in the new technology.
The concept of familiarity was created as the environmental counterpart to the
concept of substantial equivalence for health. This concept has been widely debat-
ed, and it is not yet very clear exactly what it means. Its most controversial aspect
involves defining what is comparable in ecological terms, and what is meant exact-
ly by the notion of an element being sufficiently comparable with another within
an ecosystem.13 The most important practical implication of the concept of famil-
iarity is that in the United States the environmental impact of GMOs is reduced to
a simple notification that can be made in a period of up to 30 days.
During the years after the adoption of the document establishing the general
rules, the EPA still tried to resist and introduce evidence in the defense of environ-
mental protection. In 1994, it requested that pest-resistant transgenic varieties be
treated as pesticides; however, although it was backed by the National Academy of
Science, the proposal was rejected, since it was considered to represent an incli-
nation toward process-based regulation.14 In 1999, after a research report on the
effect of Bt corn on Monarch butterflies, there were public debates once again
about the need to exercise greater environmental control over GM seeds. The result
was that the EPA asked corn producers to alternate buffer zones of conventional corn
with transgenic corn fields.
In line with the logic that a transgenic product is substantially equivalent to a
conventional product, labeling represents no significant problems, since there is
no need for any additional information about a food product in terms of its com-
position and nutritional and safety factors. In order for a GM product to be accept-
ed, it is not necessary to introduce a new label or present any scientific evidence,
except in cases in which some commonly allergenic substance is added to the
product through biotechnology.
However, labeling came under public scrutiny in 1998-1999. At that time, sur-
veys indicated that approximately 80 to 90 percent of the population was in favor
of mandatory labeling; however, the same reports also revealed that U.S. citizens’
12 Bernauer and Meins, “Technological Revolution.”
13 Jan-Peter Nap et al., “The Release of Genetically Modified Crops into the Environment,” The Plant
Journal 33 (2003): 1-18.
14 Ibid.: 9.
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interest and concern about transgenic foods were not particularly strong.15 In any
case, NGOs launched various political initiatives for introducing mandatory label-
ing, which they presented to the Senate and the House of Representatives. Two
bills promoting the labeling of transgenics were presented, plus two others for
safety testing; in addition, NGOs filed court cases. The FDA has held public hear-
ings on the need for labeling and stricter testing; however, only moderate results
have been obtained: for example, making consultations mandatory and introducing
voluntary labeling, a mechanism similar to that implemented for organic prod-
ucts. However, these results in no way questioned the approach of product-ori-
ented assessment. Since then, discussion on the labeling issue has been passed
to the state level.
The controversy over GM StarLink corn (which had a serious impact on trade,
since it produced a temporary collapse in U.S. corn exports, due to the drop in
the market in Japan, Korea and Europe) also failed to provoke radical changes in
regulations. Even though Japan cut U.S. corn imports in half, and Korea totally
banned them, U.S. producers did not rush to substantially modify their percep-
tion of the risks involved in transgenics; instead, their priorities focused on the
high costs of segregation and of preserving the identity of the origin of corn.
In summary, GMO regulation in the United States is exclusively product-ori-
ented and is based on a lack of distinction between conventional and transgenic
products. Consequently, there are no specific regulations for GMOs, and the laws
and procedures for already-existing institutions, primarily the FDA and the USDA,
are the ones implemented.16 The EPA has attempted several times to expand the
spectrum of risks evaluated; however, modifications to the process have been
minimal. The great majority of U.S. society pays little attention to transgenic
foods, and at the federal level, the concern only materializes into support for vol-
untary labeling. The GMO issue is not very politicized, and thus does not capture
the attention of NGOs, members of Congress or political parties.
Actors
To explain the reasons for this permissive policy toward GMOs in the United
States, we will apply two approaches mentioned in our introduction: the political
economics approach to the nature of the actors involved, and the discourse
approach. Both analyses complement and strengthen each other and lead to a sin-
gle explanation.
The organized actors most interested in the GMO issue are the companies ded-
icated to agricultural biotechnology, plus producers, environmental NGOs and
15 Center for Science in the Public Interest, Food Labeling for the 21st Century. A Global Agenda for
Action (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Public Interest, 1998).
16 The laws used for addressing transgenics are primarily: the Federal Plant Pest Act, the Federal Plant
Quarantine Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.
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consumer groups. In the United States a strong, broad-based coalition has been
formed to promote biotechnology, including the generators of technology, the seed-
producing industry and agricultural export producers. Meanwhile, environmental
NGOs and consumer groups, which are relatively weak, lobby against certain appli-
cations of biotechnology.
The coalition of actors in favor of biotechnology is very well organized and led
by large agro-biotechnology companies that participate very actively in regulation.
The generators of biotechnology have been on the receiving end of major govern-
mental funds and large amounts of risk capital and have also benefited from close
cooperation with universities.17 For the purpose of recuperating enormous investments
in scientific research and product development, this coalition intervenes in all mat-
ters relative to regulation, in order to achieve the formula most favorable to its interests.
These companies are organized into a single association, the Biotechnology Industry
Organization (BIO), while plant biotechnology companies are organized in the Ame-
rican Seed TradeAssociation (ASTA). In an attempt to strengthen even further the role
played by these associations, the primary large companies like Monsanto, DuPont
and Aventis tend to be even individually involved in the regulatory process.
BIO’s immense capacity for collective action can be explained by the similarity
of interests among its members, plus its scientific experience and the financial
support it receives from large biotechnology companies. The BIO has sufficient
resources and plans focusing on improving public acceptance of transgenic foods.
It has an annual budget of US$50 million, and approximately US$250 million for
the next three to five years.18
The scholars who study these companies frequently criticize the close ties —
even personal ones— between BIO officials and regulating institutions, primarily
the FDA. Many BIO officers are former government officials and the revolving door
policy has been broadly documented, indicating the essence of the influence peddling
between companies and government agencies, the FDA and the EPA.19 Former offi-
cials have publicly declared that regulating agencies tend to do exactly what agro-
biotechnology companies ask them to do.20
17 Public financing of agricultural biotechnology in the United States remains very unclear. It is known
that most financing is from private capital; however, the amount is confidential. Estimates suggest
that developing a product requires approximately 10 years and costs about US$300 million. Since
USDA spending for researching biotechnological plants does not appear in its budget under a sepa-
rate category, the amount in this regard is unknown. Source: CRS Report for Congress, Food Biotech-
nology in the United States: Science, Regulation, and Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service/The Library of Congress, 2001), 25.
18 Bernauer and Meins, “Technological Revolution”: 668.
19 Many published works reveal and criticize this close relationship, including: E. Moore, Science,
Internationalization and Policy Networks Regulating Genetically Engineered Food Crops in Canada
and the United States, 1973-1998, dissertation, University of Toronto, Political Sciences Department;
W.T. Gormley, “Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System,” Polity, vol. 18, no. 4 (Summer, 1986):
595-620; Helena Paul, Ricarda Steinbrecher, Luchy Michaels and Devlin Kuyek,Hungry Corporations.
Transnational Biotech Companies Colonize the Food Chain (London: Zed Books, 2003).
20 The New York Times, January 25, 2001.
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Another criticism of regulations is the lack of independent investigation. The
U.S. government has allowed biotechnology companies to be the ones to provide
the required scientific information and even to implement security measures, pre-
cisely because it has failed in conducting its own studies and in financing inde-
pendent investigation on the safety of GMO products.21
From the beginning, U.S. farmers have been very open to planting transgenic
seeds, and this type of production has increased rapidly. A third of corn and more
than 70 percent of soybeans produced are transgenic. The original promise from
the agro-biotechnology industry was that one of the greatest benefits of transgenic
crops would be higher yields that would lead to increased benefits for producers.
Nevertheless, after 10 years of experience in commercial planting of transgenic crops
since 1995-1996, the panorama in terms of benefits for farmers is currently mixed,
if not negative.
In fact, the benefits for producers have not been those expected, and three fac-
tors (yields, the use of chemicals and low market prices) have played a part.
Studies have proven that in the case of GM soybeans, yields have been between 5
and 10 percent lower on average than when conventional seeds are used.22 Another
promise from the industry was that less use of pesticides would be required; how-
ever, field studies demonstrate that even though during the first years of planting
GMO crops fewer chemicals were actually used, the tendency toward decreasing
use was not maintained during the following years.23 Even USDA studies confirm
that yields are not consistently higher than in the case of conventional seeds,
except in the case of cotton.24 There is another intervening factor in the calcula-
tion of benefits derived from products from GM seeds, specifically subsidies, the
effects of which are under discussion. An analysis of agricultural subsidies is not
the topic of this article, and it is therefore sufficient to mention here that the
effects from technology and from subsidies are not considered separately, and this
impedes arriving at precise calculations. For example, large producers believe they
benefit from the new technology, although by a small margin; however, this benefit
necessarily includes a large amount of subsidies they receive from public coffers.
Producers’ attitudes and perceptions of benefits also depend on the amount of
land they farm: specifically, large and medium-sized producers adopt the new tech-
nology more easily. Therefore, large producers tend to favor flexible rules, while small
farmers tend to support stricter rules and mandatory labeling, in order to benefit
21 Takahashi, Kelso, Dennis Doyle and Rachel A. Schurman, Engineering Trouble: Biotechnology and
Its Discontent (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 243-245.
22 C.M. Benbrook, Troubled Times Amid Commercial Success for Roundup Ready Soybeans, technical
paper no. 4. Sandpoint, Idaho: Northwest Science and Environmental Policy Center (2001), at
http://www.biotech-info.net/troubledtimesfinal-exsum.pdf; and M.A. Martinez-Ghersa et al., “Con-
cerns a Weed Scientist Might Have about Herbicide-tolerant Crops: a Revisitation,”Weed Technology
no. 17 (2003): 202-210.
23 J. Fernandez–Cornejo and W.D. McBride, Adoption of Bioengineered Crops, ERS Agricultural Eco-
nomic Report No. AER810 (2002), cited in Ann Clark (2004): 12.
24 J. Foster, The Causes, Costs, and Benefits of Regulatory Diversity, MIT, cited in Bernauer and Meins: 669.
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from the separation of GM and conventional foods. The largest federation of farm-
ers, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), which basically represents
large producers, supports the FDA position on labeling, while the network of small
producers, the National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC), is highly critical of the reg-
ulating agencies’ permissive policies and advocates mandatory labeling.
Two other organizations, the American Soybean Association (ASA), and the
National Corn Growers Association (NCGA), which represent export farmers, tend
to demand regulations that are even more relaxed than those promoted by the
AFBF. In contrast, the American Corn Growers Association (ACGA), which repre-
sents small producers, recommends mandatory labeling and strict approval policies
in accordance with consumer rights, in other words, with the right for consumers
to know what they are eating. Producer groups oriented toward the domestic mar-
ket are generally not opposed to GMOs; however, they tend to advocate stricter reg-
ulations.
To summarize the behavior of farmers regarding GMOs, it is important to state
that they are not homogeneous. Farmers’ interests and positions vary according to
the size of their production, and whether it is for export or domestic consumption.
The fragmentation of this sector, of course, limits its capacity for collective action:
large export-oriented producers build alliances with the biotechnology industry,
while small producers, highly fragmented among themselves, are focused on spe-
cific issues, and have only recently started to become more involved in the matter
of GMO crops and to build alliances with environmental NGOs and consumer groups.
The huge processed food industry, represented by the Grocery Manufacturers
of America (GMA) and the National Food Processors Association (NFPA), consti-
tutes another important U.S. interest group. It has basically been in favor of GMOs;
however, recently, its initial enthusiasm for the new technology has been fading,
since to date it has not received any clear, direct benefits. The biotechnology
industry has announced major improvements in its products for the direct bene-
fit of consumers, in terms of nutrition and human health, however these promis-
es have not been fulfilled. In contrast, processors and retailers, especially those
dedicated to organic food, support mandatory labeling and more rigorous regula-
tions and are lobbying in conjunction with consumer groups.25
Environmental groups have carried out campaigns against GMOs and have
explicitly asked some food processing companies to eliminate the use of GMOs in
the products they offer. In response, a number of major companies have reduced
or eliminated the use of genetically modified agricultural products. These com-
panies include Gerber, Heinz, McDonalds, McCain Foods, Frito-Lay, IAMS, Whole
Food Market, Wild Oats Markets and Seagram. As a result of the StarLink corn
controversy, the Archer Daniels Midland company, which commercializes a third
of the grains (corn, soybeans and wheat) in the United States, requested the
major grain elevators to separate GMOs from other products; and other processing
companies like ConAgra and Cargill have already initiated this separation. The
25 With groups such as the Consumers Union, Center for Food Safety and Alliance for Bio-Integrity.
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measures taken by companies are promising; however, so far they have not been
sufficient to provoke significant changes in the regulation of biotechnology.
The social actors (environmental and consumer groups) have been lobbying
around GMO-related issues since the end of the 1990s. In comparison to European
countries, for example, the approval process within the U.S. decision-making sys-
tem is much more open to public consultation and NGO intervention.
In the United States, the proportion of NGOs opposed to GMOs is very low, and
the radical groups tend to be very small. One of the outstanding radical groups
is Jeremy Rifkin’s Foundation on Economic Trends, due to the great influence it
has exerted in campaigns against biotechnology around the world. Nevertheless,
the immense majority of the relatively few NGOs active in the area of biotech-
nology hold moderate positions, and even though they advocate mandatory label-
ing, they absolutely do not question the usefulness and safety of genetically
modified organisms. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Union of
Concerned Scientists (UCS) are good examples for illustrating critical but posi-
tive attitudes toward biotechnology. The groups that organized to defend public
interests, such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), also tend
to support GMOs.
NGO activities are basically lobbying politicians regarding points of debate that
generally revolve around scientific arguments, and they also bring legal suits against
regulatory agencies and biotechnology companies. Any direct action is insignifi-
cant. It may sound a bit inconsistent, but both the moderate criticism as well as
lobbying in favor of mandatory labeling carried out by the large NGOs clearly express
the somewhat contradictory trend in U.S. public opinion: on the one hand, in fa-
vor of GMOs, and on the other, defending the right to choose.26
The case of StarLink corn, which contains a protein that may cause allergies,
illustrates very well interest groups and regulators’ limited capacity to address the
denunciation of imminent risks from transgenic foods. Although this corn variety
had not been approved for human consumption, it was detected in food products
in 2000. The discovery revealed two facts: producers’ inability to segregate con-
ventional corn from GM corn and the ineffectiveness of the so-called buffer zones
in avoiding cross-pollination. On that occasion, farmers and those commercializ-
ing the corn had to pay a high price: withdrawing the product from the market
and carrying out the necessary scientific tests. In addition, divisions emerged in
the coalition with regard to the payment of compensations. A number of NGOs
have used this issue to their advantage, launching new campaigns against current
regulations.27 However, since U.S. regulation of agricultural biotechnology is
highly centralized and the industry holds the key to accessing the system, NGOs
have been unable to modify the regulatory process.
26 In 1998, 70 percent of U.S. citizens expressed a positive opinion. Source: G. Gaskell and M.W. Bauer,
eds., Biotechnology. The Making of a Global Controversy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
27 Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Organic Consumer Association, Genetically Modified Food
Alert, etc.
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Nevertheless, the increasing commercial rejection of GMOs in international
markets and the resulting introduction of voluntary standards are factors that tend
to spark attitude changes in large corporations, which are reorienting their invest-
ments from food to the production of medications and materials with fewer
risks.28 As mentioned here, some large and many small food-distributing compa-
nies have already changed their activity profile in favor of GMO-free products.
Dominant Discourses
1. Science and technology as promoters of development and economic growth
The tendency to believe that science and technology are necessarily good and are the
primary sources of economic growth —which ultimately leads to the well-being of
the population and the world— has played a vital role in the assessment of GMOs in
the United States. The socialization and institutionalization of this discourse there
have significantly contributed to a situation wherein ignorance, scientific uncer-
tainty and the lack of knowledge are translated into something considered natural
and not very important. Long-term risks (those not yet evident or immediately sub-
ject to being quantitatively expressed) are extremely difficult to understand and to
consider in the process of making decisions regarding GMOs.
The phenomena that present the greatest risks for ecosystems in the long term
have not yet been sufficiently studied, such as, for example, the consequences of
cross-pollination, genetic flows and an interruption in the cellular ecology of plants. Due
to the adoption of the substantial equivalence principle applied to human health,
and familiarity applied to ecology, this type of risk, even when the object of intense,
scientific controversy, is simply not considered in GMO regulation in the United States.
Because of the one-dimensional, unquestionable discourse of science, a series
of factors in the U.S.-type regulatory system that negatively influence the econo-
my and ecology are ignored. The costs —both economic and ecological costs, which
frequently go together— of this excessive regulatory flexibility can be very high.
To illustrate this point, a good example is the price of what are known as super-
weeds. The generation of herbicide-tolerant super-weeds which arose, for example,
in the case of GM canola, resulted in the need to us increasing amounts of chem-
icals in agriculture. This not only affects the ecosystem and biodiversity, but also
completely eliminates the economic utility of GMO.29
2. Public interest is substantially equivalent to private interests
For a long time, policies on biotechnology were not the object of public debate in
the United States. The issue was limited to the scientific community, companies
28 Lisa N. Mills, “Terminating Agricultural Biotechnology? Hard Law, Voluntary Measures, and the
Life Sciences Industry,” in J. Kirton and M. Trebilcock, eds., Hard Choices, Soft Law (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2004), 329-346.
29 CRS Report, Food Biotechnology, 22.
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and regulatory institutions. The common good as a concept was not conceived as
something counter to the sum of public interests, as is the case, for example, in
Europe.
Only later was the issue publicly discussed, and only when it became an issue
relevant to human health, a religious matter,30 something with economic impact,
or relevant to international trade competition. Environmental risks, especially long-
term ones, were generally not taken into consideration, and at any rate, they were
subordinated to economic interests. The issue of risks inherent in science and tech-
nology did not, on its own, constitute an object of public debate, but rather a topic
reserved for a limited circle of experts who typically work for private interests.
Labeling has been the object of public debate. However, consumer rights and
the government’s responsibility to inform society were blurred, and private inter-
ests won over such factors. It is interesting to observe that the food industry’s
argument was that the eventual introduction of a label stating that a product “con-
tains GMOs” could be misunderstood, and interpreted as a warning and even a
suggestion that the product was less healthy or less nutritious than a convention-
al food product. Those opposing labeling defended their position by arguing that
FDA guidelines establish that labels should be free from values.
3. Free market and self-regulation
In the name of the free market principle, it is perfectly accepted in the United
States that the government is not responsible for regulating the market, and instead,
its responsibility is limited to assuring that the products circulating are safe. In other
words, no type of permission is required for a product to be sold. The key concept
in regulation is “safety,” as a strictly technical term, and not “security,” a term that
involves a broader, social consideration.31
The main question posed by companies’ quasi-self-regulation is whether it is
possible to reconcile, to the benefit of society, corporations’ primary objective, which
is to make money, and governments’ primary objective, which is to serve the people.
One of the most discussed issues in this regard is establishing liability for dam-
ages caused by GMOs. Since these potential damages are not incorporated into the
U.S. regulatory system, it is difficult to establish who will be held responsible, and
ultimately, who will pay when, for example, a harvest is ruined due to cross-polli-
nation with new weeds. So far, companies have not been able to find a legal solu-
tion to this problem and have even attempted to offer technological answers to
this legal problem. This is the case in justifying the acceptance of terminator
seeds, which do not reproduce themselves, as a solution to put an end, once and
for all, to the matter of responsibility. This suggestion is equivalent to offering a
technological solution —which furthermore, is very costly, and ultimately will be
30 The case of whether food is kosher or halal when a gene from an animal prohibited by a certain reli-
gion is transplanted in a plant that is the basis for a food product. Ibid., 19.
31 In English the term “safety” is used, while the term used in Spanish is “seguridad,” which has a dif-
ferent conceptual connotation.
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paid for by the taxpayers— for a problem that is legal in nature, since companies
are attempting to avoid being sued for compensation.32
The Case of Mexico
In Mexico, political controversy around transgenic corn has been especially sharp
since 2001, when the discovery of transgenic sequences in traditional corn vari-
eties —a phenomenon known in Mexico as the contamination of corn— became
public. The most likely source of this contamination was corn imported from the
United States. The fact that the Mexican public identifies regulating GMOs with
what has happened for a single crop, corn, to a large extent determines its per-
ception of the issue.
Corn is a basic food in Mexico, where it is consumed in unquestionably greater
amounts than in the United States. Corn is intimately linked to the ancient cul-
ture of Meso-America, and throughout history has become one of the symbols of
Mexican nationalism and is particularly significant for the indigenous population.
Mexico is the place where cultivated corn was developed from its wild relative,
teozinte. Corn has been grown in Mexico for at least 5,000 or up to 8,000 years,
and dozens of local corn varieties, known as criollo varieties, proliferate in the
countryside.
To understand the significance of this issue for Mexican society, it is important
to point out that while in 1995 agriculture only generated 5 percent of GDP, it
employed 22.4 percent of wage earners, a very significant part. This fact alone has
the potential to turn the topic of agriculture into a highly sensitive issue suscep-
tible to politization. With NAFTA, this picture has become even more distorted: in
2004, agriculture only generated 3.5 percent of GDP, but still employed 20.3 per-
cent of wage earners.33 Furthermore, even nowadays, between 3.1 and 3.3 million
campesinos grow corn, and the very livelihood of 12.5 million people in the coun-
tryside depends on this activity, which corresponds to 55.2 percent of the nation’s agri-
cultural production.34 An estimated 2.1 million campesinos are still subsistence
farmers, representing between 44 and 55 percent of total production.35
In terms of productivity, the asymmetries among the three NAFTA countries were
—and still are— very marked: between 1997 and 2001, 2.4 tons of corn were har-
32 Jeremy de Beer, “The Rights and Responsibilities of GMO Patent Owners” (paper, “The Right to Food
at the Nexus of Trade and Technology” conference, University of Ottawa, Ontario, October 15, 2005).
33 Data on employment and participation in GDP were obtained by Marcela Osnaya. Other informa-
tion, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Sistema de Cuentas Nacio-
nales de México, Cuenta de Bienes y Servicios, http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol
/rutinas/apt.asp?t=cuna12&c=6614 (April 2008).
34 Sergio R. Márquez Berber, Alma Velia Ayala Garay, Rita Schwentesius Rindermann and Gustavo
Almaguer Vargas, “El maíz en México ante la apertura comercial,” Extensión al campo, no. 3, Uni-
versidad Autónoma de Chapingo (March 2007): 5-7.
35 Ibid.
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vested per hectare in Mexico, as opposed to 8.4 in the U.S. and 7.3 in Canada.
Per worker employed, the gap is even larger: in 2001 the net value of agricultural
production was US$3,758.90, while in the U.S. it was US$67,871.30 and in
Canada it was US$54,081.60.36
In Mexico discussion around GMOs has taken place in a context that is complete-
ly different from that of the United States. It has been linked to the effects of NAFTA
and the opening of the agricultural sector in general. Both are considered intrinsi-
cally linked to the loss of food sovereignty and the fate of the campesino sector.
Effects of NAFTA have varied according to sector. Since agricultural production
multiplied by 1.5 at the same time that workers’ pay dropped by 50 percent, sec-
tor-based data reveals large-scale impoverishment of the rural population, and the
concentration of income in the hands of a few.37 Producers of grains like rice,
beans, corn, sorghum and wheat were the primary victims of the market opening,
which endangered the survival of 2.3 million corn producers with parcels of land
smaller than five hectares.38 Since the commercial opening of the sector, initiat-
ed before NAFTA, the price of corn has dropped by a total of 48 percent.39 Despite
these adverse market conditions, surprisingly, corn production has been maintained,
and according to some studies, has even increased, since many small producers of
other displaced products have taken refuge in corn production to guarantee their
survival.
In terms of experience with agricultural biotechnology, it is important to know
that Mexico is currently not a large-scale generator, and thus not a commercial
producer, of transgenic seeds. It is true that small areas are planted with geneti-
cally modified soybeans and Bt cotton,40 since between 1995 and 1998 a number
of genetically modified tomato, cotton and soybean varieties were authorized.41 At
least 33 field tests have been conducted with a series of GM seeds, generally under
contract from multinational corporations. The country has an estimated medium-
level scientific capacity for a developing country, meaning that it has approximate-
ly 100 scientists specialized in GMOs distributed throughout a number of private
and public institutions, with a total community of 800 biotechnologists.
An important factor that makes Mexico’s situation different from that of the
United States is its great biodiversity. Mexico is a mega-diverse country, and
the original birthplace not only of corn but also of 80 other species. The protection
36 José Luis Calva, “Ajuste estructural y el TLCAN: efectos en la agricultura mexicana y reflexiones
sobre el ALCA,” El Cotidiano, vol. 19, no. 124 (2004): 17.
37 Víctor M. Quintana, “La insoportable falta de equidad en la agricultura,” La Jornada (May 14, 2005).
The author quotes the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA) report El ingreso rural y la producción agro-
pecuaria en México (1989-2002) based on INEGI data.
38 Ramón Vera Herrera, En defensa del maíz (y el futuro). Una autogestión invisible, Interhemispheric
Resource Center (2004), at www.americaspolicy.org.
39 Edit Antal, “Who Should Tell Me What to Eat?” Voices of Mexico, no. 68 (July-September 2004):
113-117.
40 GM soybeans have been planted since 1996, the same year as in the United States. A third of cot-
ton planted is GM cotton.
41 Runge and Ryan, Global Diffusion.
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of its biodiversity is not only an aim of national policies, but also international poli-
cies developed in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Mexico is the only
country in North America that has ratified the Cartagena Protocol, which estab-
lishes the international rules of the game for the conservation of the world’s bio-
logical diversity.42
Regulation
The National Committee for Agricultural Biosecurity (CNBA), the first body dedi-
cated to the evaluation of transgenics in Mexico, in collaboration with an inter-
national public research center, the International Center for the Improvement of
Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT), already expressed concern in 1995 over the poten-
tial negative effects that Bt corn imported from the U.S. could have on Mexico’s
rural areas and environment. Consequently, in 1998, planting transgenic corn was
prohibited in Mexico, and the expectation was that imported corn would be used
exclusively for consumption. From this initial radical position, the Mexican gov-
ernment’s attitude has changed, going through a period of lack of definition, to the
current active promotion of the introduction of GMOs under the conditions set out
in the Biosecurity Law. Without a doubt, these changes, added to the government’s
lack of transparency and consistency, sparked mistrust and encouraged doubts
regarding genetically modified organisms.
The crossing of biotechnological corn varieties and native corn varieties was
totally predictable, since non-segregated corn arrived in Mexico from the United
States in increasing amounts. Even in these conditions, despite constant insistence
by scientists and rural communities, the Mexican government has never made the
decision to request segregation or the introduction of labeling for corn from the Unit-
ed States.
In 2001, Nature magazine published an article about the discovery of trans-
genic DNA sequences in criollo corn varieties in the Mexican states of Puebla and
Oaxaca.43 This seriously compromised the Mexican government, clearly revealing
its inability to implement its own policy of prohibiting the planting of transgenic
corn. The case of the contamination of Mexico’s corn immediately became a glob-
al issue, and even the popular Newsweek magazine placed the issue on its cover.
It is interesting to observe that while the article in Nature, a recognized scientif-
ic magazine, referred to the phenomenon discovered as an “introgression,” the com-
munications media immediately interpreted it as a matter of contamination with
an obviously negative connotation.
42 Miguel Altieri, “The Myth of Coexistence: Why Transgenic Crops Are Not Compatible with Agroe-
cologically Based Systems of Production,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, vol. 25, no. 4
(2005): 361-371. The case of canola in Canada seems to be a good example for demonstrating that,
in the long run, it is not possible to cultivate both varieties in the same place.
43 David Quist and Ignacio Chapela, “Transgenic DNA Introgressed into Traditional Maize Landraces
in Oaxaca and Puebla,” Nature, vol. 414, no. 29 (November 2001).
REGULATING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS 143
It is important to point out that for now, scientists have not reached any con-
sensus, and there is insufficient empirical data for evaluating the effects of crossed
pollination or the concrete meaning of genetic flow. What is specifically unknown
is the degree of spreading and permanence of transgenes in the environment, pre-
cisely what was denounced in the Nature magazine. Under these conditions, it is
believed the most appropriate action is to assume there is a lack of information
and that decisions should be postponed until research provides the necessary data
for making them.
Since 2002, a national campaign has been underway in the defense of native,
locally selected corn, with the participation of 120 organizations, rural communi-
ties, NGOs, scientists and distinguished individuals. From this campaign, called
“Without corn, there’s no country,” a political slogan emerged, with the demand for
putting an end to corn imports, plus the payment of compensation to campesinos
who plant traditional corn, in acknowledgement of their efforts to conserve bio-
diversity.
By that time, after having dismantled production capacity based on a complex sys-
tem of subsidies, satisfying the first demand was no longer easy, as Mexico depend-
ed on an average of 7 million tons of imported corn, mostly for fodder. The second
demand was inspired by a suggestion from the Convention on Biological Diversity,
but Mexico had not, and has yet to translate this into concrete rules and estab-
lished policies.
The Mexican incident, interpreted as the contamination of Mexican corn, was
also added to the agenda of global networks organized against free trade.44 In
2002, the issue was denounced at international protest forums: the World Social
Forum in Porto Alegre against globalization, and the Food Summit in Rome, where
it was presented by the Vía Campesina international movement, a radical NGO
that demands food sovereignty and the rights of farmers to collect, save, select and
improve their corn.
Later, the Mexican government hesitated to state its opinion on the phenom-
enon and was ambiguous, going from denying the contamination to considering it
an irreversible fact of life. Meanwhile, international bodies such as the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), CIMMYT45 and the Consulting Group on Internatio-
nal Agricultural Research (CGIAR) initially attempted to avoid making a statement
on the issue, and later expressed support for the use of GMOs. Some government
agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fishing
and Food (Sagarpa), as well as multinational corporations, the Inter-sector Commi-
ssion on Biodiversity and Genetically Modified Organisms (CIBIOGEM), plus dis-
tinguished individuals from Mexico’s scientific community argued that one cannot
speak of contamination, but rather of a natural genetic flow. Even Nature maga-
zine published another article denying the discovery, and at the same time, refused
44 Represented by groups such as Greenpeace, ETC, GRAIN, Vía Campesina, etc.
45 The public position taken by the CIMMYT was very important, since it had the world’s largest public
bank of corn genes.
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to publish an article from the Mexican government agency, the National Institute
of Ecology (INE), criticizing the ideological content of the second article published.
By the year 2003, campesino communities, the radical environmental NGOs and
Mexican government agencies were clearly distanced from each other. The rural
communities, with support from scientists in opposition, began to speak of self-man-
agement. This implied taking steps in their own communities, such as introducing
a de facto moratorium on GMOs, which would mean the prohibition of introduc-
ing, planting or purchasing GMOs from government DICONSA stores.46 Disinformation
and confusion around the nature of GMOs have led campesino and indigenous groups,
such as UNOSJO of the Sierra de Juárez and many others, to decide to conduct their
own diagnostic assessment of the contamination of their corn.47
At another level, the government had to continue with its international com-
mitments. In the midst of the conflict, it was necessary to reach an agreement
with the United States and Canada regarding shipments of GM corn. Mexico agreed
to not request compensation when the corn received contained less than 5 per-
cent GMOs, or when the contamination was unintentional —which in practice
would probably mean it would never make such a request. In the opinion of GMO
opponents, this agreement failed to comply with the Cartagena Protocol, which
demanded including compensation for damages caused, and sparked a protest by
300 NGOS at the international level.
Parallel to these societal actions, the legislature passed the Law on the Biose-
curity of Genetically Modified Organisms (LBOGM) in December 2004, despite
the opposition of one major political party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD), and one small one, the Green Party of Mexico (PVEM).48 Beforehand, differ-
ent political parties made eight different proposals for the Law on Biosecurity, specif-
ically the National Action Party (PAN), the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the
PVEM and the PRD. The bill that ultimately passed was designed by the Mexican
Academy of Sciences (ACM) and discussed over a three-year period. This law defines
the faculties of theMinistries of the Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat),
Agriculture (Sagarpa) and Health (SS), on the basis of scientific evidence and case-
by-case risk assessment studies. The text of the law suggests using the precaution-
ary principle and establishing reasonable doubt in the absence of studies, and when
there is any doubt about risks to human health or to the environment. However,
it does not include mechanisms for implementation.
The law creates a system of permits for experimenting and doing business with
GMOs. It has met with mixed reactions by specialists both inside and outside of Mex-
ico. Many critics of the law agree that it promotes the biotechnology industry more
46 Vera Herrera, En defensa del maíz.
47 In a study of 138 communities in nine states, contamination was found in 33 of them, and even a
third type of GMO was found. Not only were herbicide-tolerant corn and Bt insecticide corn found,
but StarLink corn, which has not been authorized for human consumption in the United States,
was also detected.
48 Ley sobre Bioseguridad de Organismos Genéticamente Modificados (2005), http://www.senado.gob.mx/
sgsp/gaceta?sesion=2005/02/15/1&documento=25.
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than it protects biodiversity. In fact, this led to a formal protest by a group of 100
scientists, and prompted Greenpeace to refer to it as “the Monsanto Law”. There
has also been criticism of the origin of and even the process whereby the proposal
was discussed. As for the Mexican Academy of Sciences (ACM), its president has
denied his organization has a consensus and has accused proponents of the law of
manipulation.49
On the positive side, the law contains a series of new and important general
affirmations. For example, it recognizes that Mexico is the place of origin for 80
plants including corn, and this means that if they are lost in this country, they are
lost for the entire world. And, the fact that the law establishes mandatory label-
ing for non-processed agricultural foods and prohibits GMOs in protected zones is
an enormous step forward.
The law’s two most interesting points that clearly represent great progress are
the establishment of a specific system for corn and the possibility of opting to
become a transgenic-free zone. At the same time, these two points are not left in
a definitive form; they will be the subject of great battles in the future, because
the law does not establish procedures or clear conditions under which procedures
can be created. The law itself does not define special protection systems for corn
and other crops originating in Mexico and their concrete implementation is left
to secondary level regulations.
At least five Mexican states have proposed becoming GMO-free, specifically Oa-
xaca, Puebla, Chiapas, Tlaxcala and Michoacan. The interpretation of the law and
the design of secondary regulations regarding special protection systems and free
zones may in the future provide a tough test of the effectiveness of the recently-
passed law on biosecurity.50
Among the primary criticisms are the following:
• A single law cannot simultaneously promote a technology and establish mech-
anisms for biosecurity;
• The law provides for very little public participation;
• It does not establish mechanisms for implementing the precautionary principle;
• There are serious doubts as to the possibility of coexistence between GMOs and
traditional organisms, especially in the case of corn, given open pollination;
• The burden of proof rests with the industry, which can be both judge and jury;
• The law does not include mechanisms for avoiding conflicts of interest, for
example in the forming of CIBIOGEM, which is responsible for risk assessment;
• It does not respect the Cartagena Protocol because it fails to include compensa-
tion for damages caused and the establishment of funds for incidental expenses.
It is still early to gauge the implications of this law, which in the highly polar-
ized Mexican context was well received by government regulators, corporations and
49 Alejandro Nadal, “El senado de los pollos,” La Jornada, February 16, 2005.
50 Ibid.
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leading biotechnology scientists, and on the other hand, highly criticized by envi-
ronmental groups and opposing scientists. The Semarnat published regulations in
2008, more than three years after the law was passed, establishing the type of
information, risk assessments and monitoring mechanisms industries must sub-
mit.51 However, these regulations have still not resolved one of the most delicate
points: the special regime for the protection of maize. They were immediately
criticized by GMO opponents who believe it leaves risk control up to the indus-
tries, which they believe is a government responsibility.52
Actors
The main Mexican rural and indigenous organizations who demonstrated against
GMOs were not directly involved in drafting or passing the Law on Biosecurity. The
various campesino and indigenous organizations have incorporated a new element,
the rejection of GMOs through the defense of local corn, into their existing dis-
course based on their historic concerns. The National Indigenista Council declar-
ed that corn is a fundamental part of Mexican culture. Organizations of producers,
poor campesinos and large campesino federations formed an alliance known as El
Campo No Aguanta Más (“The Countryside Can’t Take Any More”), and they have
demanded the renegotiation of NAFTA’s chapter on agriculture and the exclusion
of corn and beans from the trade agreement, as well as food sovereignty, and the
revision of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. In forums related to the con-
gressional debates, three rural organizations were the most active: the National
Association of Agricultural Product Commercialization Companies (Asociación Na-
cional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productos del Campo, or ANEC), the National
Union of Autonomous Campesino Regional Organizations (Unión Nacional de Or-
ganizaciones Regionales CampesinasAutónomas, or UNORCA) and the Study Center for
Change in the Mexican Countryside (Centro de Estudios para el Cambio del Cam-
po Mexicano, or CECCAM). They pointed out the negative economic, ecological,
social and cultural effects of GMOs in the Mexican countryside.
In 2004 campesino and indigenous communities and environmental groups request-
ed an independent study by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC),
which would be the first international body to become directly involved in the issue
of transgenic corn in Mexico. Its intervention was especially significant since it is an
institution created by the NAFTA parallel agreements, and because it is financed by
public funds from the three countries. Great anticipation was generated around the
CEC recommendations for various reasons, including the following: it was the first
international study that was presumed independent and at the same time linked to
51 Reglamento de la Ley de Bioseguridad de Organismos Genéticamente Modificados, April 10, 2008,
http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5019199.
52 Nadal, “El senado de los pollos” and Greenpeace, Insuficiente reglamento de la ley de bioseguridad
(March 11, 2008), at http://imagenagropecuaria.com/articulos.php?id_sec=27&id_art=371.
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the three governments, and it represented a way to make the case of Mexico corn
known to the international public not necessarily opposed to GMOs.
In addition, the CEC investigation was the first formal study with a methodologi-
cal frame of reference that included not only scientific aspects but also economic,
social and cultural elements among GMO risk factors. This change in research
methodology was not merely a formal change, but went much farther, since it implied
a break with the philosophy adopted by U.S. regulators, as explained earlier, exclusive-
ly based on scientifically-founded arguments.53 Consequently, the CEC conclusions
included a series of topics that had not yet been legitimized as part of the problems
around GMO regulation. The following excerpts from the CEC recommendations to the
NorthAmerican governments clearly illustrate the types of risks that were considered
for the first time in relation to GMOs:
Because of its cultural, spiritual status in Mexico, campesinos in Mexico consider the
presence of any transgene in maize as unacceptable risk… and… a “contamina-
tion”….Risk assessment of transgenic maize inMexico is inextricably linked to the cen-
tral role of maize.
Finally, the CEC investigation recognizes that:
So far there is no evidence that introgression of today’s GM maize traits poses a signifi-
cant harm to health or the environment in Canada, Mexico and the U.S. However, this
has not been studied in the context of Mexican ecosystems.54
In summary, the CEC recommended the three governments maintain a mora-
torium on GM corn or postpone the decision until the necessary environmental
studies are conducted, establish educational programs and introduce labeling.
The fact that representatives from indigenous organizations were formally includ-
ed in discussions of the research documents was also an important step forward
in the democratization of the regulatory process.
In reality, few NGOs are involved in this issue —primarily Greenpeace-Mexico,
GEA and ETC, which carried out campaigns on GMOs— but the ones that do are
very active, radical, well-connected and well-informed. They have carried out con-
siderable work in publicizing the issue in the print media and radio,55 contrasting
with the inefficiency and lack of timely information on the part of government
agencies. The role played by environmental groups operating in Mexico and close-
ly linked with global networks opposing globalization and free trade has been a
53 This is also the primary reason that governments, mainly of the United States and Canada, have not
viewed the study positively and have publicly criticized it.
54 CEC, Maize and Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico (2004), at http://www.cec.
org/pubs_docs/documents/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=1647.
55 Especially noteworthy is the coverage provided by the left-leaning La Jornada newspaper as well as
Radio Educación programs and the CD produced by the Environmental Studies Group (GEA) enti-
tled Los transgénicos ¡hoy, hoy, hoy!
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determining factor in publicizing the issue of the contamination of Mexican corn,
not only in Mexico but around the world. The following quote illustrates the tone
of the protest by networks leading the movement against globalization and involv-
ed in international negotiations on the topic of GMOs:
The Mexican Government takes on the tragic historical role of having permitted the
destruction of a critical reason for food safety and having jeopardized the most precious
heritage of Mexico’s indigenous peoples and peasants.56
The part of the scientific-intellectual community in Mexico that opposes GMOs,
as expressed by one of its members, Víctor Toledo, maintains that GMOs are not
attractive to campesinos for a number of reasons: either they are unable to buy them,
or they do not need them since they were developed to attack specific problems in
large monocultures in other parts of the world, or they already have a series of
proven solutions to the problems (such as resistance to insects and tolerance to
herbicides) that are less expensive, more accessible and involve less or no risk at
all.57 This type of intellectual criticizes scientists who favor biotechnology above all
for ethical reasons, accusing them of being personally and institutionally inter-
ested in obtaining financing from corporations.
In their view, moving a gene from one organism to another, from one species
to another, is not a natural process and lacks the most basic elements of biosecu-
rity. Scientists who oppose GMOs propose following agro-ecology, an approach based
on a conception of science radically opposed to biotechnology, and interdiscipli-
nary research for rural modernization.
Dominant Discourses
1. The right to survival
In Mexico the transgenic corn debate does not revolve around the right demanded
by consumers to choose the food they eat or know what it is, nor around the benefits
promised by the production and planting of GMO seeds. Rather, it revolves basically
around the right of poor campesinos to continue to produce corn free from transgen-
ics, despite totally adverse conditions. This adversity is manifested in their lack of
access to expensive, sophisticated technology and their lack of competitiveness in a
market filled with cheap, imported corn. The attack on transgenic corn is an attempt
to resist, to take a defensive position, by a considerable social sector on which one-
fifth of Mexican society depends economically. Given the controversy over whether
the coexistence of GM and conventional seeds is possible in the long term —since
56 This quote is from the protest letter published with signatures from 300 organizations after the
agreement was reached accepting a 5-percent transgenic seed ceiling on corn exported from the
United States to Mexico.
57 Víctor M. Toledo, “Los biotecnólogos y el mito del científico objetivo,” La Jornada,April 6 and 7, 2005.
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experience appears to demonstrate that if not impossible, it will at least be extreme-
ly difficult to achieve— the struggle by the still-considerable campesino sector for its
survival has radical aspects.
The significance of corn in Mexico has deep historical roots. The book entitled
¡Vivan los tamales! La comida y la construcción de la identidad mexicana (Long Live
Tamales! Food and the Construction of Mexican Identity), by Jeffrey M. Pilcher
illustrates in great detail the enormous significance of corn—as opposed to wheat,
the food of the conquerors— throughout the country’s history in forming Mexico’s
identity.58 Consequently, in the popular imagination, the transgenic contamina-
tion of corn —even worse since it came from the powerful neighbor to the North—
represents a threat to survival, and to the very existence of Mexico’s campesinos
and indigenous people.
The problem of hunger, poverty and economic marginalization in Mexico, as in
any other part of the world, does not appear to be a matter that can be simply
resolved by technological means, but rather through income distribution depend-
ing on a set of highly complex social and political factors. At any rate, “to think
that a gene… or a molecule of nucleic acid will be able to resolve a problem as
complex as hunger in the world… is amazingly naive.”59
2. Defending diversity: the connection between biodiversity and cultural diversity
InMexico, the concepts of biological diversity and cultural or ethnic diversity are close-
ly linked. The conservation of biological diversity as a part of modern environmental
discourse is reflected in the preservation of the rural way of life led by ethnic groups.
One of the most important bridges between these two ideas is the anthropological
concept of traditional knowledge about nature, agriculture and the environment which
has been conceived of, legitimized and discussed in various international forums such as
the CBD.
Based on this connection between biological and cultural diversity, campesinos
use the implementation of recommendations from the Convention on Biological
Diversity for national policies in their opposition to GMOs. Campesinos demand mo-
ral and material recognition of their role (through their use of local, traditional
knowledge accumulated over many generations) in the conservation of biodiver-
sity. This is a specific interpretation by farmers who lack access to high technol-
ogy, with the aim of defending themselves from the expansion of GMOs that offer
them nothing. This interpretation is made not only by Mexican campesinos but
also by many other poor sectors around the world who make their voices heard
through networks against globalization. The logic of their interpretation can be explain-
ed as follows: while the effects of transgenic corn on biodiversity are unknown, the
traditional methods used by local campesinos and indigenous people have proven
to be effective over thousands of years. Therefore, these campesino and indige-
58 Jeffrey M. Pilcher, ¡Vivan los tamales! La comida y la construcción de la identidad mexicana (Mexico
City: Ediciones de la Reina Roja/CIESAS/Conaculta, 2001).
59 Ibid.
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nous communities demand compensation in exchange for the work they carry out
in environmental conservation.
The defense of diversity is also very attractive for intellectuals (rural sociologists,
biologists, agronomists, ecologists) including numerous scientists critical of GMOs.
They maintain that the right to choose which risk will be assumed corresponds to
local communities, which are the users of technologies, in the same way they rec-
ognize their right to choose their own lifestyle.
3. Sovereignty and control over food
In Mexico, food production and consumption represents a much greater part of the
economy than in industrialized countries, and topics like nutrition and food security
continue to be great challenges. Therefore, control over the production, distribution
and consumption of food continues to be an enormously sensitive political issue.
Those opposing GMOs should not be viewed as innate Luddites, but rather, as ration-
al people who fear that, in a context of already highly unequal income levels, new
technologies could aggravate the disparity even further.
In Mexico the rejection of any mechanism leading to a loss of control over food
can be a very popular argument, and even more so when control passes into the
hands of only a few foreign corporations, in this case five mega-companies.60 In
the opinion of GMO opponents, the acceptance of the Law on Biosecurity is the
legitimization of contamination and the introduction of corporations into the agri-
cultural sector market in Mexico.61
Conclusions
The case of GMO regulation provides various lessons for future cooperation among
NAFTA members. In addition to environmental cooperation through the CEC, com-
mercial cooperation through the North American Biotechnology Initiative and the
Security and Prosperity Partnership of NorthAmerica (SPP), the case study demon-
strates the need for further cooperation in science and technology and even offers
certain specific fields in which to do so.
Generally speaking, one can say that there has been some sort of trade-off in
terms of GMO experiences. Mexico could teach the U.S. that, if science is exclu-
sively at the service of economic interests, it is highly probable that it will not
serve the interests of humanity in the long run, and, for its part, the U.S. could
show Mexico how to acquire greater confidence in science and new technologies,
opening up channels for diverse interests to gain access to the decision-making
process, without trampling society’s fundamental rights.
60 The same companies that previously promoted the use of pesticides and currently control 70 per-
cent of agrochemicals.
61 Nadal, “El senado de los pollos.”
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The arguments made by various actors in both countries should be understood
as interpretations in line with their vision, discourses and concrete interests. We
have seen that the dominant and traditional discourses exerting influence in the
United States and in Mexico are different, and sometimes even contradictory. This
is the case of the concept of the free market and economic growth in the United
States, in contrast to food sovereignty and recognition of the value of both biologi-
cal and cultural diversity in Mexico. The degree of confidence in science, and even
more importantly, in the authorities who administer science, as well as access to new
technologies, constitute other issues that notably differentiate the two countries.
Of course, making advances in Mexico in the field of access to technology on
the one hand, and in the trust in regulators, on the other, requires a major effort
at national level. This does not mean, however, that there is no room for cooper-
ation and exchange between the two countries. The case of the CEC report, despite
being criticized by the three governments, has demonstrated the virtue of dialogue
and deliberation: to bring together all the parties, explain and listen to the each
other’s arguments.
With regard to specific issues of scientific cooperation, we know that no stud-
ies on gene flow from GMOs to wild varieties have been conducted in the context
of Mexico’s biosystems. Furthermore, the toxicological tests relative to human
health (presented in the United States by transgenic seed generators to get autho-
rization) are not valid in local Mexican conditions, since they do not correspond
to Mexicans’ essentially different diet.62 In the field of both health and environ-
mental risk assessment, U.S. public agencies have much more experience and
technology than their Mexican counterparts. Cooperation in science and technol-
ogy between the two countries could clear up the doubts as to what is definitively
known and not known regarding GMOs, since currently in Mexico there is a lot of
fear, partly due to uncertainty over the real risks and partly to the lack of specific
studies conducted in Mexico’s ecological and social context.
Another specific topic of desirable cooperation is the genetic identification and
possible segregation of GM seeds from conventional seeds. This could be a positive
measure that would not radically affect the interests of either country, but would,
nevertheless, require a great deal more cooperation. This does not remove the pos-
sibility of U.S. producers using sophisticated technology, or of offering an option
(organic, transgenic-free production) to poor campesinos in Mexico without access
to technology.
Scientific and technological cooperation in the aforementioned fields requires
the building of new channels, in addition to the SPP, which aims at defining the
issues of cooperation among the three NAFTA counties and which, in fact, includes
a series of biosecurity issues. It could be expanded to include Mexican society’s
specific concerns on biosecurity.
62 Sheldon Krimsky and Peter Shorett, eds., Rights and Liberties in the Biotech Age. Why We Need a
Genetic Bill of Rights (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 73.
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